Stakeholder Governance and the Eclipse of Shareholder Primacy

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and Kevin S. Schwartz.

For decades, advocates of “shareholder primacy” as the North Star of corporate governance have steered our leading corporations and our Nation’s economic engine perilously off-course. Since the 1970s, when the work of Milton Friedman, Michael Jensen, and Frank Easterbrook took hold in business schools, activists and raiders in high-profile proxy fights and hostile takeovers on Wall Street have wrapped their arms around the shareholder-primacy narrative to advance their own short-termist objectives. Far from shared scholarly interest, their objective was plain: To justify cutting off directors’ reasoned judgment, in favor of maximizing short-term shareholder value, notwithstanding the attendant harm to the health of our corporate and economic landscape and even our national security. To be sure, some in academia and in the corporate world fought back, in favor of responsible corporate stewardship in pursuit of long-term sustainable value, by advocating consideration of other stakeholders who make essential contributions to the creation of sustainable value. And the 2008 financial crisis alerted others to the dangers of the shareholder-primacy paradigm. But until recently, shareholder primacy remained stubbornly ascendant, largely crowding out other voices. Even the Business Roundtable, which officially adopted shareholder primacy in 1997, did not recognize its existential threat to society and abandon it for stakeholder corporate governance until 2019.

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The Shareholder Franchise, Transformative Investor Changes, and Motivational Misalignments

Henry T. C. Hu is the Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance at the University of Texas Law School, and Lawrence A. Hamermesh is an Emeritus Professor at Widener University Delaware Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” In the generation since Chancellor William Allen’s soaring rhetoric in Blasius, the “transcending significance” of the franchise has become corporate governance catechism. His hope, if not expectation, was that the rise of the institutional investor would help the franchise transition from an “unimportant formalism” to an importance of source of discipline.

This catechism has motivational alignment as its foundational premise: a shareholder’s economic ownership will generally motivate her to use the associated voting rights to promote share value. Implicitly, the premise assumes that the voting rights and the economic rights of share ownership are inextricably linked—i.e., are “coupled.” Transformative institutional investor changes are increasingly undermining the premise, animated in large part by an accelerating, but insufficiently recognized, severing of that link—“decoupling.”

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SEC and NAM appeal decision holding proxy advisor rule amendments unlawful

Cydney Posner is Special Counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

You probably remember the saga about the SEC’s rules regarding proxy advisory firms? Back in 2019, the SEC issued interpretive guidance that proxy advisory firms’ vote recommendations were, in the view of the SEC, “solicitations” under the proxy rules and subject to the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 14a-9.  (See this PubCo post.) That guidance led ISS to sue the SEC and then-SEC Chair Jay Clayton. SEC rules codifying that interpretation were adopted in 2020.  ISS amended its complaint, contending that the interpretation in the release and the subsequent rules were unlawful for a number of reasons, including that the SEC’s determination that providing proxy advice is a “solicitation” was contrary to law, that the SEC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and that the views expressed in the release were arbitrary and capricious. The National Association of Manufacturers, which favored the 2020 amendments, intervened on the side of the SEC (and also became a defendant).  Over four years later, in February 2024, the DC District Court held that the SEC’s rules regarding proxy advisory firms were invalid, stating that the “SEC acted contrary to law and in excess of statutory authority when it amended the proxy rules’ definition of ‘solicit’ and ‘solicitation’ to include proxy voting advice for a fee.” (See this PubCo post.) Now, both NAM and the SEC have filed notices of appeal with the DC Circuit.

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M&A Developments: Hedge Fund Activism

Igor KirmanVictor Goldfeld, and Elina Tetelbaum are Partners at Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Kirman, Mr. Goldfeld, Ms. Tetelbaum, Zach Podolsky, Ryan McLeod and Noah Yavitz.

Hedge Fund Activism

a. The Activism Landscape

Recent years have consistently seen elevated levels of activity by activist hedge funds, both in the U.S. and abroad. Such funds often seek the adoption of corporate policies that would increase short-term stock prices, such as increasing share buybacks, selling or spinning off one or more businesses of a company or selling the entire company. There has been a resurgence of activism activity after the temporary drop during the Covid-19 pandemic; 2023 saw a 9% increase in global activism campaigns compared to 2022, which itself saw a 38% year-on-year increase in the number of campaigns launched in 2021. Approximately 17% of S&P 500 companies have a known activist holding more than 1% of their outstanding shares. Activists’ assets under management (“AUM”) have grown substantially in recent years, with the 50 most significant activists ending 2023 with approximately $156 billion in equity assets. Matters of business strategy, operational improvement, capital allocation and structure, CEO succession, M&A, options for monetizing corporate assets, stock buybacks and other economic decisions have also become the subject of shareholder referenda and pressure, with operational matters attracting particular attention amid the ongoing economic uncertainty. Hedge fund activists have also pushed for governance changes as they court proxy advisory services and governance-oriented investors, particularly as they seek board representation, often through one or a few board seats or, in certain cases, control of the board. Activists have also increasingly targeted top management for removal and replacement by activist-sponsored candidates. In addition, activists have worked to block proposed M&A transactions, mostly on the target side but sometimes also on the acquiror side, with the goal of either sweetening or scuttling the transaction. READ MORE »

Next-Gen Governance: AI’s Role in Shareholder Proposals

Arnaud Cavé is a Director and Niamh O’Brien is a Senior Consultant at FTI Consulting. This post is based on their FTI memorandum.

With AI continuing to captivate businesses, consumers and regulators, institutional investors are also increasingly focusing their attention on the implications for the businesses in which they invest. In our Responsible AI Governance white paper published in January 2024, we highlighted the risks to businesses and wider society of AI, provided an overview of regulators’ and investors’ responses, and proposed a governance framework to manage these risks. One topic covered in the report that is gaining traction is the emergence of shareholder proposals urging companies to disclose more information on the risks associated with  the deployment of AI and their efforts to mitigate them.

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Innovation: The Bright Side of Common Ownership?

Mireia Giné is Professor of Finance at the IESE Business School. This post is based on a recent paper by Prof. Giné; Miguel AntónFlorian Ederer, and Martin Schmalz.

The common ownership hypothesis has ignited a debate among scholars, policymakers, investors, and other industry stakeholders about the impact of widespread diversified investment on corporate competition. Central to the debate is the claim that when large investors such as asset management companies have significant stakes across competing firms within the same industry, they might dampen competitive incentives. Common ownership can lead companies to refrain from aggressive competitive strategies like price cutting or increased innovation, as these actions could harm the profits of their rival firms, which are also part-owned by the same institutional investors.

Proponents of the common ownership hypothesis suggest that this phenomenon could explain some puzzling trends in the economy, such as reduced business dynamism, elevated profit margins, and diminished consumer surplus. However, critics challenge these interpretations, arguing that the empirical evidence linking common ownership to anticompetitive behavior is not definitive and ignores the impact that common ownership may have for firms competing across multiple industries and for corporate innovation. They caution against regulatory interventions that could disrupt the investment landscape without clear proof of harm. This debate has not only academic implications but also practical consequences, influencing how markets are regulated and how corporate strategies are formulated. Our research dives deeper into this complex issue, exploring how common ownership affects corporate innovation across the U.S. economy.

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DOJ Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosures for Individuals

James J. Fredricks is a Partner and Bora P. Rawcliffe is Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

On April 15, 2024, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Criminal Division unveiled a new Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosures for Individuals that offers non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to individuals who voluntarily disclose “original information” about certain types of crimes and who meet certain criteria.

By incentivizing individuals in this way, the program also intends to encourage companies to implement compliance programs that will enable them to prevent, detect, remediate and report misconduct. In practice, the pilot program — if successful — is likely to become another consideration for companies when deciding whether and when to self-disclose potential misconduct.

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Evolving lines of responsibility between the board and the management

Natalie Cooper is Senior Manager at the Center for Board Effectiveness at Deloitte LLP; Bob Lamm is Independent Senior Advisor at the Center for Board Effectiveness at Deloitte LLP; and Randi Val Morrison is Senior Vice President and General Counsel at the Society for Corporate Governance. This post is based on a Deloitte memorandum by Ms. Cooper, Mr. Lamm, Ms. Morrison, and Carey Oven.

As the business environment continues to evolve in complexity, so does the oversight role of boards. At the same time, investor, regulator, and other stakeholder expectations of board involvement in certain aspects of the business, including aspects traditionally within management’s sole purview, are changing in ways that may blur the lines of responsibility between the two. Ultimately, management’s job is to manage, whereas the board’s role is to oversee. Effective oversight relies upon maintaining clear lines of responsibility between the board and management.

This Board Practices Quarterly presents findings from a survey of members of the Society for Corporate Governance on the board’s leadership structure, independence, and involvement in a number of business matters, including activities related to corporate strategy, human capital, risk and risk management, and operations.

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Defenseless companies invite activism

Miles Rogerson is a Financial Journalist at Diligent Market Intelligence (DMI). This post is based on his Diligent memorandum.

Nearly half of the Russell 3000 companies targeted by activists in 2023 had few defenses against such advances.

According to Diligent Market Intelligence’s (DMI) Governance data, of the 103 Russell 3000 companies targeted by primary- and partial-focus activists in 2023, 50 had a “low” corporate defense score. Another 33 had a defense score ranked as “medium” while 20 companies had defenses ranked as “high.”

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Weekly Roundup: April 26-May 2, 2024


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 26-May 2, 2024

The CSDDD: How the Phoenix Can Rise from the Ashes


That Starbucks DEI Case Doesn’t Stand for What You Think It Does


Climate Action 100+ Departures Put Proxy Voting in the Spotlight


Introduction to SEC v. Panuwat: Understanding “Shadow” Insider Trading


For or against? The year in shareholder resolutions—2023


UK Takeover Panel Proposes Narrowing the Scope of Companies Subject to the Takeover Code


Data in the Driver’s Seat: What Boards Need to Know about Data Governance


Against Contractual Formalism in Shareholder Oppression Law


Action Items for Boards: Where Directors and C-Suite Leaders Align and Diverge


The SEC and CFTC Overhaul Form PF


Contextual Corporate Governance



The Board Member’s Oversight of AI Risk – Moving from Middle to Modern English



Sharpened Expectations on Climate


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