The issue of drug pricing has been thrust center stage (again) after Turing Pharmaceuticals raised the price of daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per dose. The public issued a loud outcry, the pharmaceutical industry condemned the move, and presidential candidates are now discussing drug prices (as discussed previously on this blog). The reactions were so swift and loud that Turing eventually backed down, indicating that they will lower the drug’s price, though it is unclear by how much.
The drug in question in this debate, daraprim, is a 62-year old drug used to treat toxoplasmosis, a parasite that is particularly dangerous in infants, AIDS patients, and cancer patients. The curiosity of this case in particular is that the usual host of development incentives implicated in driving up the cost of a drug (e.g., patents, market exclusivity) was not in play. The reason Turing was able to raise the cost of daraprim is because no other generic competitor for the drug is on the market to drive down the cost. This is largely a result of the small market for daraprim, which had 13,000 prescriptions filled for it last year. This begs the questions: specifically for disease areas where populations are small, will drug prices, even for generics, remain stubbornly high?
Georgia’s Court of Appeals recently categorized a clinic’s front-desk person’s failure to communicate a patient’s complaints to the doctors as ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. Wong v. Chappell, 773 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.App. 2015).
This categorization has four important implications:
First, it allows an aggrieved patient to file her suit and proceed to trial without obtaining expert testimony and a preliminary affidavit (or certificate of merit) from a qualified physician.
Second, it frees plaintiffs from the stringent limitations and repose rules that apply in medical malpractice actions. Continue reading →
On 18th December 2014, the CJEU rendered its’ much-anticipated decision in C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents (ISCC). Qualifying its’ earlier ruling in Brüstle v. Greenpeace (Brüstle) with regard to non-fertilised human ova stimulated by parthenogenesis, the Court held that in order to constitute a ‘human embryo’ – and thus to be unpatentable under the EU Biotechnology Directive – the stimulated ovum must have the “inherent capacity to develop into a human being”. This would allow patents on innovative parthenotes which had not been genetically modified to achieve totipotent capabilities. Hence the judgment establishes a crucial limitation of the broad interpretation of “human embryos” in Brüstle, where the CJEU held that parthenotes are covered by the term “human embryo” since they are “capable of commencing the process of development of a human being”. The ISCC decision is to be welcomed since it provides an ethically justifiable leeway for patenting and offers reasonable support to the commercial viability of European cell therapy research. Yet, ISCC’s impact still depends on national implementations and only applies to certain hESC cells. Thus, further clarifications would be helpful concerning other non-totipotent hESCs.
I am pleased to announce two new publications on (1) “European patent strategies under the UPCA” and (2) “Synthetic Biology & Intellectual Property Rights”:
1) Minssen, T & Lundqvist, B 2014, ‘The ”opt out” and “opt-in” provisions in the Unified Patent Court Agreement – Impact and strategies for European patent portfolios‘ , published in N I R (Nordic IP Review), vol 2014, nr. 4, s. 340-357.
Abstract: Many questions concerning the UPC’s jurisdiction during the transitional period for European Patents under Article 83 UPCA remain unsolved. Focusing on the “opt in” and “opt out” choices under Article 83 (3) & (4), this paper discusses the legal nature and prerequisites of these provisions, as well as the options and strategic choices that patent proprietors and applicants are facing. Considering the pros and cons of the emerging unitary system in light of a persisting uncertainty of how to interpret relevant stipulations, it is emphasized that there will be no clear-cut solutions. Rather the suitability of each approach will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all circumstances surrounding an invention, its patent-claims and the underlying business strategy. Recognizing that the worst thing to do is to do nothing at all, we conclude with a summary and some general remarks.
In Part II of this blog on legal issues relating to the revival of phage therapy I discussed the US Supreme Court’s decisions in Myriad and Prometheus, which might present major obstacles to the patentability of phage-related technology (a more detailed analysis of the Myriad and Prometheus decisions is available here).
Yet, all is not lost. As indicated in Part II, Myriad does not directly affect the patentability of synthetically modified biological compounds and Prometheus would still allow patents on inventive applications of natural processes and correlations that add new features to “natural laws”. Thus there still seems to be considerable leeway for patenting within the area of page therapy.
One example, mentioned in a recent Nature article, could be the skillful selection and precise combination of different phages in order to attack one specific type of bacteria. Such selections, however, would face a tough battle to overcome the “additional features that add significantly more” and “not identical” thresholds set by Prometheus and Myriad. Another example with even better prospects for patentability relates to genetically modified phages that are – due to human intervention – enabled to target only specific bacteria. This technology was recently presented by MIT researchers at the 2014 American Society for Microbiology Meeting. The researchers led by Timothy Lu had genetically engineered phages that use a DNA-editing system called CRISPR to target and kill only antibiotic-resistant bacteria while leaving other susceptible cells untouched. The significant engineering and alteration of natural products and processes involved in such inventions would most likely meet both the Myriad and Prometheus standards.
Yet, while the USPTO has recently issued new patent eligibility guidance and the CAFC has begun to directly apply Prometheus and Myriad to reject patent claims in biotech cases (e.g. In re Roslin), many questions remain unsolved. In particular, it is still not sufficiently clear exactly how much modification is required to render a molecule or method sufficiently distinct from naturally occurring product and processes. And even if the patent-eligibility threshold could be met in extraordinarily circumstances, the claimed invention would still have to fulfil other patentability requirements such as novelty, non-obviousness and the written description-requirements. The threshold for these requirements, however, have been heightened in recent years (see e.g. KSR v. Teleflex (2007) , Nautilus (2014) etc.). Considering that phage therapy is almost a century old with a substantial common general knowledge and a state of the art employing routine methods, these crucial requirements might still prevent the patentability of many useful applications.
Please find attached a ppt presentation on “New regulatory pathways and incentives for sustainable antibiotics: Recent European & US Initiatives” given on March 7, 2014 at the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard. The presentation was followed by a discussion moderated by US patent attorney Melissa Hunter-Ensor, Partner at Saul Ewing, Boston.
I started out by emphasizing increasing problems of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) on a global level, providing new statistics and facts. This was followed by a discussion of main reasons for these alarming developments, such as inappropriate use in agriculture and medicine, insufficient precautions, lack of education, climate change, travel behavior, insufficient collaboration and funding of R&D, scientific complexities, and the problem that incentives provided by the traditional innovation system model often fail in the case of antibiotics.
Next the presentation focused on a variety of solution models that could be discussed to fight AMR. These include both conservational and preventive approaches comprising use limitations, increased public awareness, and better hygiene, but also reactive push & pull strategies, such as increased investments, new collaborative models for R&D in antibiotics, prizes, “sui generis” IP-related incentives, regulatory responses and new pathways for approval.
Ruth Grant is a Professor of Political Science at Duke University and a Senior Fellow at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, specializing in political theory and political ethics. Her most recent book, Strings Attached: Untangling the Ethics of Incentives, examines moral concerns raised by the pervasive use of incentives to shape behavior. Her seminar talk will propose an ethical framework for thinking about the promises and limits of incentives, including the use of incentives in public health.
No, I mean it: this is a question to Bill of Health readers who know about the law on this topic.
This week, a colleague handed me a palm card she’d been given at a subway station here in Philadelphia. “Cash for diabetic test strips” it read. Comparing prices on the company’s website with prices on Wal-Mart’s pharmacy page, it looked like the test-strip buyer pays about 20 cents on the dollar for “pre-owned” test strips.
The palm card and the website both stipulate that the strips be unexpired and in their original, unopened, factory-sealed boxes.
So, one asks, are there enough people out there who buy more diabetic test strips than they need, and are willing to take an 80% loss to ensure they are used by someone else? That seems unlikely.
Yesterday, Boston public radio station WBUR interviewed a Massachusetts primary care physician who refuses to admit new obese patients. She claims that it’s because she lacks proper equipment, but she seems to have mixed motives. Earlier she had admitted that it’s rather because she feels that if they don’t lose the weight, “I’m paying the cost of other people’s choices.” I bet if she lacked the equipment for wheelchair-bound patients, she would go buy it.
In an upcoming post (09/07: update here), Holly Fernandez Lynch, who, along with Glenn Cohen, gets kudus for kicking off this blog, will explain whether it’s legal for doctors to reject obese patients. But before rejecting them becomes the next trend, is it right?
A whopping 35.7% of Americans are obese, and the trend continues upwards. Obesity increases risk for heart disease, stroke, type II diabetes, and various cancers. It costs the system a fortune. We must tackle this problem head on. But conditioning physician access on weight loss is not the way. Continue reading →