BraceLand

I recently received a note from a college friend, currently serving as a Captain in the Marines. He’s stationed in Afghanistan, and like most service people in war zones, he doesn’t exactly have tons of time to post status updates on Facebook or check in via email on a regular basis. So to keep in touch, he’s sent around a 28-page missive, complete with lots of photos, detailing his experience so far. (I, being the techno-illiterate that I am, couldn’t figure out how to get the pictures out of the word doc into my post or else I would have shared those too).

I found it utterly fascinating, especially with Dexter Filkins’ Forever War still rolling around in my head. Ironically, he’s had pretty good internet access lately so I’ve been emailing with him and he’s agreed to let me re-post some of his thoughts here, on condition that I don’t identify him or give away any identifying information.

Of the 28 pages, the parts I found most interesting were his personal thoughts on the war effort at large:

Afghanistan is a new arena for the preponderance of the Marines deployed with the MEB. There are an extraordinarily high number of combat veterans in our ranks who bring with them valuable experience, mostly from Iraq. It is apparent that, as a military force, we have greatly improved our ability to engage in counterinsurgency operations. The men and the leadership have a much better awareness now than they did in 2001 in Afghanistan or in Iraq in 2003 of the importance of having an understanding of the culture, language, history, and politics of the region. We have acknowledged and, for the most part, taken to heart the moral and practical imperative of protecting, and not alienating, the population as we work to route the enemy from the country and bring political and economic stability to this land and its people.

I am convinced that our work and presence here is important, for reasons ranging from fulfilling our obligations to the Afghan people after having abandoned them in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and providing access to oil and gas reserves in Central Asia to ridding the country of religious extremists bent on exporting violence and protecting nuclear-armed Pakistan from Taliban take over. I am, however, uncertain of our overall objectives. The ones that have been stated are vague at best. What the US military and government hope to achieve here should be articulated in precise terms and we should be honest with our servicemen and women – with all of our citizens, in fact – about what the cost of our commitment and the duration of our stay here is likely to be.

The Marines here are happy and proud to serve. Most, if asked, would tell you that they feel indebted to our Nation and that they view their service as an obligation, a view they probably wish more people shared. They would also tell you that they are pleased to be out of Iraq and glad to be in a different environment with novel sights, new people, and the presence of a formidable foe willing to engage in more traditional forms of combat. What the Marines ask is that their guidance and orders be clear and consistent, their support on the home front be unwavering, and their time here – some of the best years of their lives – be spent in a worthwhile fashion. They desire to contribute to our efforts here in a significant, rational manner.

The thought that is sometimes expressed, usually in hushed tones and in private quarters, is that we have a solid understanding of what we should be doing on the tactical level, but our operational and strategic objectives have not been clearly outlined. The MEB is not doing anything disastrous, but we do not seem to be gaining any real traction either. Maybe it is too soon to expect significant forward movement. I also realize that at our relatively low level, we junior officers do not see everything that our senior leadership does and we are not privy to conversations between the general and his staff. I hope that the reasons behind what we are seeing – or not seeing – are that the force is new to the environment and, as such, is taking its time, developing an understanding of the region and working to ensure that a solid foundation has been laid before endeavoring to spread its influence and engage in more distributed, aggressive operations.

Another criticism is that the organization dedicates an inordinate amount of time, money, equipment, and personnel to tackling symptoms of problems when they could be focusing their efforts on the major, underlying issues. The counter IED fight is an example of this. In our efforts at defeating these devices and keeping our personnel safe as they travel, we sometimes loose sight of the basic questions at the root of matters: why are we seeing these devices and what can we do to alter the environment in such a way as to make them disappear?

I also really enjoyed his descriptions of the relationship between the Marines and other NATO forces:

I dined at the British mess hall where some fried potato product was served at every meal and curry was a staple. The food was actually quite good and it was entertaining to watch the mix of people, English, Irish, Scottish, Dutch, and Estonian, who wandered in and out of the facility. The British were friendly, the Dutch all seemed to speak surprisingly good English, and the Gurkas were always willing to barter for some US uniform item — one day, I even saw them exchange their signature knives for pairs of Oakley ballistic sunglasses. The British were fond of – and allowed to – wear shorts. The Danes wore very short shorts.

I was amused to discover that the British soldiers, like their American counterparts, have an affinity for port-a-john graffiti. On the British part of the camp, the Army vs. Marine Corps bathroom scrawl that characterized the walls of private places in Baghdad, Al Asad, and Fallujah was replaced by banter aimed at disparaging the US and Britain. There were plenty of comments about the 4^th of July and the perceived need for the US to bailout the UK in Helmand, as well as the occasional mention of the fact that our current allies managed to torch the White House and much of DC during the early part of the nineteenth century. It was also refreshing to see that, despite our difference and competition, the young British and American servicemen were able to find some common ground: their antipathy for the French. These feelings were made manifest shortly after the arrival of a small, French airborne contingent. After a while, more and more entries along the lines of “Q: What’s worse than a US Marine? A: A French Para” and “Why don’t you try to defend Paris for once?” started to appear and fewer anti-US or British remarks were made.

I guess I don’t really have much to add. We at home have been focused so much on the health care debate that not much attention has been paid to Afghanistan. (It seems like there’s always something to divert our attention from that country doesn’t it?) My own feelings about our renewed commitment to the military campaign there are ambivalent. I’m not sure there’s much we can do, and I’m not sure anymore what the purpose is. Is it to prevent the creation of a safe haven for terrorists plotting attacks against us? Well, aren’t they already doing that in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? Is it to fulfill a commitment to a population that we’ve abandoned in the past? If so, I’m not sure a military incursion is the best solution to that problem. On the other hand, I have some sense that we have an obligation to at least give the mission a fair shot. It got shortchanged once we decided to engage in the folly that was Iraq. Who knows what could have been if due attention was paid to Afghanistan in 2002 onwards? It’s probably too late to try and turn back the clock and make up for lost time, but I guess I feel like we can’t really pull out until we’ve done what we can.

In any event, I hope he knows that I’m (we’re) praying that he makes it home safe, so we can keep up with him on Facebook like normal people are supposed to do.