We recently submitted a comment letter in connection with a rulemaking petition, currently before the SEC, urging the development of rules to require public companies to disclose the use of corporate resources for political activities. The Petition was submitted by the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, a group of ten corporate and securities law experts that we co-chaired. In further support of the rules advocated by the Petition, our comment letter submitted for consideration by the SEC our Article Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, which was published recently in the Georgetown Law Journal.

The submitted Article puts forth a comprehensive, empirically-grounded case for the rules advocated in the Petition. The Article also provides a detailed response to each of the ten objections that have been raised by the Petition’s opponents, either in the comment file or elsewhere. The Article shows that none of these objections, either individually or collectively, provides a basis for opposing rules requiring public companies to disclose political spending.

The main part of our comment letter discusses and reviews the analysis in the attached article as follows:

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GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards survey includes data on 5,977 companies in 45 countries around the world. The results show that progress on most measures of female representation continues to be slow. Women now hold 11% of board seats at the world’s largest and best-known companies, up 0.5 percentage points from a year ago and a total of only 1.7 percentage points since 2009. Among these companies, 63% have at least one female director, and 13% have at least three women—a level that some research suggests may constitute a critical mass and allow women’s leadership styles to come to the fore. As we noted last year, women make up a higher percentage of directors in developed markets (11.8%, up from 11.2% last year) than they do in emerging markets (7.4%, both this year and last).

Underlying the incremental pace of global change are very heterogeneous trends in female board representation in different countries and regions. Leading the globe on gender-diverse boards is Europe, where legal requirements for women’s representation exist or are being considered at both the EU level and in various countries. Norway, Sweden and Finland continue to lead the developed world in their percentage of female directors, with 36.1%, 27.0%, and 26.8%, respectively. Significant increases in women’s representation are also happening in Italy and France, following the passage of recent laws on board diversity. France now ranks 4th in the world, with 18.3% female directors. (In Spain, however, where a law exists but enforcement mechanisms are weak, much less change has occurred.) In addition to raising their percentages of female directors over the last year, Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have all seen sharp increases (of between 8-18 percentage points) in the proportion of companies with at least three women. Over half of French boards, and a third of those in Germany, now have at least three female directors.

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A large body of prior literature examines the relation between managerial equity incentives and financial misreporting but reports mixed results. This literature argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if managers are risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, managers face a risk/return tradeoff when making a misreporting decision. In this case, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price, or portfolio delta, will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager’s equity portfolio to changes in risk, or portfolio vega, will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. Accordingly, when managers are risk-averse, it is important to jointly consider both portfolio delta and portfolio vega when assessing the relation between equity incentives and misreporting.

In our paper, The Relation Between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we show that jointly considering both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in the literature. Specifically, we find inferences in studies reporting either a positive relation or no relation between portfolio delta and misreporting are not robust to controlling for vega.

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All U.S. S&P 500 companies except one report some form of sustainability disclosure. This widespread reporting indeed is good news. But, isolated sustainability disclosures have proven to be of limited value to corporate management trying to improve the bottom line, and for investors seeking to gauge risk and opportunity.

New research from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) and the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2) – the first to benchmark the status of integrated reporting in the U.S. – finds that nearly all S&P 500 companies are failing to connect the disclosure dots. A mere seven companies are integrating financial and sustainability reporting. These trendsetters include American Electric Power, Clorox, Dow Chemical, Eaton, Ingersoll Rand, Pfizer and Southwest Airlines.

The study also finds companies typically are beginning to place a dollar figure on sustainability – about 74 percent of corporations. But, these disclosures frequently mention other initiatives without quantification of the benefits and costs. Also interesting is that some 44 percent of companies link executive compensation to sustainability criteria.

What’s driving increased disclosure is a combination of factors – rules, regulations, fines, and even the increased volume on the climate change debate. What’s problematic, however, is that the rules are disjointed. As a result, companies and investors don’t have a clear vision so they can factor sustainability into corporate planning and financials.

But this disorderly backdrop doesn’t mean companies lack the capability to quantify the impact of sustainability.

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As discussed in our previous memo, in January 2013, the SEC approved amendments to the NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards relating to compensation committees and their advisers. Unless they have already done so, companies should begin implementing the new requirements with respect to compensation committees and their advisers that take effect on July 1, 2013. Compensation committee action is required in order to comply with these requirements.

Companies should note that, while the new rules require compensation committees to consider the independence of their advisers, the rules do not require that such advisers be independent, nor is any aspect of the mandated independence review required to be disclosed publicly (other than proxy disclosure concerning compensation consultants to a company or its compensation committee).

Companies should also note that this independent assessment applies only to advisers; there will be a separate independence assessment of directors required later, as noted below.

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One of the dumbest corporate governance issues is whether to split the roles of Board Chair and CEO. That debate is now playing out on the front pages of business sections (print and online) as shareholders will decide next week in a nonbinding vote whether to take the chairman of the board title away from JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon.

This is a reprise, for the zillionth time, of the pointless push by governance types to call the senior director "chairman of the board" rather than "lead" or "presiding" director and to deny the CEO the chairman of the board title. (Dimon, of course, is today Chairman of the Board and CEO of JP Morgan; Lee Raymond is JPM's "lead" director.)

What is lost in virtually all stories and commentary hyping the Dimon election is an answer to the basic question: what is the function of the lead director? It is this issue of function, not form (i.e., what title that senior director carries), which is crucial.

It has been a governance verity, if not always a reality, that a strong board should provide oversight and constructive criticism to the CEO and other company leaders.

Since Enron, this basic principle has been implemented in most companies by designating one director to be first among equals, whatever her title. That director performs at least the following core roles (as I have discussed in detail elsewhere):

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Transactions that reduce regulatory capital requirements for banks have recently come under media and regulatory scrutiny. The New York Times characterized them as a “trading sleight of hand.” The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed limiting the ways in which capital requirements can be reduced by such transactions. This post discusses the new Basel proposals in light of prior guidance published by Basel and the Federal Reserve. As banks seek ways to meet heightened capital requirements and surcharges that are being implemented, they may find greater difficulties in reducing their exposures.

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In our paper, Audit Committee Elections, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether and in what ways shareholder votes in the elections of directors who sit on the audit committee (AC) are associated with the effectiveness of the audit committee. Within the board, the audit committee is responsible for monitoring the financial reporting process. This process involves oversight over the external auditor, internal controls and overall quality of the financial reports. Aside from voting in director elections, shareholders can do very little to influence or signal their satisfaction to the AC. Yet, research examining director elections does not generally focus on the AC. In this study we aim to fill this void.

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Appraisal, or dissenters’, rights, long an M&A afterthought, have recently attracted more attention from deal-makers as a result of a number of largely unrelated factors. By way of brief review, appraisal rights are a statutory remedy available to objecting stockholders in certain extraordinary transactions. While the details vary by state (often meaningfully), in Delaware the most common application is in a cash-out merger (including a back-end merger following a tender offer), where dissenting stockholders can petition the Chancery Court for an independent determination of the “fair value” of their stake as an alternative to accepting the offered deal price. The statute mandates that both the petitioning stockholder and the company comply with strict procedural requirements, and the process is usually expensive (often costing millions) and lengthy (often taking years). At the end of the proceedings, the court will determine the fair value of the subject shares (i.e., only those for which appraisal has been sought), with the awarded amount potentially being lower or higher than the deal price received by the balance of the stockholders.

While deal counsel have always addressed the theoretical applicability of appraisal rights where relevant, a number of developments in recent years have contributed to these rights becoming a potential new frontier in deal risk and litigation:

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Why do governments repay external sovereign borrowing? This is a question that has been central to discussions of sovereign debt capacity, yet the answer is still being debated. Models where countries service their external debt for fear of being excluded from capital markets for a sustained period (or some other form of harsh punishment such as trade sanctions or invasion) seem very persuasive, yet are at odds with the fact that defaulters seem to be able to return to borrowing in international capital markets after a short while. With sovereign debt around the world at extremely high levels, understanding why sovereigns repay foreign creditors, and what their debt capacity might be, is an important concern for policy makers and investors. In our paper, Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we attempt to address these issues.

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