Archive for the ‘Court Cases’ Category

Appraisal Rights — The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?

Posted by Daniel E. Wolf, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on Thursday May 16, 2013 at 9:30 am
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Editor’s Note: Daniel Wolf is a partner at Kirkland & Ellis focusing on mergers and acquisitions. The following post is based on a Kirkland memorandum by Mr. Wolf, Matthew Solum, Joshua M. Zachariah, and David B. Feirstein. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Appraisal, or dissenters’, rights, long an M&A afterthought, have recently attracted more attention from deal-makers as a result of a number of largely unrelated factors. By way of brief review, appraisal rights are a statutory remedy available to objecting stockholders in certain extraordinary transactions. While the details vary by state (often meaningfully), in Delaware the most common application is in a cash-out merger (including a back-end merger following a tender offer), where dissenting stockholders can petition the Chancery Court for an independent determination of the “fair value” of their stake as an alternative to accepting the offered deal price. The statute mandates that both the petitioning stockholder and the company comply with strict procedural requirements, and the process is usually expensive (often costing millions) and lengthy (often taking years). At the end of the proceedings, the court will determine the fair value of the subject shares (i.e., only those for which appraisal has been sought), with the awarded amount potentially being lower or higher than the deal price received by the balance of the stockholders.

While deal counsel have always addressed the theoretical applicability of appraisal rights where relevant, a number of developments in recent years have contributed to these rights becoming a potential new frontier in deal risk and litigation:

…continue reading: Appraisal Rights — The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?

Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday May 8, 2013 at 9:14 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Alan W. Kornberg, partner and chair of the Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

On March 27, 2013, Judge Sean Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the $11 billion merger of US Airways Group and AMR Corporation effective upon confirmation of the AMR debtors’ chapter 11 plan. Upon completion of the merger, a new entity – “Newco,” for present purposes – will survive. In his March 27 ruling, Judge Lane declined to approve a proposed $20 million severance payment by Newco to Thomas Horton, the current Chief Executive Officer of AMR Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Judge Lane issued a written opinion explaining his reasoning for denying the proposed severance payment and in it, foreclosed an attempt to approve a severance package free from the strict standards of Section 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Background

In connection with the proposed merger, the AMR debtors sought Bankruptcy Court approval of employee compensation and benefit arrangements (the “Employee Arrangements”) falling into three categories (i) Ordinary Course Changes; (ii) Employee Protection Arrangements; and (iii) the CEO severance payment. Though the US Trustee initially objected to all three Employee Arrangements, she eventually withdrew her objections to all but the CEO severance payment.

…continue reading: Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO

Court Dismisses Insider Preference Claims Against Affiliates of Goldman Sachs

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday May 2, 2013 at 9:39 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Donald S. Bernstein, partner and co-head of the Insolvency and Restructuring Practice at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum.

Firms offering comprehensive financial services scored a significant victory on April 9, 2013, when Judge Robert Sweet of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Capmark Financial Group Inc.’s (“Capmark”) insider preference action against four lender affiliates of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”), which arose out of Capmark’s 2009 bankruptcy. [1] Davis Polk represented the Goldman Sachs lender affiliates and advanced the arguments adopted by Judge Sweet. The court’s opinion rejected Capmark’s attempt to cast the lenders as “insiders” of Capmark based on an indirect equity interest in Capmark held by funds managed by affiliates of Goldman Sachs and Goldman Sachs’s service as an advisor to Capmark. In doing so, Judge Sweet reaffirmed that corporate veils separating a lender from an affiliated entity holding equity positions or serving as advisor to the debtor will not lightly be disregarded, and that participation in an arm’s-length transaction as an ordinary commercial lender will not give rise to insider status. Furthermore, Judge Sweet held that reorganized debtors are judicially estopped from making an about-face on key factual issues underlying relief secured in bankruptcy court. In sum, the Capmark decision should pose a substantial obstacle to claims alleging that a lender is an “insider” by virtue of affiliated entities’ contacts with a debtor in the absence of evidence that the lender actually used the affiliates’ contacts to influence the debtor’s decisions.

…continue reading: Court Dismisses Insider Preference Claims Against Affiliates of Goldman Sachs

Supreme Court: Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Applies to Alien Tort Statute

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday May 1, 2013 at 9:15 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., partner and co-chair of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s Appellate and Constitutional Law Group, Crisis Management Group, and Transnational Litigation and Foreign Judgments Group. The post is based on a Gibson Dunn client alert by Mr. Boutrous, Christopher M. Francis, Daniel M. Sullivan, and William E. Thomson.

On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., __ U.S. __ (2013), addressing the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“ATS”). In Kiobel, the Court sharply limited the availability of U.S. courts to hear claims brought by foreign nationals against other foreign nationals for human rights violations committed outside the United States. Although the decision was unanimous, the Justices’ reasoning divided. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS and that nothing in the ATS itself rebuts that presumption. The Chief Justice’s opinion, joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, casts doubt on the viability of ATS claims arising from foreign acts, but leaves open the possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality might be rebutted if claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States” with “sufficient force to displace” that presumption. A foreign defendant’s “[m]ere corporate presence” in the United States, however, does not suffice. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, filed a concurrence in the judgment rejecting the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality and instead proposing that claims for violations of international law can be recognized under the ATS even for violations committed abroad either where the defendant is an American national or where the case sufficiently implicates a U.S. interest.

The Court’s analysis in Kiobel will likely have far-reaching repercussions for foreign nationals alleging that they have been the victims of human rights abuses outside the United States, for corporations potentially subject to expensive and difficult-to-predict ATS suits, and for foreign countries whose policies and actions might become the subject of ATS suits.

…continue reading: Supreme Court: Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Applies to Alien Tort Statute

Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday April 22, 2013 at 9:11 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Wolf-Georg Ringe, Professor of International Commercial Law at Copenhagen Business School.

This blog has repeatedly reported on the use of empty voting strategies at the Canadian telecommunications provider Telus Corporation. (see, e.g., here and here). Empty voting – that is, the strategic separation of economic risk from voting rights – has been considered by courts, regulators and academics over the past years in various forms. The latest account is the case of Canadian telecommunications company Telus, which became the target of US hedge fund Mason Capital. After a lengthy battle in various courtrooms, the dust has settled around this conflict. The Telus saga sheds new light on how empty voting structures are used by businesses in practice and supports calls for regulatory activity. In my recent paper, Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga, I analyze the various instances of this important legal battle and develop regulatory implications.

…continue reading: Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga

Delaware M&A Quarterly

Posted by Toby S. Myerson, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, on Friday April 19, 2013 at 12:32 pm
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Editor’s Note: Toby Myerson is a partner in the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP and co-head of the firm’s Global Mergers and Acquisitions Group. The following post is based on a Paul Weiss memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In this issue, we discuss several cases of significance to the M&A practice, including In re Ancestry.com, In re Bioclinica, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Kallick v. Sandridge Energy and Meso Scale Diagnostics v. Roche Diagnostics, as well as some market trends that may be of interest.

Board Enjoined From Impeding Consent Solicitation Until It Approves Insurgent Slate for Purposes of Credit Agreement

In Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery, in an opinion by Chancellor Strine, enjoined the incumbent board of SandRidge Energy, which faced a consent solicitation initiated by a large stockholder seeking to de-stagger and replace the board, from, among other things, soliciting against or otherwise impeding the consent solicitation until the board approved the rival slate for purposes of a “proxy put” provision in SandRidge’s credit agreements. The Kallick decision, along with the Court of Chancery’s earlier decision in San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, confirm that corporations, as a matter of process, should carefully consider and review whether proxy put and other similar change-of- control provisions in credit agreements and indentures are truly in the best interests of the stockholders. For more detail, click here.

…continue reading: Delaware M&A Quarterly

Judicial Review and Gains of Minority Shareholders in Freeze-Out Transactions

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday April 18, 2013 at 9:21 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Fernan Restrepo of Stanford Law School. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Freeze-outs have been subject to different standards of judicial review in Delaware since 2001, when the Delaware Chancery Court, in In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Civ. A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. June 19, 2001), introduced a distinction based on the form in which the transaction is executed. In particular, in Siliconix, the chancery court held that, unlike freeze-outs executed as a merger (which have been subject to “entire fairness review” since 1952), freeze-outs executed as a tender offer were exempted from that standard of review. According to the court, tender offers do not warrant entire fairness because, in these transactions, in contrast to a merger, minority shareholders are protected by the decision itself of tendering or not tendering. Moreover, one month after Siliconix, in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corporation, 777 A.2d. 242 (Del 2001), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a short-form merger is also excluded from entire fairness review. As a result of these two decisions, a controlling shareholder was allowed to completely avoid entire fairness by acquiring the remaining shares from minority shareholders through a tender offer followed by a short-form merger.

…continue reading: Judicial Review and Gains of Minority Shareholders in Freeze-Out Transactions

Federal Court Dismisses Delaware Law Compensation Disclosure Claim

Posted by David A. Katz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Wednesday April 10, 2013 at 9:16 am
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Editor’s Note: David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz, Warren R. Stern, Jasand P. Mock, and Kim B. Goldberg. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

We have previously discussed a wave of “say-on-pay” lawsuits focused on allegedly inadequate proxy disclosures (in a memo, article, and memo). At least six courts (four state and two federal) have denied requests for injunctive relief against say-on-pay votes. Now, a federal court that had already denied preliminary injunctive relief has dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Noble v. AAR Corp., No. 12 C 7973 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2013).

Applying Delaware and federal law, the Northern District of Illinois held that Delaware law did not require a company soliciting proxies in advisory say-on-pay vote to disclose information beyond that specified in Regulation S-K:

…continue reading: Federal Court Dismisses Delaware Law Compensation Disclosure Claim

Delaware Court Limits Non-Delaware Dismissal

Posted by Theodore Mirvis, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Monday April 8, 2013 at 9:22 am
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Editor’s Note: Theodore N. Mirvis is a partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The following post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Mirvis, William Savitt, and Ryan A. McLeod. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here. Further reading about the Delaware Supreme Court decision discussed below is available here.

The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery erred by failing to give preclusive effect to an earlier with-prejudice dismissal of a parallel derivative suit in another state, and by creating a presumption that all plaintiffs who file derivative suits without first conducting books-and-records inspections are inadequate representatives. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2012 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). The decision stresses the importance of interstate comity and the need to give full faith and credit to the decisions of other courts.

Allergan is a drug company that incurred losses in resolving civil and criminal investigations of off-label drug marketing. Derivative suits were filed in both federal court in California and the Court of Chancery alleging that Allergan’s directors were liable for the losses because they failed to properly monitor the company’s marketing practices. The Delaware shareholder plaintiff obtained documents through a books-and-records inspection under 8 Del. C. § 220 before filing suit. The California plaintiffs did not, but later amended their complaints when the Delaware plaintiff shared the documents. Defendants moved to dismiss in both jurisdictions. The California federal court ruled first, dismissing with prejudice for failure to establish demand futility. The Court of Chancery refused to give preclusive effect to that ruling, applying Delaware law to the preclusion question. Turning to the merits, Chancery disagreed with the federal court, holding that demand was futile and that the case should proceed.

…continue reading: Delaware Court Limits Non-Delaware Dismissal

Court: Disclosure of SEC Investigation Insufficient to Plead Loss Causation

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday March 29, 2013 at 9:04 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Adam Hakki, partner and global head of the Litigation Group at Shearman & Sterling LLP, and is based on a Shearman & Sterling client publication.

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued an important decision that addresses two types of allegations that plaintiffs routinely rely on to plead loss causation in federal securities fraud cases. In Meyer v. Greene, 2013 US App. LEXIS 4187 (11th Cir. Feb. 25, 2013), the Eleventh Circuit appears to have become the first federal court of appeals to rule definitively that the mere announcement of an investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) followed by a decline in a company’s stock price is insufficient to plead loss causation. The Court also ruled, consistent with decisions from other federal circuits, that a negative third-party analyst presentation is not a corrective disclosure for purposes of pleading loss causation if the presentation is based on publicly available information.

…continue reading: Court: Disclosure of SEC Investigation Insufficient to Plead Loss Causation

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