Co-blogged with University of Arizona Fellow, Jonathan Loe
Breathlessly, many news outlets reported yesterday that Kim Kardashian West was in trouble with the FDA for misleading social media advertising of the drug Diclegis. For example, the reliably hyperbolic Daily Mail led with “Kim Kardashian slammed by FDA.”
As followers of this blog may not know, Mrs. Kardashian West is pregnant with her second child. Following on the disappointing news that the soon-to-be sibling of baby “North West” will not be named South, the celebrity-for-celebrity’s-sake shared a post on Instagram (and Facebook, and linked to from Twitter, naturally). The post announced for the world that “OMG” her “#morningsickness” had benefited from a prescription of Diclegis—with “no increased risk to the baby.” The FDA issued a warning letter, because the social media post failed to communicate any risk information.
But is the FDA really concerned with people, however famous, commenting on their personal experiences with drugs?
Marco Rubio, Mike Huckabee, and other politicians continue to assert a common fallacy about abortion—because human life begins at conception, fetuses are persons, and abortion must be prohibited. Indeed, Huckabee and Rubio claim that the U.S. Constitution requires such a result.
But they are wrong. And not just because people disagree about the beginning of personhood. The flaw in the Rubio/Huckabee logic was pointed out more than 40 years ago, even before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade. In “A Defense of Abortion,” Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson correctly observed that even if we assume that personhood begins at conception, it does not follow that abortion must be banned before the fetus is viable. Indeed, as she wrote, a ban on abortion before fetal viability would be inconsistent with basic principles of law. Continue reading →
The slippery slope is an argument frequently invoked in the world of bioethics. It connotes the notion that a particular course of action will lead inevitably to undesirable and unintended consequences. Saying no to the original action, even if that act is moral in itself, may, in light of the slope that looms, be the ethical thing to do.
Slippery slope arguments have been especially pervasive in discussions of euthanasia, in which physicians actively end patients’ lives, and physician-assisted dying (or physician-assisted suicide), in which physicians supply medications to patients that enable them to end their own lives. The concern, fueled by the German experience with racially motivated euthanasia in the last century, has been that approving either of these procedures for a few individuals will inevitably lead to overuse and abuse. […]
Republican candidates convened last night for the first debates of the 2016 campaign. The presidential hopefuls disagreed on every topic they faced — immigration, health care, foreign policy, gay rights, the economy — all but one, that is. Their differences of opinion disappeared each time they were asked about the controversy over the recent release of an undercover video with Planned Parenthood. On the issue raised by that edited film clip, the candidates came together in a rare consensus.
All 17 — from Ted Cruz to Carly Fiorina — staunchly opposed research that uses tissue cells from aborted or miscarried fetuses. The candidates unanimously called for Congress to end its support of Planned Parenthood over its contribution to that research, with some like Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal joining party leaders who would force a government shutdown over that issue. This, after Senate Republicans earlier this week failed to clear a procedural vote to defund. […]
All grown up! TWIHL’s 21st episode-thanks for all the support! This week we discussed the FDA, tobacco regulation, and the 1st Amendment with Micah Berman, who is on the law and public health faculties at Ohio State. You can find many of Professor Berman’s fine publications here.
The Week in Health Law Podcast from Frank Pasquale and Nicolas Terry is a commuting-length discussion about some of the more thorny issues in Health Law & Policy.
Our blogger Michelle Goodwin has a piece up on Politico:
Republicans on Capitol Hill, and now GOP presidential candidates like Donald Trump and Jeb Bush, are jumping over each other to defund Planned Parenthood because it transfers fetal tissues to researchers at cost. But if Americans want the benefits of biotechnology—helpful surgeries, cosmetics, vaccines, Alzheimer’s treatment and pharmaceutical drugs—they and their elected representatives need to learn a few basic facts about how these social services and products are derived from human tissue research.
The latest assault on Planned Parenthood comes after graphic video clips were released over the past three weeks purporting to show the non-profit organization nefariously trading fetal body parts for profit. Despite a move by Senate Democrats to block the defunding bill on Monday, Sen. Ted Cruz and Donald Trump are joining together to try to shut down the government if Planned Parenthood gets federal money. Just yesterday, Jeb Bush railed against “the hard-to-fathom $500 million in federal funding that goes to Planned Parenthood—an organization that was callously participating in the unthinkable practice of selling fetal organs.” […]
Yale Law School and so many others in the medical-legal community mourn the sudden passing of our colleague and friend, Robert (“Bo”) Burt. As many readers of this blog know, Bo was an early pioneer in thinking about doctor-patient relationships and the hardest questions about the end of life. He worked for years on the Soros Project, Death in America, and authored numerous books, including In the Whirlwind: God and Humanity in Conflict (Harvard Univ. Press, 2012); Death is That Man Taking Names: Intersections of American Medicine, Law and Culture (Univ. of California Press and the Milbank Memorial Fund, 2002); and Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in Doctor-Patient Relations (Free Press, 1979). His YLS obituary is here. He will be sorely missed and always remembered.
Each month, members of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) review the peer-reviewed medical literature to identify interesting empirical studies, in-depth analyses, and thoughtful editorials on pharmaceutical law and policy.
Below are the papers identified from the month of July. The selections feature topics ranging from the change in industry relationships among members of academic institutional review boards over the past decade, to manufacturer delays in reporting serious and unexpected adverse events to the FDA, to the drug patenting in India. A full posting of abstracts/summaries of these articles may be found on our website.
The 21st Century Cures Act is a big deal; the House passed it handily, and we’re still waiting to see what the Senate does. A lot has been written about what it does in terms of changing FDA review processes, and a fair bit about the lovely increase in funding for NIH (see Rachel Sachs’ blog posts here, here, and here). These are tremendously important.
But another provision in the bill has been getting much less play: the way it changes HIPAA to enable large-scale research, which is also a big deal all by itself. Continue reading →
In his stunning Op-Ed in today’s Boston Globe, Steven Pinker seems to suggest that bioethicists come in only one flavor: conservative. I certainly don’t fit that bill. But there’s a lot I think he gets right in this critically important piece. Why not change the default rules: what if new scientific advances were welcome, unless we had strong reason to worry, rather than the other way around?
Take a look, this is really important.
Update, 8/6/15: Many people have voiced strong objections to Pinker’s piece, taking his admonition that “the primary moral goal for today’s bioethics” should be to “[g]et out of the way” as squarely directed at IRBs. His statement was definitely overbroad, but I didn’t take him to mean that we don’t need IRBs or human subjects protection at all. In fact, he explicitly acknowledges that “individuals must be protected from identifiable harms” and recognizes the importance of existing safeguards for subject safety and informed consent. Instead, I read his piece not just with human subjects research in mind, but all of science. At the most basic level, I think he is making a very reasonable call for us to be aware of the risks of overprotection, of trying to imagine everything that could ever go wrong, with blinders on to the consequences of what will happen if we sit still, worrying for too long.
On July 30, the White House announced the updated 2020 HIV/AIDS strategy. The admirable vision of the strategy is that “The United States will become a place where new HIV infections are rare, and when they do occur, every person, regardless of age, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, or socio-economic circumstance, will have unfettered access to high quality, life-extending care, free from stigma and discrimination.”
This said, the strategy reflects continuing concerns about the numbers of people who do not know their HIV status, who do not have access to effective treatment, and who do not take advantage of preventive strategies. Demographic groups especially at risk include men having sex with men, African American men and women, Latino men and women, people who inject drugs, youth age 13-24, people in the Southern United States, and transgender women. The strategy emphasizes care coordination, coordination between health care and other social services such as housing, treatment as prevention, and pre-exposure prophylaxis. Notable initiatives since the 2010 HIV/AIDS strategy include interagency efforts to address the intersection of HIV and violence against women, a DOJ and CDC collaboration to publish a comprehensive examination and best practices guide on the intersection between HIV and criminal laws, and demonstration projects funded through the HHS Minority AIDS Initiative Fund. Continue reading →
If you are familiar with about a thousand medical malpractice decisions and can’t think of an accident that might surprise you, read Stayton v. Delaware Health Corporation, — A.3d —- 2015 WL 3654325 (Del. 2015). Another reason for reading this new decision of the Delaware Supreme Court is that it has delivered an important precedent: the Court decided that the collateral source rule does not cover medical costs written off by Medicare. Continue reading →
What should the future look like for brain-based pain measurement in the law? This is the question tackled by our concluding three contributors: Diane Hoffmann, Henry (“Hank”) T. Greely, and Frank Pasquale. Professors Hoffmann and Greely are among the founders of the fields of health law and law & biosciences. Both discuss parallels to the development of DNA evidence in court and the need for similar standards, practices, and ethical frameworks in the brain imaging area. Professor Pasquale is an innovative younger scholar who brings great theoretical depth, as well as technological savvy, to these fields. Their perspectives on the use of brain imaging in legal settings, particularly for pain measurement, illuminate different facets of this issue.
This post describes their provocative contributions – which stake out different visions but also reinforce each other. The post also highlights the forthcoming conference-based book with Oxford University Press and introduces future directions for the use of the brain imaging of pain – in areas as diverse as the law of torture, the death penalty, drug policy, criminal law, and animal rights and suffering. Please read on!
The recent meeting at Harvard on neuroimaging, pain, and the law demonstrated powerfully that the offering of neuroimaging as evidence of pain, in court and in administrative hearings, is growing closer. The science for identifying a likely pattern of neuroimaging results strongly associated with the subjective sensation of pain keeps improving. Two companies (and here) recently were founded to provide electro-encephalography (EEG) evidence of the existence of pain. And at least one neuroscientist has been providing expert testimony that a particular neuroimaging signal detected using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is useful evidence of the existence of pain, as discussed recently in Nature.
If nothing more is done, neuroimaging evidence of pain will be offered, accepted, rejected, relied upon, and discounted in the normal, chaotic course of the law’s evolution. A “good” result, permitting appropriate use of some valid neuroimaging evidence and rejecting inappropriate use of other such evidence, might come about. Or it might not.
We can do better than this existing non-system. And the time to start planning a better approach is now. (Read on for more on how)
By Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law
Many thanks to Amanda for the opportunity to post as a guest in this symposium. I was thinking more about neuroethics half a decade ago, and my scholarly agenda has, since then, focused mainly on algorithms, automation, and health IT. But there is an important common thread: The unintended consequences of technology. With that in mind, I want to discuss a context where the measurement of pain (algometry?) might be further algorithmatized or systematized, and if so, who will be helped, who will be harmed, and what individual and social phenomena we may miss as we focus on new and compelling pictures.
Some hope that better pain measurement will make legal disability or damages determinations more scientific. Identifying a brain-based correlate for pain that otherwise lacks a clearly medically-determinable cause might help deserving claimants win recognition for their suffering as disabling. But the history of “rationalizing” disability and welfare determinations is not encouraging. Such steps have often been used to exclude individuals from entitlements, on flimsy grounds of widespread shirking. In other words, a push toward measurement is more often a cover for putting a suspect class through additional hurdles than it is toward finding and helping those viewed as deserving.
Of Disability, Malingering, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Disutility (read on for more)
As someone who has been greatly concerned about and devoted much of my scholarship to legal obstacles to the treatment of pain, I applaud Professor Pustilnik for increasing attention to the role of neuroimaging in our efforts to understand our experience of pain and how the law does or does not adequately take into account such experience. Pustilnik has written eloquently about this issue in several published articles but her efforts to bring together scientists, medical experts, legal academics, and judges (see also here) deserves high praise as a method for illuminating what we know and do not know about pain and the brain and to what extent brain imaging can serve as a diagnostic tool or an external validator of pain experience.
In this post, I discuss how DNA testing serves as a precedent for how to develop responsible uses of new technologies in law, including, potentially, brain imaging for pain detection. The ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of DNA research and testing were integral to developing national protocols and rules about DNA. Brain imaging of pain needs its own ELSI initiative, before zealous adoption outpaces both the technology and the thinking about the right guiding principles and limitations.
The idea of brain images serving as a “pain-o-meter” to prove or disprove pain in legal cases is clearly a premature use of this information and likely an over simplification of the mechanisms of pain expression. However, the potential for an objective diagnostic tool or indicator of the pain experience is something that lawyers representing clients in criminal, personal injury, workers comp or disability cases may find too attractive to resist and attempt to have admitted in the courtroom. This state of affairs brings to mind the ways in which lawyers have attempted to use genetic test results, initially obtained for medical purposes, in litigation. (Read on for more about ELSI in DNA and several national pain initiatives that could adopt the Human Genome Project and DNA ELSI model).
In “D.M.A. s/ declaración de incapacidad” decided early this month, the Supreme Court of Argentina upheld the right to decide about one´s own death (“muerte digna”). As I had explained in a previous comment written when the ruling of the case was pending, the case involved a patient, M.A.D., that had been in a permanent, irreversible, vegetative state for 20 years due to a car accident. His sisters requested the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.A.D alive in an artificial way. Although this was not the first time that the Court discussed the right to die, it was a different case in that there was not a patient’s written statement on whether it was appropriate for him to continue or not certain medical treatment to keep him alive.
The Argentine National Congress had already passed legislation stating that, whenever a patient is unable to give informed consent, her relatives can do so in her name. On that basis, following the opinion of the sisters of M.A.D., the Supreme Court ordered the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.D alive in an artificial way. Continue reading →
Earlier this month the Supreme Court of New South Wales ruled that an individual who experienced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as the result of an airplane crash could recover damages under the Montreal Convention. The case was important because many courts have previously ruled that PTSD, absent any other “bodily injury,” was not covered by the bodily injury provisions of the international agreement.
The case is illustrative of the way in which courts across the world continue to find a meaningful distinction between “physical” (or “bodily”) injury/pain and “mental” (or “emotional”) injury/pain. If you want an example closer to home, pull out your auto insurance policy and scan for the phrase “bodily injury.” Auto insurance cases sometimes include disagreement about whether mental injuries are considered bodily.
I’m on the record as saying this traditional physical/emotional distinction no longer holds up because substance dualism is no longer a viable theory. If neurons and glia cells are physical (and last I checked they were), then emotions and emotional pain must be physical too. But that doesn’t mean that the law has to treat all pain the same. Even if everything is physical, law may – for a variety of good reasons – choose to differentiate amongst them. For instance, do we want to understand assault (which is the infliction of “bodily injury”) to include the infliction of emotional pain? Maybe, but it’s not so cut and dry.
A potential difficulty, but also an opportunity, relating to using neuroimaging evidence in legal cases arises from the difficulty brain researchers have in separating emotional and physical pain. We know that pain and emotion are tightly linked. In fact, “emotion” is in the very definition of pain. The IASP definition of pain is: “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” Yet, the legal system deals with “physical” versus “psychiatric” versus “emotional” pain in different ways.
Chronic pain is associated with anxiety, depression, and stress. These factors can exacerbate the pain, and pain can exacerbate them. Pain’s sensory and emotional components connect in a “feed-forward” cycle. It may not be possible to entirely separate the sensory and emotional components of pain, biologically or experientially. But it might be necessary for the purposes of legal cases, as important areas of law create sharp distinctions between physical and emotional, or body and mind.