As discussed in our previous memo, in January 2013, the SEC approved amendments to the NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards relating to compensation committees and their advisers. Unless they have already done so, companies should begin implementing the new requirements with respect to compensation committees and their advisers that take effect on July 1, 2013. Compensation committee action is required in order to comply with these requirements.

Companies should note that, while the new rules require compensation committees to consider the independence of their advisers, the rules do not require that such advisers be independent, nor is any aspect of the mandated independence review required to be disclosed publicly (other than proxy disclosure concerning compensation consultants to a company or its compensation committee).

Companies should also note that this independent assessment applies only to advisers; there will be a separate independence assessment of directors required later, as noted below.

…continue reading: Compensation Committee and Adviser Implementation Begins July 1, 2013

Transactions that reduce regulatory capital requirements for banks have recently come under media and regulatory scrutiny. The New York Times characterized them as a “trading sleight of hand.” The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed limiting the ways in which capital requirements can be reduced by such transactions. This post discusses the new Basel proposals in light of prior guidance published by Basel and the Federal Reserve. As banks seek ways to meet heightened capital requirements and surcharges that are being implemented, they may find greater difficulties in reducing their exposures.

…continue reading: Basel Developments: Credit Risk Mitigation Transactions and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage

Appraisal, or dissenters’, rights, long an M&A afterthought, have recently attracted more attention from deal-makers as a result of a number of largely unrelated factors. By way of brief review, appraisal rights are a statutory remedy available to objecting stockholders in certain extraordinary transactions. While the details vary by state (often meaningfully), in Delaware the most common application is in a cash-out merger (including a back-end merger following a tender offer), where dissenting stockholders can petition the Chancery Court for an independent determination of the “fair value” of their stake as an alternative to accepting the offered deal price. The statute mandates that both the petitioning stockholder and the company comply with strict procedural requirements, and the process is usually expensive (often costing millions) and lengthy (often taking years). At the end of the proceedings, the court will determine the fair value of the subject shares (i.e., only those for which appraisal has been sought), with the awarded amount potentially being lower or higher than the deal price received by the balance of the stockholders.

While deal counsel have always addressed the theoretical applicability of appraisal rights where relevant, a number of developments in recent years have contributed to these rights becoming a potential new frontier in deal risk and litigation:

…continue reading: Appraisal Rights — The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Green, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on Sections 165 and 121 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Our testimony will focus on the FDIC’s role and progress in implementing Section 165, including the resolution plan requirements and the requirements for stress testing by certain financial institutions.

Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act

Resolution Plans

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, bankruptcy is the preferred resolution framework in the event of a systemic financial company’s failure. To make this prospect achievable, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that all large, systemic financial companies prepare resolution plans, or “living wills”, to demonstrate how the company would be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner under the Bankruptcy Code in the event of the company’s material financial distress or failure. This requirement enables both the firm and the firm’s regulators to understand and address the parts of the business that could create systemic consequences in a bankruptcy.

The FDIC intends to make the living will process under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act both timely and meaningful. The living will process is a necessary and significant tool in ensuring that large financial institutions can be resolved through the bankruptcy system.

…continue reading: Examining the Application of Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act

I am sure many of you are looking forward to your well-earned celebrations after today’s commencement exercises, so I will heed the advice that President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave to speechmakers: “Be sincere, be brief and be seated.”

Perhaps the most challenging part of delivering a commencement speech is the realization that whatever one says will soon be forgotten. Frankly, my memory of the commencement speech at my own graduation is a bit hazy. So today I will ask you to remember just two things: First, the challenges you will face in life – and there will be many – are just new opportunities to learn and further your education. And second, it is always better to do the right thing, even if that may seem the harder choice.

Commencement is a good time for looking back, as well as for looking forward. When I graduated from Georgia Southern during the last century – well, 1976 – our school was called Georgia Southern College. The school only had about 6,000 students, mostly from the Southeast, and there was no football team. Today, Georgia Southern is a major university with more than 20,000 students coming from almost all 50 states and over 80 countries. And the Eagles will soon be dominating the Sun-Belt Conference.

…continue reading: Preparing for Challenges and Opportunities

In our study, CEO Succession Practices (2013 Edition), which The Conference Board recently released, we document and analyze 2012 cases of CEO turnover at S&P 500 companies. The study is organized in four parts.

Part I: CEO Succession Trends (2000-2012) illustrates year-by-year succession rates and examines specific aspects of the succession phenomenon, including the influence on firm performance on succession and the characteristics of the departing and incoming CEOs.

Part II: CEO Succession Practices (2012) details where boards assign responsibilities on leadership development, the role performed within the board by the retired CEO, and the extent of the disclosure to shareholders on these matters.

Part III: Notable Cases of CEO Succession (2012) includes summaries of 11 episodes of CEO succession that made headlines in the past two years and that were carefully chosen to highlight key circumstances of the process.

Part IV: Shareholder Activism on CEO Succession Planning (2012) reviews examples of companies that have recently faced shareholder pressure in this area.

The following are some of the major findings discussed in the study:

…continue reading: Statistics on CEO Succession in the S&P 500

Early Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season

As Skadden monitors the initial weeks of the 2013 proxy season, we are seeing the following preliminary trends:

Vote Results

Of the first 279 companies of the Russell 3000 to report the results of say-on-pay proposals, approximately:

• 72 percent have passed with over 90 percent support;
• 22 percent have passed with between 70.1 percent and 90 percent support;
• 4 percent have passed with between 50 percent and 70 percent support; and
• 2 percent (six companies) obtained less than 50 percent support.

…continue reading: Emerging Say-on-Pay Trends and Litigation Developments

Almost half a decade after the onset of the financial crisis, populist sentiment and the resulting political environment continue to fuel stricter regulation of executive and director compensation, with the latest wave in Europe including substantive restrictions on compensation in the financial services industry and “say-on-pay” initiatives (i.e., initiatives providing for shareholder approval of compensation). This post describes these recent European compensation developments, namely:

• The so-called “banker bonus cap” – substantive limits on the amount of variable compensation that can be paid to certain employees at financial institutions; and
• Say-on-pay developments in the E.U. and Switzerland.

…continue reading: European Compensation Developments: Financial Institutions and Beyond

On April 22, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced its first non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with a company in a matter involving alleged violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). [1] The SEC entered into the agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation (Lauren), resolving allegations that Lauren violated the FCPA when its Argentine subsidiary allegedly paid bribes to government and customs officials to improperly secure the importation of Lauren’s products into Argentina. The NPA in this case resulted from Lauren’s prompt self-reporting and extensive cooperation. Prior to the Lauren NPA, the SEC seemed to provide limited credit to public companies for cooperation in FCPA investigations.
Time will tell whether the Lauren NPA is a harbinger of a new approach.

…continue reading: SEC Announces First Non-Prosecution Agreement in an FCPA Matter

This year, the practice of activist hedge funds engaged in proxy contests offering special compensation schemes to their dissident director nominees has increased and become even more egregious. While the terms of these schemes vary, the general thrust is that, if elected, the dissident directors would receive large payments, in some cases in the millions of dollars, if the activist’s desired goals are met within the specified near-term deadlines.

These special compensation arrangements pose a number of threats, including:

…continue reading: Bylaw Protection against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment Schemes