<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: The SEC: Gatekeeper of Shareholder Rights?</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/10/12/the-sec-gatekeeper-of-shareholder-state-law-rights/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/10/12/the-sec-gatekeeper-of-shareholder-state-law-rights/</link>
	<description>Sponsored by the HLS Corporate Governance Program</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2009 04:03:01 -0500</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: James McRitchie</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/10/12/the-sec-gatekeeper-of-shareholder-state-law-rights/comment-page-1/#comment-5238</link>
		<dc:creator>James McRitchie</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 2007 21:48:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/10/12/the-sec-gatekeeper-of-shareholder-sta#comment-5238</guid>
		<description>Excellent points. An editorial in The Economist (In praise of corporate democracy, 10/2/07, http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9895518) also was a fine rebuttal of Stout&#039;s weak arguments. 

The Economist points to Stout&#039;s questionable reasoning when she argues that by “giving activists even greater leverage over boards, the SEC&#039;s proposed proxy access rule will undermine American corporations&#039; ability to do exactly what investors, and the larger society, want them to do.” Why would shareholders get less of what they want if they have more power to decide who runs their firm? 

The editorial then continues to turn Stout&#039;s argument on its head. 
&quot;Ms Stout seems to fear the tyranny of the minority, in which activists (whether from hedge funds or union pension-funds) force management to act against majority interest. But the usual problem in democracy is the tyranny of the majority, and it is hard to imagine that this would not be the case with more corporate democracy. And if it is, the oppression of minority views, such as those of activists, would surely be exactly what Ms Stout wants.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Excellent points. An editorial in The Economist (In praise of corporate democracy, 10/2/07, <a href="http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9895518)" rel="nofollow">http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9895518)</a> also was a fine rebuttal of Stout&#8217;s weak arguments. </p>
<p>The Economist points to Stout&#8217;s questionable reasoning when she argues that by “giving activists even greater leverage over boards, the SEC&#8217;s proposed proxy access rule will undermine American corporations&#8217; ability to do exactly what investors, and the larger society, want them to do.” Why would shareholders get less of what they want if they have more power to decide who runs their firm? </p>
<p>The editorial then continues to turn Stout&#8217;s argument on its head.<br />
&#8220;Ms Stout seems to fear the tyranny of the minority, in which activists (whether from hedge funds or union pension-funds) force management to act against majority interest. But the usual problem in democracy is the tyranny of the majority, and it is hard to imagine that this would not be the case with more corporate democracy. And if it is, the oppression of minority views, such as those of activists, would surely be exactly what Ms Stout wants.&#8221;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
