The incentive to take socially costly financial risks is inherent in banking: because of the interconnected nature of banking, one bank’s failure can increase the risk of failure of another bank even if they do not have a contractual relationship. If numerous banks collapse, the sudden withdrawal of credit from the economy hurts third parties who depend on loans to finance consumption and investment. The perverse incentive to take financial risk is further aggravated by underpriced government-supplied insurance and the government’s readiness to play the role of lender of last resort.
Archive for the ‘Financial Regulation’ Category
On September 29, 2014, the Financial Stability Board (the “FSB”) published a consultative document concerning cross-border recognition of resolution actions and the removal of impediments to the resolution of globally active, systemically important financial institutions (the “Consultative Document”). The Consultative Document encourages jurisdictions to include in their statutory frameworks seven elements that would enable prompt effect to be given to foreign resolution actions. In addition, due to a recognized gap between the various national legal resolution regimes that are currently in place and those recommended by the FSB, the Consultative Document sets forth two “contractual solutions”—that is, resolution-related arrangements to be implemented as a matter of contract among the private parties involved—to address two underlying substantive issues that the FSB considers critical for orderly cross-border resolution, namely:
In the paper Financial Market Infrastructures, recently made publicly available on SSRN and forthcoming as a chapter of The Oxford Handbook on Financial Regulation, edited by Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, and Jennifer Payne (Oxford University Press), we study the impact of the post-crisis reforms on financial market infrastructures in the securities and derivatives markets.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis led to large-scale reforms to the regulation of securities and derivatives markets. Regulators around the world acknowledged the need for structural reforms to the financial system and to market infrastructures in particular. Due to the global dimension of the crisis and the extent to which financial markets had been revealed to be closely interconnected, national regulators moved the related policy debate to the supranational level. This approach led to the international regulatory guidelines and principles adopted by the G20 and then developed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The new global regulatory framework which has followed has institutionalized financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as key supports for financial stability and as cornerstones of the crisis-era regulatory reform agenda for financial markets.
The U.S. banking agencies have finalized revisions to the denominator of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), which include a number of key changes and clarifications to their April 2014 proposal. The SLR represents the U.S. implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio.
Under the U.S. banking agencies’ SLR framework, advanced approaches firms must maintain a minimum SLR of 3%, while the 8 U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (U.S. G-SIBs) and their U.S. insured depository institution subsidiaries are subject to enhanced SLR standards (eSLR).
On September 3, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the “Federal Reserve”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) (collectively, the “Agencies”), released a final rule that applies a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (the “LCR”) to certain U.S. banking organizations (the “Final Rule”). The rule finalizes a proposal published by the Agencies on October 24, 2013 (the “Proposed Rule”), and includes a number of substantive and technical changes.
The world of American finance has been invested by a new scandal. At its core, there is New York’s Federal Reserve; in other words, the institution that supervises America’s main banks. The scandal exploded because of the revelations emerged in a legal lawsuit about a layoff.
Carmen Segarra, a supervision lawyer, sued after being fired only seven months into her job. The New York Fed says it fired her due to poor performance. Segarra instead maintains that she was given the pink slip because she did not adapt to ‘Fed culture’—so permissive towards banks it regulates, almost to the point of collusion.
On September 3, 2014, U.S. banking regulators re-proposed margin, capital and segregation requirements applicable to swap entities  for uncleared swaps.  The new proposed rules modify significantly the regulators’ original 2011 proposal in light of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s and the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (“BCBS/IOSCO”) issuance of their 2013 final policy framework on margin requirements for uncleared derivatives and the comments received on the original proposal. The revised proposal:
[On September 10, 2014], the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (collectively, the “Agencies”) provided an addition to their existing list of Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) addressing the implementation of section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule.”
On September 2, 2014, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) finalized its risk governance framework for large banks and thrifts (“Guidelines”) that was proposed in January 2014.  The Guidelines formalize the heightened risk management standards that the OCC has been communicating through the supervisory process for several years, but do so somewhat more flexibly than the January proposal (“proposal”) did. Although many firms have been working to enhance their risk management programs to meet the proposal and supervisory communications, most still have work to do in order to meet the Guidelines’ requirements.
The Guidelines maintain the proposal’s emphasis on risk governance at the bank level to ensure safety and soundness, and affords the OCC greater flexibility (prescribed under regulations) to take enforcement actions in response to a bank’s compliance failure. The responsibility to oversee risk management remains with the Board of Directors which retains its ultimate risk governance oversight role; however, the Guidelines clarify that the Board need not take on responsibility for day-to-day managerial duties as the proposal had suggested.
Ed Morrison, Judge Christopher Sontchi and I recently posted to SSRN our article recommending a major narrowing of the repo safe harbors, after presenting it at the Federal Reserve’s recent conference on Wholesale Funding Markets in which the Boston Fed president warned of the dangers in the repo market. Overall, we conclude that the Bankruptcy Code has aggressively and unwisely sought to regulate market liquidity and systemic risk, with the Code’s “safe harbors” from the normal bankruptcy machinery largely backfiring during the financial crisis. The sounder policy would be to limit the repo safe harbors to U.S. Treasury repos and repos of similarly liquid government securities.