Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX

Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Saturday July 23, 2011 at 10:43 am
  • Print
  • email
  • Twitter
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Mergers & Acquisitions at the Pennsylvania State University School of Law. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is co-sponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Notwithstanding the excellence of the Delaware judiciary, the multiple standards of review under Delaware law for reviewing the actions of a target’s directors involved in a merger or acquisition transaction are cumbersome, a source of needless litigation, and economically inefficient. In my paper Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX, recently made public on SSRN, I put forward a proposal to resolve these issues through changes in Delaware’s General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). DGCL should be amended to permit the shareholders of a corporation to adopt a provision requiring that if the corporation becomes a target of a bona fide acquisition proposal, the board of the corporation must petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for the appointment of an independent, disinterested, and knowledgeable special committee of the board (a “Change of Control Special Committee”). This Committee would have complete power over the acquisition transaction. At the discretion of the Delaware Court of Chancery, a member of the current board could be appointed to the Change of Control Special Committee.

All decisions of the Change of Control Special Committee, including any decision to employ, maintain, or terminate a poison pill, would be subject to the deferential business judgment rule standard of review. As a consequence, litigation involving the actions taken by the Committee would be rare, if not essentially eliminated, because it could be expected that the decisions made by the Committee would be in the interest of the target’s shareholders. As a practical matter, the role of the Court of Chancery in such transactions would be moved from the back-end to the front-end, because the Chancery Court’s determination of the independence, disinterestedness, and competence of the board members would be made on an ex ante as opposed to an ex post basis.

This type of amendment to the DGCL is consistent with the concept of this statute as an “enabling” law, permitting shareholders to adopt provisions that the shareholders determine are in their interests. Also, adoption of this proposal would breathe life into the proposal by Vice Chancellor Laster in In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders Litigation, where he suggested that the business judgment rule standard of review be applicable to freeze-out mergers where the transaction is (1) supervised by a special committee with all of the power of an independent board, and (2) conditioned upon the tendering or voting by a majority of the nonaffiliated shareholders.

This article builds on my several of my prior articles, which called for a Congress and the SEC to address conflicts of interest in merger and acquisition transactions by mandating an independent Change of Control Board for public companies, including “Change of Control Board: Federal Preemption of the Law Governing a Target’s Directors” (70 Mississippi Law Journal 35) and “The Missing Link in Sarbanes-Oxley: Enactment of the ‘Change of Control Board’ Concept, or Extension of the Audit Committee Provisions to Mergers and Acquisitions” (63 The Business Lawyer 81).

The full paper is available for download here.

  1. [...] entitled Change against Control Special Committee: Breathing Life In CNX, is highlighted there to which Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog plus is available for SSRN here. Mod It brief [...]

    Pingback by New Delaware Standard Proposed for Review of Target Boards | Attorney and Lawyers — July 24, 2011 @ 10:23 pm

  2. New Delaware Standard Proposed for Review of Target Boards…

    Professor Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Mergers…

    Trackback by Corporate Law Blog — July 28, 2011 @ 12:50 pm

 

Add your comment below:

(required)

(required but not published)

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URI

 
  •  » A "Web Winner" by The Philadelphia Inquirer
  •  » A "Top Blog" by LexisNexis
  •  » A "10 out of 10" by the American Association of Law Librarians Blog
  •  » A source for "insight into the latest developments" by Directorship Magazine