The Dodd-Frank law took effect July 21, 2010.  Subtitle E of Title IX of Dodd-Frank addresses “Accountability and Executive Compensation” (§§951-957). Since the enactment of the act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has adopted final rules as to two of the provisions, proposed rules as to two others and has not yet proposed (but has announced it will be proposing) rules as to another three provisions. This post summarizes the current status of regulation projects under Dodd-Frank Sections 951 through 957.
Archive for the ‘Accounting & Disclosure’ Category
In my paper, Beyond Efficiency in Securities Regulation, recently made available on SSRN, I argue that the emergence of algorithmic trading calls into question the foundation underpinning today’s securities laws: the understanding that securities prices reflect all available information in the market. Securities regulation has long looked to the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) for theoretical validation to ground its most central tenets like mandatory disclosure, the Fraud-on-the-Market presumption in Rule 10b-5 litigation, as well as the architecture of today’s system of interconnected exchanges. It is easy to understand why. Laws that make markets more informative should also make them better at communicating with investors and in allocating capital across the economy. In this paper, I suggest that this connection between informational and allocative efficiencies can no longer be so readily assumed in the age of algorithmic trading. In other words, even as algorithmic trading pushes markets to achieve ever-greater levels of informational efficiency, able to process vast swathes of data in milliseconds, understanding what this information means for the purposes of capital allocation seems ever more uncertain. Recognizing that notions of informational efficiency are growing disconnected from the market’s ability to also interpret what this information signifies for capital allocation, this paper proposes a thoroughgoing rethinking about the centrality of efficiency economics in regulatory design.
Two articles (among several) in a comprehensive proposal to revise EU corporate governance would have a significant beneficial impact if they were to be adopted in the United States. In large measure they mirror recommendations by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., in two essays: Can We do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Columbia Law Review 449 (Mar. 2014) and One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? 66 Business Lawyer 1 (Nov. 2010).
On March 12, the SEC issued a 400-page rule proposal that, if adopted as proposed, would impose a multitude of new compliance requirements on The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”), The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), National Securities Clearing Corporation (“NSCC”), Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) and ICE Clear Europe. Since these clearing agencies play a fundamental role in the options, stock, debt, U.S. Treasuries, mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps markets, the proposed requirements have important implications for banks, broker-dealers and other U.S. securities market participants, as well as securities exchanges, alternative trading systems and other trading venues.
When offering securities to the public, corporations must comply with an exclusive informational regime that allows speech only within the uniform boundaries determined by the SEC. Corporations must use a standardized method for financial audit and report, and disclose in plain and simple English any material fact of interest to a potential buyer. But when offering the public other products, corporations are entitled to speak freely to consumers as they wish, under the wide wings of the freedom of commercial speech, constrained merely by the ban on misrepresentation and fraud. Why are investors better protected than consumers? Why does our legal system choose to provide consumers of investments better information to secure their freedom of choice?
While hundreds of research papers discuss earnings quality, there is no agreed-upon definition. We take a unique perspective on the topic by focusing our efforts on the producers of earnings quality: Chief Financial Officers. In our paper, The Misrepresentation of Earnings, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we explore the definition, characteristics, and determinants of earnings quality, including the prevalence and identification of earnings misrepresentation. To do so, we conduct a large-scale survey of 375 CFOs on earnings quality. We supplement the survey with 12 in-depth interviews with CFOs from prominent firms.
The private equity firm that was the controlling stockholder of Orchard Enterprises effected a squeeze-out merger of the minority public stockholders. Two years later, a Delaware appraisal proceeding determined that Orchard’s shares at the time of the merger were worth more than twice as much as was paid in the merger. Public shareholders then brought suit, claiming that the directors who had approved the merger and the controlling stockholder had breached their fiduciary duties and should be held liable for damages. The Orchard decision  issued by the Delaware Chancery Court this past Friday adjudicates the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment before trial.
In an article recently posted to SSRN I addressed certain issues faced by the SEC in the ongoing Title III rulemaking process under the JOBS Act of 2012, enacted into law by Congress in April 2012. The SEC issued proposed rules to implement Title III in October 23, 2013, and has yet to issue final rules.
Title III of the JOBS Act created an exemption from registration for the offer and sale of so-called “crowdfunded” securities under the Securities Act of 1933, allowing the offer and sale of securities to an unlimited number of unaccredited investors without registration with the SEC, on an Internet-based platform, through intermediaries (portals) which are either registered broker-dealers or SEC licensed “funding portals.” Title III also provided for a number of built-in investor protections, including limitations on the amount invested, a limitation on the amount an issuer may raise in a 12 month period ($1 million), detailed financial and non-financial disclosure in connection with the offering, and ongoing annual issuer disclosure. Congress left much of the details of Title III in the hands of the SEC, to be fleshed out in the rulemaking process.
Following an increase in shareholder and investor activism beyond pure executive remuneration issues in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2013, with some 25 companies targeted for public campaigns, this post provides a summary of certain principles of English law and UK and European regulation applicable to UK listed public companies and their shareholders that are relevant to the expected further increase in activism in 2014. This post covers (i) stake-building; (ii) shareholders’ rights to require companies to hold general meetings; (iii) shareholders’ rights to propose resolutions at annual general meetings; and (iv) recent developments in these and related areas through raising and answering a number of relevant questions.
On January 24, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued an order instituting settled administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against KPMG LLP (“KPMG”) for violating auditor independence rules in its relationships with affiliates of three of its SEC-registered audit clients.  At the crux of the SEC’s order are its findings that:
- KPMG provided prohibited non-audit services to affiliates of its audit clients;
- KPMG hired a former employee of an affiliate of one of KPMG’s audit clients and subsequently loaned him back to the affiliate to do the same work he had done as an employee of the affiliate;
- Certain KPMG employees owned stock in KPMG’s audit clients or affiliates of its audit clients; and
- KPMG repeatedly represented in its audit reports that it was “independent.”
KPMG settled the charges for approximately $8.2 million.