Regulation is the most important factor influencing strategic change at financial institutions and is the second largest threat – after economic uncertainty – to growth prospects, according to PwC’s Annual Global CEO Survey [1]. The survey, which is in its fifteenth consecutive year, canvassed CEOs at over 250 financial institutions in 42 countries late last year and provides a good barometer on market sentiment. The significance of regulation as a change driver in the financial sector has grown steadily since the recent crisis. Based on PwC’s face-to-face interviews with CEOs of some of the world’s largest financial institutions, it is clear, though, that it is not simply regulatory change, but regulatory complexity and uncertainty that are really dampening confidence in growth.

Upgrading the European Union (EU) prudential regime for banks in line with the Basel III proposals is an excellent example of both regulatory complexity and uncertainty. In July 2011, the European Commission [2] released two proposals to introduce the new regime. The bulk of the existing EU prudential regime, with the amendments necessary to introduce Basel III, is recast into a regulation – the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) – amongst other things to support the parallel EU goal of harmonising and deepening the internal market through a single rule book. In addition, a Directive – Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) – sets out requirements in a limited number of areas where Member State discretion is still necessary, for example in relation to corporate governance.

…continue reading: Regulatory Complexity and Uncertainty: The Capital Requirements Directive IV

The Federal Reserve issued a statement last week clarifying that it will interpret the Volcker Rule to afford banking entities the full two-year period provided by the statute to conform their activities and investments to the Rule’s prohibitions and restrictions. The financial services industry should welcome this alternative to curtailing trading and investment activities earlier than the statute on its face would have required, but inevitably some questions remain. The Federal Reserve still has not given any indication whether it may extend this period. As compliance activities progress and we gain greater insight into the effect of the Rule on the economy, the public may seek even clearer guidance on this aspect of the Federal Reserve’s discretion.

Statute

The Volcker Rule added a new section 13 (“Section 13”) to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 imposing prohibitions and requirements on a banking entity that engages in proprietary trading and has investments in or certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund. [1] The Rule also provides that a non-bank financial company supervised by the Federal Reserve that engages in proprietary trading or makes hedge fund investments must comply with certain other requirements, including supplemental capital requirements or quantitative limitations. [2] The Rule takes effect on the earlier of two years after the date of its enactment, July 21, 2012, or 12 months after the date of issuance of rules implementing that section. Because the Agencies did not issue implementing rules by July 21, 2011, the effective date will be July 21, 2012.

…continue reading: Federal Reserve Clarifies Deadline for Volcker Rule Compliance

On April 3, 2012 the Financial Stability Oversight Council issued its final rule and interpretive guidance governing its process for designating a nonbank financial company as a systemically important financial institution under the Dodd-Frank Act. The adoption of the Final Rule marks the completion of the highly anticipated standards for designating SIFIs, a process that first began in October 2010. While there have been changes made to the process, much remains to be understood how the FSOC will use its authority to determine whether a nonbank financial company should be supervised and subject to prudential standards. It is widely anticipated that designations of some SIFIs will be made before year-end, making us wonder whether the designation process has been underway without final rules being in place.

The Statute

Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act [1] authorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to designate a nonbank financial company to be supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”) and be subject to prudential standards. [2] The FSOC will make a designation after determining that material financial distress at the company or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.

…continue reading: Final Rule Issued on Systemically Important Firms, Many Unknowns Remain

In the paper, Management Quality, Venture Capital Backing, and Initial Public Offerings, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use hand-collected data on the quality and reputation of the management teams of a large sample of 3,240 entrepreneurial firms going public during 1993-2004 to conduct the first large-sample study of the relationship between VC-backing and management quality and the effect of these two variables on a firm’s IPO characteristics and valuation, post-IPO financial policies, and post-IPO operating performance. We hypothesize that VC-backing positively affects the quality of a firm’s management team, and that both management quality and VC-backing play a certifying role in conveying a firm’s intrinsic value to the financial market, reducing the information asymmetry faced by it.

Our empirical findings are as follows. First, we find that overall VC-backed firms have higher quality management teams compared to non-VC-backed firms. In particular, VC-backed firms have a greater percentage of management team members with MBA degrees, a greater percentage of managers with prior managerial experience, a greater percentage of managers in core functional areas (operations and production, sales and marketing, R&D, and finance), and larger management teams compared to non-VC-backed firms. At the same time, VC-backed firms have lower percentages of management team members who are CPAs and who have prior managerial experience at law and accounting firms; further, their managers have shorter average tenures and smaller heterogeneity in these tenures.

…continue reading: Management Quality, Venture Capital Backing, and Initial Public Offerings

Although a branch of a bank is not a separate juridical entity from the bank of which it is a component, U.S. law treats branches as separate from the head office and other branches of a bank when such differentiation is appropriate for various purposes. Branches are a hybrid structure, at the same time both an integral part of the banks of which they are merely offices and separate legal entities for a number of U.S. regulatory and commercial law purposes. This feature of bank branches is a central tenet of federal banking statutes, and the law governing U.S. branches of foreign banks in particular.

At times the status of a U.S. branch of a foreign bank under a particular statutory scheme is explicit. Such is the case with the U.S. law treatment of U.S. branches of foreign banks in insolvency. As discussed below, U.S. law treats those branches virtually as separate entities in insolvency.

In other circumstances, a particular statute does not explicitly address the status of U.S. branches of foreign banks, and the treatment has to be arrived at through an analysis of the purpose of the statutory scheme. For example, as discussed below, after a long series of no-action letters, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued interpretive guidance providing that securities issued or guaranteed by U.S. branches of a foreign bank (but not its non-U.S. branches) could rely on the exemption from registration afforded to securities issued or guaranteed by a bank under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). Thus, U.S. branches can rely on the Section 3(a)(2) exemption while the bank itself is required to register to distribute its securities in the United States.

This paper will review the treatment of U.S. branches of foreign banks under a variety of statutory schemes and explore the rationale for that treatment.

…continue reading: Separate Entity Doctrine for U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks

As widely reported in the press, seizures of banks and thrifts by regulatory authorities began to subside in 2011. Throughout the year, 92 institutions were seized compared with 157 in 2010 and 140 in 2009. In contrast, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation professional liability lawsuits targeting failed financial institutions began to increase in 2011. These are lawsuits in which the FDIC, as receiver for failed financial institutions, brings professional liability claims against directors and officers of those institutions and against other related parties, such as accounting firms, law firms, appraisal firms, or mortgage brokers.

Overview

From July 2, 2010, through January 27, 2012, the FDIC filed 21 lawsuits related to 20 failed institutions (two of the 21 lawsuits were associated with IndyMac Bank, F.S.B). Of the 21 lawsuits, two were filed in 2010, 16 in 2011, and three in January 2012. Aggregate damages claimed in the complaints totaled $1.98 billion.

…continue reading: FDIC Lawsuits Targeting Failed Financial Institutions

The recovering, but still uncertain, economy and real estate markets have led to diverging opinions and concerns over the future value of a target’s assets which might otherwise prevent agreement on transaction pricing. As discussed in prior memos, contingent consideration structures have for years been used to bridge differences between buyers and sellers in uncertain times. With the burgeoning trend of increased M&A activity involving smaller banks, it is important to remember that these structures, while requiring careful thought, can be useful in both small and large deals alike to creatively address pricing challenges.

Capital Bank Financial Corp.’s recently announced agreement to acquire Southern Community Financial Corporation is the third transaction in the last 18 months in which that acquiror has utilized a contingent value right, or CVR, as a portion of the consideration. The CVR provides the opportunity for additional value to Southern Community shareholders if the portfolio performance exceeds a designated benchmark, while allowing Capital Bank to limit its exposure if performance should deteriorate. It has a value determined by the performance of Southern Community’s legacy loan and foreclosed asset portfolio at the end of a five-year period. Payments under the CVR may range from zero to $1.30 per share in addition to the primary merger consideration of $2.875 per share. Any payments would only be made at the end of the five-year measurement period. The CVR was structured so as not to require registration with the SEC, avoiding not only the cost of registration but also the ongoing reporting requirements. Consequently, the CVR is not transferable, does not grant any voting or dividend rights, bears no stated rate of interest, and will not be certificated.

…continue reading: Contingent Consideration in Bridging Valuation Gaps

Recently, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“Council”) unanimously approved a final rule (the “Final Rule”) and related interpretive guidance (the “Final Guidance”) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), [1] regarding the designation of systemically important nonbank financial companies (often referred to as nonbank “SIFIs”). The Final Rule and Final Guidance describe how the Council will apply the statutory designation standards and the procedures it intends to employ in exercising this authority. Designated companies are required to comply with enhanced prudential standards and are subject to consolidated supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”). The Federal Reserve’s recent proposal regarding these enhanced standards suggests that this will be a comprehensive and rigorous regulatory regime. [2]

The Final Rule and Final Guidance, which are substantially similar to the Council’s October 2011 proposed rule and guidance (the “October 2011 Proposal”), [3] do not provide significant new insight as to which companies will ultimately be designated. Nonetheless, it is an important initial procedural step to enable the actual designation process to begin. Secretary of the Treasury Geithner, who chairs the Council, has indicated that the first of these designations will be made this year.

…continue reading: Final Rule on Designation of Systemically Important Companies

In autumn 2008 the developed world’s banking system suffered a severe crisis. In response the world’s regulators and central banks have focused on building a more stable banking system for the future: less leveraged, more liquid, better supervised and with even the largest banks able to be resolved without taxpayer’s support. The implementation of that bank-focused regulatory agenda is still unfinished, but much progress has been made.

Looking back to the year 2007/08, however, it’s striking that the crisis did not at first look like a traditional banking crisis, but rather one related to a new phenomenon: shadow banking. Initially the problems seemed concentrated in the US, where the development of non-bank credit intermediation was most advanced, and many of the events which marked the developing crisis related to non-bank institutions and markets.

…continue reading: Shadow Banking and Financial Instability

Excessive risk-taking by banks is widely blamed as a primary factor behind the financial meltdown of 2007-2008. Yet, not much work has been done on whether banks fundamentally changed their risk-taking behavior prior to the crisis, nor has much formal work been done on whether banks’ risk-taking was “excessive” in any way. In our paper, Risk-taking by Banks: What Did Banks Know and When Did We Know It?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we tackle these questions head on and also examine possible motives for bank managers to have changed their risk-taking behavior in the years leading up to the crisis.

In the years 2000 to 2006, a preliminary examination of stock price volatility does not seem to support the idea that the financial markets deemed the level of risks assumed by banks to be excessive. But we document a remarkable compositional shift in the measures of risk-taking: bank’s systematic risk, measured by their equity betas, almost doubled while their idiosyncratic volatility came down significantly. This reduction in idiosyncratic risk is consistent with the increasing reliance on securitization to shed firm-specific risks. But the remarkable increase in betas clearly shows that bank assets were becoming increasingly similar in terms of their risk characteristics and that future bank performance was viewed as much more dependent on the performance of the macro-economy. Our results indeed indicate major changes in the nature of risk-taking by banks in the years preceding the crisis.

…continue reading: Risk-taking by Banks