After the NFIB decision in June, Maine tried to expand Justice Roberts’ remedy to also make the “maintenance of effort” provision optional for states. Maine was unsuccessful in the First Circuit with the argument, for procedural reasons. Prior coverage here.
The Obama Administration is sticking to the letter of the law, and announced Tuesday that it is refusing to allow cuts for Medicaid beneficiaries at or below 133% (138% after the 5% income disregard) of FPL in Maine.
Maine has not yet announced whether it will take the case back to the First Circuit. With Huberfeld & Leonard, we’ve argued at length (see esp. pp. 75-83) that Maine does not have the winning argument, in an article to be published in the BU Law Review later this month. SSRN version here. The short version is that MOE is a common tool to lock-in states during transition to a new program, was discussed in the briefing, but was not part of the coercion analysis in Justice Roberts’ plurality. The key provision was 42 USC 1396c, the Secretary’s authority to reduce some or all of the funding to non-compliant states. But we will see if Maine wants to argue the substance of this point at the First Circuit.
By Nicole Huberfeld
You may be thinking “DOMA? Hello, this is HEALTH LAW.” Please stick with me for a moment. The Supreme Court appears to be collecting petitions for certiorari regarding the Defense of Marriage Act, likely to determine which circuit’s decision is the best vehicle for considering the constitutionality of this federal law. One such petition results from the First Circuit’s decision in Massachusetts v. Department of Health and Human Services/Hara v. Office of Personnel Management, which held that section 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that promoting marriage is not rationally related to denying federal benefits to same-sex couples, thereby avoiding the creation of a new category of suspect class. The twist is that the state of Massachusetts also claims that section 3 of DOMA, which denies federal economic benefits to same-sex couples, exceeds Congress’s Spending Clause authority and infringes the state’s 10th Amendment rights. While the First Circuit did not agree with the state on these points, it did incorporate federalism concerns into its Equal Protection Clause analysis by noting that states traditionally have defined marriage, therefore the federal government cannot protect the state of Massachusetts from its own definition of marriage by promoting heterosexual marriage. Continue reading
By Leslie P. Francis
A recent Utah Court of Appeals decision is very much worth calling to the attention of those interested in access to health care and in disability rights. As financial pressures on Medicaid increase, and as Medicaid plays a increasingly important role in health reform, states are likely to consider ways of restricting services in order to manage costs. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), has long stood for the assumption that cutbacks in Medicaid funding are very difficult to challenge as disability discrimination. In the near future, it will be critical for advocates on behalf of people with disabilities both to challenge this assumption and to consider other ways of arguing that funding cutbacks under the Medicaid program are legally problematic.
Conley v. Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, 2012 Ut. App. 274 (Sept. 27, 2012), is a challenge to the denial of benefits for “speech augmentative communication devices (SACDs)” for non-pregnant Medicaid recipients over the age of 21. These are electronic speech aids used by people with conditions such as cerebral palsy who cannot make themselves heard due to motor difficulties. The ALJ hearing the case had concluded that it was reasonable for the Utah Medicaid Program to provide these devices to persons under the age of 21 and to pregnant women, but not to others qualifying for Medicaid. The ALJ’s reasoning was that federal regulations and case law allow state Medicaid to use a “utilization control procedure” in deciding what benefits to provide. Continue reading
By Nicole Huberfeld
The Pacific Legal Foundation seems unable to face its defeat before the Court in June. The PLF has filed a motion seeking leave to amend a complaint on behalf of a small business owner who would have the ACA declared unconstitutional based on the theory that the law was introduced in the Senate, not the House. Article I section 7 of the Constitution commands that “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House….” This plaintiff, Matt Sissel, originally filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the ACA as exceeding Congress’s commerce power; but, because the Court decided that the ACA is constitutional as an exercise of tax authority in part because it raises revenue, the plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint rather than allow it to be dismissed based on the decision in NFIB v. Sebelius.
It seems ironic that this novel filing made news the same day that the Census Bureau reported that the number and the percentage of uninsured Americans dropped for the first time since 2007. The drop is largely attributed to young adults being permitted to stay on their parents’ insurance policies under new ACA requirements. While the drop is movement in the right direction, it is hardly a victory given that nearly one in six Americans still lack health insurance coverage and the percentage of Americans on Medicaid has increased due to the ongoing effects of the Great Recession. Nevertheless, it is a small taste of the positive outcomes that the ACA may produce if the federal government could stop defending the law and instead focus on implementing it.
Though it seems unlikely that lower federal courts will be interested in the obscure constitutional provision PLF relies on, as I have said before, the administration needs to learn from the nonchalance with which it initally treated challenges to the ACA. The novelty or obscurity of the challenger’s theory does not correllate to failure with the Roberts Court, which has proven itself willing to accept new legal theories and willing to ignore or modify precedent.
[cross-posted from HealthLawProf Blog]