Delaware Reaffirms that Corporate Control Lies in the Boardroom

Editor’s Note: Edward D. Herlihy is a partner and co-chairman of the Executive Committee at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The following post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Herlihy, William SavittDavid E. Shapiro, and Ryan A. McLeod. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In an important ruling [October 14, 2014], the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a merger challenge on the pleadings and reaffirmed the primacy of director authority, the significance of the vote of disinterested stockholders, and the vibrancy of the business judgment rule. In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 9210-CB (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014).

…continue reading: Delaware Reaffirms that Corporate Control Lies in the Boardroom

Corporate Governance and the Creation of the SEC

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday October 20, 2014 at 8:59 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Arevik Avedian of Harvard Law School; Henrik Cronqvist, Professor of Finance from China Europe International Business School (CEIBS); and Marc Weidenmier, Professor of Economics at Claremont Colleges.

Severe turmoil in financial markets—whether the Panic of 1826, the Wall Street Crash of 1929, or the Global Financial Crisis of 2008—often raises significant concerns about the effectiveness of pre-existing securities market regulation. In turn, such concerns tend to result in calls for more and stricter government regulation of corporations and financial markets. It is widely considered that the most significant change to U.S. financial regulation in the past 100 years was the Securities Act of 1933 and the subsequent creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce it. Before the SEC creation, federal securities market regulation was essentially absent in the U.S. In our paper, Corporate Governance and the Creation of the SEC, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how companies listing in the U.S. responded to this significant increase in the provision of government-sponsored corporate governance. Specifically, did this landmark legislation have any significant effects on board governance (e.g., the independence of boards) and firm valuations?

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Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday October 19, 2014 at 8:31 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Luca Enriques, Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law at University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, and Sergio Gilotta of University of Bologna.

In our recent paper, Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation, we provide a critical overview of the role of disclosure in financial market regulation.

We begin by discussing the goals of disclosure regulation, which we identify in investor protection, agency cost reduction and price accuracy enhancement. Disclosure protects investors because (a) it gives them the information that is needed in order to make correct investment decisions, (b) it prevents them from being “exploited” by traders having superior information, and (c) it constrains managers’ and controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behavior. In this last respect, the goal of investor protection equates that of agency cost reduction.

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FINRA To Propose Market Structure Actions

Posted by Annette L. Nazareth, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Saturday October 18, 2014 at 7:18 am
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Editor’s Note: Annette Nazareth is a partner in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and a former commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum.

On September 19, 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) announced that its Board of Governors (the “Board”) approved a series of regulatory initiatives primarily focused on equity and fixed income market structure issues. This is a direct response by FINRA to two important speeches this summer by SEC Chair Mary Jo White, in which she articulated an ambitious agenda of market structure reforms. [1]

The Board authorized FINRA staff to prepare Regulatory Notices soliciting comments or issuing guidance on the following:

…continue reading: FINRA To Propose Market Structure Actions

APG Asset Management Issues Remuneration Guidelines

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday October 17, 2014 at 9:06 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from David Shammai, Senior Governance Specialist and Martijn Olthof, Senior Portfolio Manager, both at APG Asset Management. APG’s remuneration guidelines are available here.

One of the world largest fiduciary asset managers, APG recently issued remuneration guidelines that will be applied to its portfolio of European listed companies. APG believes that the innovation in the new guidelines is twofold. First in that they are based on its practical experience of company engagements and therefore reflect an integrated investment and governance outlook. More specifically, the guidelines place a clear emphasis on value creation. By issuing the guidelines APG is aiming to make its ongoing discussions with companies around pay more effective, thus freeing up time for it to focus on other important corporate governance areas such as board structure, succession and nominations.

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Directors Should Communicate with Shareholders

Editor’s Note: John Wilcox is chairman of Sodali and former Head of Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF. This post is based on a Sodali publication by Mr. Wilcox.

To demonstrate their effectiveness, corporate boards should increase transparency, provide an annual report of boardroom activities and take charge of their relations with shareholders.

With shareholders continuing to press for ever-deepening levels of engagement, companies must find a way to answer the most basic question of corporate governance: “How effective is the board of directors?” It is a question that can only be answered by the board itself, but it presents directors with a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge is to overcome the mindset, habits and perceived risks that have long kept boardroom activities under wraps. The opportunity, on the other hand, is to define governance and strategic issues from the board’s perspective, manage shareholder expectations, take the engagement initiative away from shareholders and reduce the likelihood of activism. Directors should give careful consideration to this opportunity. Over the long term, it will be far better for companies to control the process by which board transparency is achieved rather than waiting for yet again another set of governance reforms that could further erode the board’s authority.

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New Evidence on Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday October 16, 2014 at 9:12 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Jenny Chu, Jonathan Faasse, and Raghavendra Rau, all of the Finance & Accounting Group at the University of Cambridge.

In 2013, CEOs in S&P 500 firms were paid, on average, over 200 times the average worker’s salary in their firms. To avoid or minimize public outrage, managers have a substantial incentive to obscure and try to legitimize their excessive compensation. One way of doing so is to have “independent” compensation consultants recommend higher pay to the board. However, prior literature has not been able to find significant evidence that hiring consultants leads to higher pay, partly because the information is only available after 2006 and most studies on this topic examine one or two years after 2006.

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SEC Whistleblower Program Achieves Critical Mass

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday October 15, 2014 at 9:02 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Matt T. Morley, partner in the Government Enforcement practice area at K&L Gates LLP, and is based on a K&L Gates alert authored by Mr. Morley.

Two recent Dodd-Frank whistleblower awards suggest that the program is becoming the kind of “game changer” for law enforcement that many had predicted. The program, which took effect in August 2011, mandates the payment of bounties to persons who voluntarily provide information leading to a successful securities enforcement action in which more than $1 million is recovered. Informants are entitled to receive between 10 and 30 percent of the amounts recovered, with the precise amount to be determined by the SEC.

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How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements?

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday October 15, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Eric Posner, Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago.

The incentive to take socially costly financial risks is inherent in banking: because of the interconnected nature of banking, one bank’s failure can increase the risk of failure of another bank even if they do not have a contractual relationship. If numerous banks collapse, the sudden withdrawal of credit from the economy hurts third parties who depend on loans to finance consumption and investment. The perverse incentive to take financial risk is further aggravated by underpriced government-supplied insurance and the government’s readiness to play the role of lender of last resort.

…continue reading: How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements?

SEC Enforcement Actions Regarding Section 16 Reporting Obligations

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Tuesday October 14, 2014 at 9:09 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from John P. Kelsh, partner in the Corporate and Securities group at Sidley Austin LLP, and is based on a Sidley Austin publication by Mr. Kelsh, Paul V. Gerlach, and Holly J. Gregory.

Last month, the SEC announced that it brought enforcement actions primarily relating to Section 16(a) under the Securities Exchange Act against 34 defendants. The defendants were 13 individuals who were or had been officers or directors of public companies, five individual investors, ten investment funds/advisers and six public companies.

This post briefly discusses several noteworthy points regarding this development and also discusses practical steps that companies could consider taking in response.

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