Fee Variation in Private Equity

Juliane Begenau is an Associate Professor of Finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Emil Siriwardane is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. This post is based on their recent article forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

The private capital industry has experienced a meteoric rise over the past two decades, with estimates of capital invested in vehicles like private equity and venture capital now exceeding $10 trillion. With this growth, there has been a corresponding increase in calls for greater transparency around the fees and operational structures of private market funds, especially given the amount of capital inflows from public defined-benefit pensions around the globe. Private capital funds, like private equity, are typically governed by complex limited partnership agreements (LPAs). LPAs, which are rarely observable to fund outsiders, are often further modified by so-called side letter agreements. This contracting environment makes it difficult to answer basic questions about costs in this industry, like for instance whether fees are set uniformly within funds or if some investors (LPs) consistently pay lower fees.

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Weekly Roundup: May 3-9, 2024


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 3-9, 2024

Defenseless companies invite activism


Evolving lines of responsibility between the board and the management


DOJ Pilot Program on Voluntary Self-Disclosures for Individuals


Innovation: The Bright Side of Common Ownership?


Next-Gen Governance: AI’s Role in Shareholder Proposals


M&A Developments: Hedge Fund Activism



The Shareholder Franchise, Transformative Investor Changes, and Motivational Misalignments


Stakeholder Governance and the Eclipse of Shareholder Primacy


Delaware’s Status as the Favored Corporate Home: Reflections and Considerations


The Missing “T” in ESG


Primer on Corporate Political Spending for Incoming Directors


Activism Vulnerability Report


The effect of female leadership on contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street


Exempt solicitation urging BlackRock shareholders to vote against the election of Saudi Aramco CEO


Exempt solicitation urging BlackRock shareholders to vote against the election of Saudi Aramco CEO

Comptroller Brad Lander serves as a trustee and the custodian and investment advisor to the City’s pension funds and retirement systems. This post is based on Comptroller Lander’s recent letter to BlackRock shareholders on behalf of the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS).

The New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS) is urging BlackRock shareholders to vote against the appointment of Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Aramco, to BlackRock’s Board of Directors at the company’s annual meeting on May 15, 2024. NYCERS has approximately $43 million invested in BlackRock common stock. Additionally, BlackRock manages approximately $19 billion on NYCERS’ behalf.

As summarized in my letter to BlackRock shareholders, potential conflicts of interest compromise Nasser’s ability to provide independent oversight, both in general, and particularly concerning BlackRock’s decarbonization strategy. Moreover, Nasser’s position as CEO of a company implicated in one of the largest alleged climate-related breaches of international human rights law is an unwarranted reputational risk for BlackRock, its Board of Directors, and its shareholders.

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The effect of female leadership on contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street

Jonathan Brogaard is the Kendall D. Garff Chaired Professor in the Finance department at the University of Utah’s David Eccles School of Business. Nataliya Gerasimova is an Associate Professor of Finance at the Norwegian Business School. Maximilian Rohrer is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics. The post is based on their article published in the Journal of Financial Economics.

Do female politicians alleviate barriers faced by women-owned-businesses (WOBs)?

It is well established that WOBs are underrepresented in the economy relative to the share of women in society, 36% versus 50%. More strikingly, this under-representation is by an order of magnitude bigger within government procurement:  only 9% of government contracts were allocated to WOBs between 2008 and 2020.  Receiving government contracts has been linked to long-run success, employment growth, and reducing financial frictions for small firms. Hence, alleviating barriers faced by WOBs in government contracting will increase their economic potential.

The main contribution of this paper is to identify a novel channel how female politicians reduced barriers faced by WOBs, namely increased allocation of government contracts. We establish causality by exploiting a regression discontinuity design around mixed-gender elections.

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Activism Vulnerability Report

Jason Frankl and Brian G. Kushner are Senior Managing Directors and Robert J. Kueppers is Senior Advisor at FTI Consulting. This post is based on a FTI Consulting memorandum by Mr. Frankl, Mr. Kushner, Mr. Kueppers, Kurt Moeller, Tom Kim, and Ryan Chiang.

Introduction

A resilient U.S. economy, with inflation cooling from 2023 levels and interest rates likely peaking, can provide a favorable backdrop for shareholder activism and M&A in 2024. Activist activity was strong in 2023 and there are clear signs that momentum has carried into 2024. We could see activism and M&A activity ramping up over the coming months, as companies seek growth opportunities, and based on the results of our proprietary screener, the most vulnerable industries are Utilities, Airlines & Aviation and Media & Publishing.

In this issue of the FTI Activism Vulnerability Report, we offer more insights, analysis and commentary, including sections on high profile activist campaigns involving Disney and Starbucks. As with prior reports, we provide key trends in activism campaigns. READ MORE »

Primer on Corporate Political Spending for Incoming Directors

Bruce F. Freed is President and Co-Founder, Jeanne Hanna is Research Director, and Karl Sandstrom is Strategic Advisor at the Center for Political Accountability. This post is based on their CPA memorandum.

Over the past year, several corporate executives have expressed a concern to the Center for Political Accountability that new members of corporate boards often lack a broad knowledge of corporate political spending and what it entails. They saw this as impairing new directors’ ability to set political spending policies and conduct the due diligence required to protect their company, especially in today’s risk fraught political environment.

They asked that CPA fill the gap. Our recently released Primer on Corporate Political Spending for Incoming Directors does so. As has been the case with the Center’s previous works — the Guide to Corporate Political Spending and the Guide to Becoming a Model Code Company, the Primer reflects the input of corporate executives and directors to ensure that it is a practical guide for discharging a director’s responsibility for overseeing the company’s political engagement.

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The Missing “T” in ESG

Danielle Chaim is an Assistant Professor at Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law, and Gideon Parchomovsky is Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Chair in Corporate Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

In recent years, environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing has reached unprecedented heights. Investors are pouring billions of dollars into funds, prioritizing companies with strong environmental records, positive social impact, and good corporate governance. Proponents of ESG investing hail it as a win-win strategy that promises higher financial returns while addressing pressing global challenges like climate change and social inequality. With a risk of a slight exaggeration, the ESG movement often depicts corporations—and, by extension, institutional investors as their largest shareholders—as modern-day saviors of the world, offering a pathway to a better future. ESG rating agencies rank public corporations based on various ESG indicators, bestowing bragging rights on those with the highest scores, allowing them to attract more investments.

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Delaware’s Status as the Favored Corporate Home: Reflections and Considerations

Amy Simmerman, William B. Chandler III, and David Berger are Partners at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on a Wilson Sonsini memorandum by Ms. Simmerman, Mr. Chandler, Mr. Berger, Brad Sorrels, and Ryan Greecher and is part of the Delaware Law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In recent months, a conversation has emerged as to whether Delaware should remain the favored state of incorporation for business entities. Indeed, many of our clients have asked us whether they should remain in Delaware or choose Delaware as the state of incorporation for their new ventures. In this discussion, we provide our reflections on that question and various factors that entrepreneurs, investors, and companies should consider when weighing incorporation in Delaware against incorporation in another state.

The Reliance on Delaware Compared to Other States

The sheer number of entities formed in Delaware reflects its dominance in this area. In 2022, more than 313,650 entities were formed in the state of Delaware, resulting in more than 1.9 million entities total in Delaware.[1] Delaware also continues to be the state of incorporation for nearly 68.2 percent of the Fortune 500, 65 percent of the S&P 500,[2] and approximately 79 percent of all U.S. initial public offerings in calendar-year 2022.[3] Of course, those numbers reflect that a substantial portion of entities are incorporated elsewhere, both within and outside of the United States. The Chief Justice of Delaware’s Supreme Court has noted that business entities indirectly or directly generate about a third of the state’s revenue.[4]

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Stakeholder Governance and the Eclipse of Shareholder Primacy

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and Kevin S. Schwartz.

For decades, advocates of “shareholder primacy” as the North Star of corporate governance have steered our leading corporations and our Nation’s economic engine perilously off-course. Since the 1970s, when the work of Milton Friedman, Michael Jensen, and Frank Easterbrook took hold in business schools, activists and raiders in high-profile proxy fights and hostile takeovers on Wall Street have wrapped their arms around the shareholder-primacy narrative to advance their own short-termist objectives. Far from shared scholarly interest, their objective was plain: To justify cutting off directors’ reasoned judgment, in favor of maximizing short-term shareholder value, notwithstanding the attendant harm to the health of our corporate and economic landscape and even our national security. To be sure, some in academia and in the corporate world fought back, in favor of responsible corporate stewardship in pursuit of long-term sustainable value, by advocating consideration of other stakeholders who make essential contributions to the creation of sustainable value. And the 2008 financial crisis alerted others to the dangers of the shareholder-primacy paradigm. But until recently, shareholder primacy remained stubbornly ascendant, largely crowding out other voices. Even the Business Roundtable, which officially adopted shareholder primacy in 1997, did not recognize its existential threat to society and abandon it for stakeholder corporate governance until 2019.

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The Shareholder Franchise, Transformative Investor Changes, and Motivational Misalignments

Henry T. C. Hu is the Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance at the University of Texas Law School, and Lawrence A. Hamermesh is an Emeritus Professor at Widener University Delaware Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” In the generation since Chancellor William Allen’s soaring rhetoric in Blasius, the “transcending significance” of the franchise has become corporate governance catechism. His hope, if not expectation, was that the rise of the institutional investor would help the franchise transition from an “unimportant formalism” to an importance of source of discipline.

This catechism has motivational alignment as its foundational premise: a shareholder’s economic ownership will generally motivate her to use the associated voting rights to promote share value. Implicitly, the premise assumes that the voting rights and the economic rights of share ownership are inextricably linked—i.e., are “coupled.” Transformative institutional investor changes are increasingly undermining the premise, animated in large part by an accelerating, but insufficiently recognized, severing of that link—“decoupling.”

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