You are viewing a read-only archive of the Blogs.Harvard network. Learn more.

Spin on Audible Magic

That’s not really filtering on a decentralized P2P system.  That’s a decentralized P2P system that requires each user to access a centralized point of control in order to be on the network.  Can such a network protect users’ anonymity and be robust to targeted attacks in ways necessary to enable legitimate uses and speech?  Not like Freenet can.  No matter how many times the RIAA says that this would simply be KaZaA without the infringing files, with no other consequences, that doesn’t make it the truth.


Update: Ernest makes a fair point, but I think it’s a little too simplified.  Yes, there are elements of centralization in the commercial systems, but that doesn’t mean their “nature” wouldn’t be changed at all.  Audible Magic adds centralization that directly affects how files can be distributed.  For instance, if someone DoSs the GAIN servers, nothing changes about the way you can share files on KaZaA – if anything, it might go faster because GAIN might stop feeding you ads.  However, if Audible Magic is processing files slower because of a technical attack or just your everday server slowdown, that will affect your legitimate uses.


Also, as Ernest does note, the “nature” of systems would certainly be changed for fully decentralized systems, like Freenet or non-Streamcast (and some other commercial vendors’) versions of Gnutella.  And that was precisely my point: when Audible Magic or the RIAA claim that this filtering can happen in a truly decentralized environment, they are wrong.  This requires centralized control that will do more than simply rid the system of infringing files, and to force all P2P providers to include this filtering would limit the types of designs.