What should the future look like for brain-based pain measurement in the law? This is the question tackled by our concluding three contributors: Diane Hoffmann, Henry (“Hank”) T. Greely, and Frank Pasquale. Professors Hoffmann and Greely are among the founders of the fields of health law and law & biosciences. Both discuss parallels to the development of DNA evidence in court and the need for similar standards, practices, and ethical frameworks in the brain imaging area. Professor Pasquale is an innovative younger scholar who brings great theoretical depth, as well as technological savvy, to these fields. Their perspectives on the use of brain imaging in legal settings, particularly for pain measurement, illuminate different facets of this issue.
This post describes their provocative contributions – which stake out different visions but also reinforce each other. The post also highlights the forthcoming conference-based book with Oxford University Press and introduces future directions for the use of the brain imaging of pain – in areas as diverse as the law of torture, the death penalty, drug policy, criminal law, and animal rights and suffering. Please read on!
As someone who has been greatly concerned about and devoted much of my scholarship to legal obstacles to the treatment of pain, I applaud Professor Pustilnik for increasing attention to the role of neuroimaging in our efforts to understand our experience of pain and how the law does or does not adequately take into account such experience. Pustilnik has written eloquently about this issue in several published articles but her efforts to bring together scientists, medical experts, legal academics, and judges (see also here) deserves high praise as a method for illuminating what we know and do not know about pain and the brain and to what extent brain imaging can serve as a diagnostic tool or an external validator of pain experience.
In this post, I discuss how DNA testing serves as a precedent for how to develop responsible uses of new technologies in law, including, potentially, brain imaging for pain detection. The ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of DNA research and testing were integral to developing national protocols and rules about DNA. Brain imaging of pain needs its own ELSI initiative, before zealous adoption outpaces both the technology and the thinking about the right guiding principles and limitations.
The idea of brain images serving as a “pain-o-meter” to prove or disprove pain in legal cases is clearly a premature use of this information and likely an over simplification of the mechanisms of pain expression. However, the potential for an objective diagnostic tool or indicator of the pain experience is something that lawyers representing clients in criminal, personal injury, workers comp or disability cases may find too attractive to resist and attempt to have admitted in the courtroom. This state of affairs brings to mind the ways in which lawyers have attempted to use genetic test results, initially obtained for medical purposes, in litigation. (Read on for more about ELSI in DNA and several national pain initiatives that could adopt the Human Genome Project and DNA ELSI model).
A potential difficulty, but also an opportunity, relating to using neuroimaging evidence in legal cases arises from the difficulty brain researchers have in separating emotional and physical pain. We know that pain and emotion are tightly linked. In fact, “emotion” is in the very definition of pain. The IASP definition of pain is: “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” Yet, the legal system deals with “physical” versus “psychiatric” versus “emotional” pain in different ways.
Chronic pain is associated with anxiety, depression, and stress. These factors can exacerbate the pain, and pain can exacerbate them. Pain’s sensory and emotional components connect in a “feed-forward” cycle. It may not be possible to entirely separate the sensory and emotional components of pain, biologically or experientially. But it might be necessary for the purposes of legal cases, as important areas of law create sharp distinctions between physical and emotional, or body and mind.
The prevalence of chronic pain is staggering. The Institute of Medicine reported in 2011 that 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain – more than those with heart disease, cancer and diabetes combined. The report also highlights that the annual costs for medical care, lost wages and productivity is more than $600B. These enormous personal and societal costs of chronic pain has driven an effort to “prove” if and how much pain an individual is suffering from for health care providers, insurance companies and legal actors. This is challenging because pain is a personal and subjective experience. Ideally, self report would be sufficient to establish the “ground truth” of the pain experience.
However, some are not able to provide self reports accurately, and the potential financial gain associated with claims of pain has tarnished the perceived authenticity of subjective reports. This has led some to develop brain imaging-based tests of pain – a so-called “painometer.” Yet, current technologies are simply not able to determine whether or not someone has chronic pain. Here, I consider specifically how we could develop a brain-imaging based painometer – and whether we would want to do so. As we ask: “Can we do it?,” we should always ask, “Is this the right thing to do?”
Last Christmas, I spent a somewhat panicky inter-semester break writing an amicus brief for King v. Burwell. I was worried that five Supreme Court justices were going to be too tempted by the plaintiffs’ legalistic interpretation of Obamacare’s text, despite ample evidence beyond the text that Congressnever intended to deprive citizens in 34 states of health insurance subsidies.
In a seminar I taught at Boston University, one of my students had proposed a legalistic version of the common sense point that Congress could not possibly have intended the plaintiffs’ result—a legalistic argument that could be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case but that the government could not make—and I decided to spend my break writing and submitting it. […]
It’s been our great pleasure to collaborate with the Health Affairs Blog on this series stemming from theThird Annual Health Law Year in P/Review symposium at Harvard Law School. This annual event takes a look back over the prior year and previews the year to come with regard to hot topics in health law.
After the symposium, we asked our speakers to keep the conversation going online by expanding on their topics from different angles or by honing in on particularly intriguing features. These pieces were published on the Health Affairs Blog through the spring and into summer.
We heard more from Kevin Outterson on how to promote innovation in the development of new antibiotics, from Rachel Sachs on whether the Food and Drug Administration’s proposal to regulate laboratory-developed tests will really stifle innovation, and from Claire Laporte on the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on bio-IP.
George Annas weighed in on the Ebola outbreak, which has already almost faded from public consciousness but offers important public health lessons, while Wendy Parmet and Andrew Sussman tackled important developments in tobacco control. […]
Increasingly, health systems are studying their own practices in order to improve the quality of care they deliver. But many organizations do not know whether the data they collect at the point of care constitutes research, and if so, whether it requires informed consent. Further, many investigators report that institutional review boards (IRBs) place unreasonable burdens on learning activities, impeding systematic inquiry that is needed to enhance care.
As a result, some commentators have argued that our human research participant protection regulatory framework needs a dramatic overhaul. Yet, it is not the regulations that must change.
Instead, IRBs should educate themselves about quality improvement and comparative effectiveness research, exempt studies that qualify for exemption, and provide waivers to informed consent, when that is appropriate. At the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) must clarify the regulations that have an impact on this type of research, create better guidance about how IRBs should regulate such research, including illustrative case studies to guide IRBs.
This article builds on, but goes well beyond, my prior work on the Facebook experiment in Wired (mostly a wonky regulatory explainer of the Common Rule and OHRP engagement guidance as applied to the Facebook-Cornell experiment, albeit with hints of things to come in later work) and Nature (a brief mostly-defense of the ethics of the experiment co-authored with 5 ethicists and signed by an additional 28, which was necessarily limited in breadth and depth by both space constraints and the need to achieve overlapping consensus).
Although I once again turn to the Facebook experiment as a case study (and also to new discussions of the OkCupid matching algorithm experiment and of 401(k) experiments), the new article aims at answering a much broader question than whether any particular experiment was legal or ethical. Continue reading →
Wellness programs have been enthusiastically embraced by employers seeking to promote health and hoping to control costs. On April 20, 2015, program proponents received long awaited news: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a proposed rule clarifying how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) would apply to wellness programs. Many large employers likely breathed a sigh of relief upon reading the rule, but the rule is not final and may reignite a longstanding debate over the appropriate use of wellness incentives.
Wellness programs have become common in the workplace. A 2014 Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that among large employers offering health benefits, just over half offered an opportunity to complete a health risk assessment (HRA), a questionnaire that is often a gateway for the provision of health risk information and other wellness program components (Exhibit 12.8 in the Kaiser survey). A similar fraction offered biometric screenings (Exhibit 12.1), such as tests for cholesterol or blood pressure, or measurement of body mass index. Some screening programs test for cotinine, which is associated with nicotine exposure.
Some wellness programs offer financial incentives such as premium adjustments or gift cards. The 2014 survey found that more than half of large employers using HRAs provide incentives for their completion, and more than a third of these incentives equaled or exceeded $500 (Exhibit 12.10). A federally commissioned report prepared by RAND suggests that incentives are effective in increasing HRA completion. […]
What role did geography, advertising, community, Navigators, and the controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) play in consumers’ decisions whether to purchase health insurance in the individual marketplaces? The percentage of potential exchange marketplace enrollees who actually made use of the marketplace to purchase insurance varied widely from state to state for 2014 and 2015.
As of February 22, 2015, for example, there were eight states with enrollment at 50 percent or greater and eight states with enrollment at 25 percent or lower. (Per the Kaiser Family Foundation, the top eight were Vermont, Florida, Maine, DC, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and North Carolina. The bottom eight were Colorado, Ohio, Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa).
It would be an interesting and challenging task to explain this variation empirically. Generating reliable statistical inferences from inter-state comparisons is notoriously difficult, and the variables at play here range from the easily measured (percent of population eligible for subsidies, navigator grant amounts, number of participating insurers, premiums) to the not-so-easily measured (enthusiasm for Obamacare, efficacy of state or federal outreach efforts, geography, education, availability and usefulness of charity care and emergency Medicaid, functionality of state exchange website, population health, availability of health services). […]
The Food and Drug Law Journal is pleased to announce a forthcoming symposium—Constitutional Challenges to the Regulation of Food, Drugs, Medical Devices, Cosmetics, and Tobacco Products—to be held at the Georgetown University Law Center (GULC) on Friday, October 30, 2015, and co-sponsored by the Food and Drug Law Institute and GULC’s O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law.
By now, we’ve all heard the commotion around Indiana’s new Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), although it appears that the public’s fickle attention has already moved on to other matters. Despite some headlines to the contrary, the law originally said nothing explicitly about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It focused exclusively on religious freedom, allowing the government to impose a substantial burden on “any exercise of religion” only if it is able to demonstrate that burdening the person in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
In line with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby, which held that corporations are persons capable of exercising religion, the Indiana law defines “person” to include individuals, organizations organized for religious purposes, and business entities that “may sue and be sued” and exercise “practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief held by: (i) an individual; or (ii) the individuals; who have control and substantial ownership of the entity, regardless of whether the entity is organized or operated for profit or nonprofit purposes.” […]
Last fall, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) finally took steps toward an action that it had been publicly considering for over four years: the regulation of laboratory-developed tests (LDTs). The FDA defines LDTs as tests which are “designed, manufactured, and used within a single laboratory.”
This definition encompasses a wide range of diagnostics, including complex multigene panels that are performed in just a single laboratory in the United States, and basic diagnostic tests like a complete blood count, which are performed in thousands of laboratories nationwide.
As long as a manufacturer does not make and sell a kit for use in other laboratories, its test can be provided as an LDT. Estimates suggest that tens of thousands of diagnostic tests, including the majority of genetic tests, are currently available as LDTs.
Yet at present, the FDA exercises essentially no regulatory authority over LDTs. As such, they can be performed without any of the safeguards that typically apply to other medical technologies, including pre-market review and adverse event reporting. This is not to say that these tests are entirely unregulated. […]
In a recent series of decisions, the Supreme Court has begun to express concern that some patents suppress innovation. And it has done so in a number of cases that turn on what used to be a sleepy backwater of the patent law: 35 U.S.C. § 101. This statute says, simply, that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, … may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title [i.e., the other requirements of the patent law].”
You might think that this language means that all you have to do is figure out whether an invention falls into one of the permitted categories. If it does, it’s something that can be patented (assuming you meet the other requirements — which are numerous). But no! Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has engrafted a whole new set of judge-made requirements onto this statute: you cannot get a patent on something that is a “law of nature,” a “product of nature,” or an “abstract idea.” And starting in 2010, the Court put real teeth into these doctrines. […]
The relationship between medicine and capital punishment has been a persistent feature of this past year in health law, both at the level of medical ethics and Supreme Court review.
Our story starts in Oklahoma, where the execution of Clayton Lockett was botched on April 28, 2014. National Institutes of Health (NIH) bioethicist Seema Shah described the events in question:
Oklahoma was administering a new execution protocol that used the drug midazolam, a sedative that is often used in combination with other anesthetic agents. Oklahoma had never used this drug in executions before; in fact, only a few states had experience with using the drug in lethal injection. Florida had previously used this drug in lethal injections, but with a dose five times higher than what was indicated in Oklahoma’s protocol. […]
Brittany Maynard’s highly publicized decision to end her life under Oregon’s Death With Dignity law has given a new face to the American right to die movement. It is that of a young, attractive, athletic newlywed, who would not have considered herself as having a stake in the movement until the day she learned a brain tumor was the cause of her severe headaches. She was terminally ill and faced a future of six months of increasing pain, debilitation, and severe seizures before dying.
A video of Maynard’s story produced by the non-profit advocacy organization Compassion and Choices has reached many millions of viewers. Extended coverage of her decision-making process by People Magazine resulted in record numbers of hits to the publication’s website. During her illness, Maynard moved from California to Oregon and on November 1, 2014 took barbiturates to end her life. In her memory, her husband and mother have become prominent activists in the effort to legalize physician aid-in-dying (PAD). […]
As of early February, the Open Payments database includes documentation of 4.45 million payments valued at nearly $3.7 billion made from medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers to 546,000 doctors and 1,360 teaching hospitals between August 2013 and December 2013. This included 1.7 million records (totaling $2.2 billion) without the names of physicians or teaching hospitals who received the payments.
These records were intentionally de-identified by CMS because the records had not been available for review and dispute for 45 days, or because the records were not matched by CMS to a single physician or teaching hospital due to missing or inconsistent information within the submitted records. Future reports will be published annually and will include data collections from a full 12 month period. […]
The sale of cigarettes and tobacco products at retailers with pharmacies has received considerable attention over the past year. The national debate reignited in February 2014, when CVS/pharmacy announced that we would quit the sale of cigarettes and tobacco products in our 7,800 pharmacies nationwide. In September 2014, we announced we were officially tobacco free — one month earlier than planned. This was met with kudos from the media, public health officials, and even the President of the United States.
But one question that did not receive anywhere near that level of attention was whether or not our actions would make a difference in the prevalence of smoking and, ultimately, in the public health.
Sometime in the next few months, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is expected to issue the so-called deeming regulations, which will open the door to the federal regulation of e-cigarettes. In considering whether to issue the regulations, which were first published for notice and comment rulemaking last April, the FDA faces a formidable challenge: it must decide whether and how to regulate in the midst of scientific uncertainty and limited statutory flexibility.
By subjecting e-cigarettes to its regulatory regime, the FDA risks retarding the growth of what may prove to be a powerful new tool for harm reduction. But by failing to act, the agency risks undermining decades of progress in tobacco control. In either case, the public health impact is apt to be significant.
Milstein East BC
Harvard Law School
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Religion and medicine have historically gone hand in hand, but increasingly have come into conflict in the U.S. as health care has become both more secular and more heavily regulated. Law has a dual role here, simultaneously generating conflict between religion and health care, for example through new coverage mandates or legally permissible medical interventions that violate religious norms, while also acting as a tool for religious accommodation and protection of conscience.
This conference, and anticipated edited volume, will aim to: (1) identify the various ways in which law intersects with religion and health care in the United States; (2) understand the role of law in creating or mediating conflict between religion and health care; and (3) explore potential legal solutions to allow religion and health care to simultaneously flourish in a culturally diverse nation.
Special sessions include:
Thursday, May 7, pre-conference session on the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision
Friday, May 8, Keynote: Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia School of Law – Religious Liberty, Health Care, and the Culture Wars
Saturday, May 9, Plenary Session: Adèle Keim, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, and Gregory Lipper, Americans United for Separation of Church and State – The Contraceptives Coverage Mandate Litigation