Archive for the ‘Bankruptcy & Financial Distress’ Category

New ISDA Protocol Limits Buy-Side Remedies in Financial Institution Failure

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday December 14, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Stephen D. Adams, associate in the investment management and hedge funds practice groups at Ropes & Gray LLP, and is based on a Ropes & Gray publication by Mr. Adams, Leigh R. Fraser, Anna Lawry, and Molly Moore.

The ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol, published on November 12, 2014, by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), [1] represents a significant shift in the terms of the over-the-counter derivatives market. It will require adhering parties to relinquish termination rights that have long been part of bankruptcy “safe harbors” for derivatives contracts under bankruptcy and insolvency regimes in many jurisdictions. While buy-side market participants are not required to adhere to the Protocol at this time, future regulations will likely have the effect of compelling market participants to agree to its terms. This change will impact institutional investors, hedge funds, mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other buy-side market participants who enter into over-the-counter derivatives transactions with financial institutions.

Among the key features of the Protocol are the following:

…continue reading: New ISDA Protocol Limits Buy-Side Remedies in Financial Institution Failure

Towards a “Rule of Law” Approach to Restructuring Sovereign Debt

Posted by Steven L. Schwarcz, Duke University, on Tuesday October 14, 2014 at 9:08 am
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Editor’s Note: Steven L. Schwarcz is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law.

In a landmark vote, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly decided on September 9 to begin work on a multilateral legal framework—effectively a treaty or convention—for sovereign debt restructuring, in order to improve the global financial system. The resolution was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing nations and China. In part, it was sparked by recent litigation in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to comply with a pari passu clause (imposing an equal-and-ratable repayment obligation), Argentina could not pay holders of exchanged bonds without also paying holdouts who retained the original bonds. That decision was all the more dramatic because the holdouts included hedge funds—sometimes characterized as “vulture funds”—that purchased the original bonds at a deep discount, yet sued for full payment.

…continue reading: Towards a “Rule of Law” Approach to Restructuring Sovereign Debt

Cross-Border Recognition of Resolution Actions

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, and is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication authored by Mitchell S. Eitel, Andrew R. Gladin, Rebecca J. Simmons, and Jennifer L. Sutton. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

On September 29, 2014, the Financial Stability Board (the “FSB”) published a consultative document concerning cross-border recognition of resolution actions and the removal of impediments to the resolution of globally active, systemically important financial institutions (the “Consultative Document”). The Consultative Document encourages jurisdictions to include in their statutory frameworks seven elements that would enable prompt effect to be given to foreign resolution actions. In addition, due to a recognized gap between the various national legal resolution regimes that are currently in place and those recommended by the FSB, the Consultative Document sets forth two “contractual solutions”—that is, resolution-related arrangements to be implemented as a matter of contract among the private parties involved—to address two underlying substantive issues that the FSB considers critical for orderly cross-border resolution, namely:

…continue reading: Cross-Border Recognition of Resolution Actions

The Duty to Maximize Value of an Insolvent Enterprise

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday October 9, 2014 at 9:07 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Brad Eric Scheler, senior partner and chairman of the Bankruptcy and Restructuring Practice at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, and is based on a Fried Frank M&A Briefing authored by Mr. Scheler, Steven Epstein, Robert C. Schwenkel, and Gail Weinstein. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin (October 1, 2014), Vice Chancellor Laster clarified the Delaware Chancery Court’s approach to breach of fiduciary duty derivative actions brought by creditors against the directors of an insolvent corporation. Importantly, the Vice Chancellor applied business judgment rule deference to the non-independent directors’ decision to try to increase the value of the insolvent corporation by adopting a highly risky investment strategy—even though the creditors bore the full risk of the strategy’s failing, while the corporation’s sole stockholder would benefit if the strategy succeeded. By contrast, the court viewed the directors’ decisions not to exercise their right to defer interest on the notes held by the controller and to pay above-market fees to an affiliate of the controller as having been “transfers of value” from the insolvent corporation to the controller, which were subject to entire fairness review.

…continue reading: The Duty to Maximize Value of an Insolvent Enterprise

Update on Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Bankruptcy

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday September 24, 2014 at 9:02 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Douglas K. Mayer, Of Counsel in the Restructuring and Finance Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Mayer, Martin J.E. Arms, and Emil A. Kleinhaus.

Directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) insurance coverage continues to represent a key element of corporate risk management. See memo of July 28 2009. A decision in the bankruptcy of commodities brokerage MF Global, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014), provides a recent illustration of how D&O insurance may be treated upon the bankruptcy of the insured company, depending on the specific structure and terms of the insurance at issue.

…continue reading: Update on Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Bankruptcy

Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors

Posted by Mark Roe, Harvard Law School, on Wednesday September 10, 2014 at 9:02 am
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Editor’s Note: Mark Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches bankruptcy and corporate law. This post is based on an article co-authored by Professor Roe, Ed Morrison, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, and Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi for the District of Delaware. All three are members of the Advisory Committee on Derivatives, Financial Contracts and Safe Harbors, which is working with the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11. The article was presented at the Federal Reserve’s recent conference on Wholesale Funding Markets.

Ed Morrison, Judge Christopher Sontchi and I recently posted to SSRN our article recommending a major narrowing of the repo safe harbors, after presenting it at the Federal Reserve’s recent conference on Wholesale Funding Markets in which the Boston Fed president warned of the dangers in the repo market. Overall, we conclude that the Bankruptcy Code has aggressively and unwisely sought to regulate market liquidity and systemic risk, with the Code’s “safe harbors” from the normal bankruptcy machinery largely backfiring during the financial crisis. The sounder policy would be to limit the repo safe harbors to U.S. Treasury repos and repos of similarly liquid government securities.

…continue reading: Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors

Bankruptcy Court Holds Secured Creditors Can Be “Crammed Down” With Below-Market Replacement Notes

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Saturday September 6, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Mark I. Bane, Partner focusing on corporate restructurings at Ropes & Gray LLP, and is based on a Ropes & Gray Alert.

On August 26, 2014, in the case In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (“Momentive”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that secured creditors could be “crammed down” in a chapter 11 plan with replacement notes bearing interest at substantially below market rates. Unless overturned on appeal, this decision will introduce a new level of risk to leveraged lending—secured lenders will face the specter of losing in a bankruptcy restructuring not only their negotiated rates, but any semblance of market treatment. This risk could result in a tightening of availability and increased costs to borrowers in levered transactions.

…continue reading: Bankruptcy Court Holds Secured Creditors Can Be “Crammed Down” With Below-Market Replacement Notes

A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday August 25, 2014 at 9:02 am
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Editor’s Note: The following paper comes to us from Alessio Pacces and Alessandro Romano, both of the Erasmus School of Law at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

In our recent ECGI working paper, A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies, we study how to induce Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) to produce ratings as accurate as the available forecasting technology allows.

Referring to CRAs, Paul Krugman wrote that: “It was a system that looked dignified and respectable on the surface. Yet it produced huge conflicts of interest. Issuers of debt […] could choose among several rating agencies. So they could direct their business to whichever agency was most likely to give a favorable verdict, and threaten to pull business from an agency that tried too hard to do its job.”

However, the conflicts of interest stemming from the issuer-pays model and rating shopping by issuers are not sufficient to explain rating inflation. Because ratings are valuable only as far as they are considered informative by investors, in a well-functioning market, reputational sanctions should prevent rating inflation.

…continue reading: A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies

Nationalize the Clearinghouses!

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday August 8, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Stephen J. Lubben, Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethic at Seton Hall University School of Law.

A clearinghouse reduces counterparty risks by acting as the hub for trades amongst the largest financial institutions. For this reason, Dodd-Frank’s seventh title, the heart of the law’s regulation of OTC derivatives, requires that most derivatives trade through clearinghouses.

The concentration of trades into a very small number of clearinghouses or CCPs has obvious risks. To maintain the vitality of clearinghouses, Congress thus enacted the eighth title of Dodd-Frank, which allows for the regulation of key “financial system utilities.” In plain English, a financial system utility is either a payment system—like FedWire or CHIPS—or a clearinghouse.

But given the vital place of clearinghouses in Dodd-Frank, it is perhaps surprising that Dodd-Frank makes no provision for the failure of a clearinghouse. Indeed, it is arguable that the United States is not in compliance with its commitment to the G-20 on this point.

…continue reading: Nationalize the Clearinghouses!

Make-Whole Provisions Continue to Cause Controversy

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday August 3, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Michael Friedman, Partner in the Banking Group and in the Litigation, Bankruptcy and Restructuring Group at Chapman and Cutler LLP, and is based on a Chapman publication by Mr. Friedman and Craig M. Price.

Given today’s low interest rate environment, the enforceability of make-whole provisions has been the subject of intense litigation as debtors seek to redeem and refinance debt entered into during periods of higher interest rates, and investors seek to maintain their contractual rates of return. This trend has come to the forefront most recently in two separate cases, one filed in Delaware and the other in New York. In Energy Future Holdings, the first-lien and second-lien indenture trustees have each initiated separate adversary proceedings in Delaware bankruptcy court claiming the power company’s plan to redeem and refinance its outstanding debt entitles the respective holders to hundreds of millions of dollars in make-whole payments. [1] Conversely, In MPM Silicones, LLC, it is the debtors that have sought a declaratory judgment from the New York bankruptcy court that, on account of an automatic acceleration upon the bankruptcy filing, no make-whole payment is required to be paid. [2] Given the frequency which make-whole disputes have arisen and the enormous sums at stake, it is important for all investors to understand the various arguments for and against payment of a make-whole premium, and the specific issues to look for when analyzing debt containing make-whole provisions. Despite the various legal arguments that exist, the single most important factor will always be the specific language of the applicable credit agreement or indenture.

…continue reading: Make-Whole Provisions Continue to Cause Controversy

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