Posts Tagged ‘Bankruptcy’

What It Takes for the FDIC SPOE Resolution Proposal to Work

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Karen Petrou, co-founder and managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, Inc., and is based on a letter and a FedFin white paper submitted to the FDIC by Ms. Petrou; the full texts are available here.

In a comment letter and supporting paper to the FDIC on its single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution concept release, Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, argues that SPOE is conceptually sound and statutorily robust. However, progress to date on orderly liquidation has been so cautious as to cloud the credibility of assertions that the largest U.S. financial institutions, especially the biggest banks, are no longer too big to fail (“TBTF”). Crafting a new resolution regime is of course a complex undertaking that benefits from as much consensus as possible. However, if definitive action is not quickly taken on a policy construct for single-point-of-entry resolutions resolving high-level questions about its practicality and functionality under stress, markets will revert to TBTF expectations that renew market distortions, place undue competitive pressure on small firms, and stoke systemic risk. Even more dangerous, the FDIC may not be ready when systemic risk strikes again.

Questions addressed in detail in the paper and Ms. Petrou’s answers to them are summarized below:

…continue reading: What It Takes for the FDIC SPOE Resolution Proposal to Work

The Three Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil

Posted by Jonathan R. Macey, Yale Law School, on Thursday March 27, 2014 at 9:20 am
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Editor’s Note: Jonathan R. Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law at Yale University. The following post is based on an article co-authored by Professor Macey and Joshua Mitts of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. The views in this post are those of Mr. Mitts and not his employer.

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is shrouded in misperception and confusion. On the one hand, courts understand the fact that the corporate form is supposed to be a juridical entity with the characteristic of legal “personhood.” As such courts acknowledge that their equitable authority to pierce the corporate veil is to be exercised “reluctantly” and “cautiously.” [1] Similarly, courts also recognize that it is perfectly legitimate to create a corporation or other form of limited liability company business organization such as an LLC “for the very purpose of escaping personal liability” for the debts incurred by the enterprise. [2]

…continue reading: The Three Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil

The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday December 9, 2013 at 9:33 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law. The post is based on a paper co-authored by Professor Schwarcz and Ori Sharon of Duke University School of Law.

Bankruptcy law in the United States, which serves as an important precedent for the treatment of derivatives under insolvency law worldwide, gives creditors in derivatives transactions special rights and immunities in the bankruptcy process, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights against the debtor (hereinafter, the “safe harbor”). The concern is that these special rights and immunities grew incrementally, primarily due to industry lobbying and without a systematic and rigorous vetting of their consequences.

Path Dependence

This type of legislative accretion process is a form of path dependence—a process in which the outcome is shaped by its historical path. To understand path dependence, consider Professor Mark Roe’s example of an 18th century fur trader who cuts a winding path through the woods to avoid dangers. Later travelers follow this path, and in time it becomes a paved road and houses and industry are erected alongside. Although the dangers that affected the fur trader are long gone, few question the road’s inefficiently winding route.

…continue reading: The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis

Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO, Again

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday October 27, 2013 at 9:22 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Alan W. Kornberg, partner and chair of the Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, and is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

For the second time in six months, Judge Sean H. Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York declined to approve a $20 million severance payment to Thomas Horton, Chief Executive Officer of AMR Corporation. Earlier this year, as described in our April 18, 2013 client alert (discussed here), Judge Lane reviewed and denied the Horton severance payment as part of the $11 billion merger of US Airways and AMR Corporation but he left open the possibility—without expressing a view—of pursuing such a payment under the chapter 11 plan. In a September 13, 2013 decision, Judge Lane reviewed the same $20 million severance payment, this time included as part of AMR Corporation’s plan of reorganization, and, while confirming the plan of reorganization, again denied the severance payment. [1]

…continue reading: Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO, Again

A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganization

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday October 23, 2013 at 9:08 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Eric Posner, Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar at the University of Chicago, and E. Glen Weyl, Assistant Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a dizzyingly complex and inefficient process. Voting on potential reorganization plans take place by class, rules are based on achieving majorities and super-majorities by different standards, and a judge must evaluate the plan to ensure it respects pre-bankruptcy entitlements appropriately. Plan proponents can gerrymander plans in order to isolate creditors; hedge funds can buy positions that pay off if plans fail while allowing them to exert influence over the negotiation process; and judges are often unable to stop such gaming. To cut through this morass, lawyers and economists have proposed reforms, such as holding an auction for the firm or offering options to junior creditors that enable them to buy out senior creditors.

While these reforms could make important steps towards improving Chapter 11, they neglect a crucial problem the current system is designed to address: that of collective action. The current owners of various claims on the firm are usually well-suited to play the particular roles they are playing within the capital structure. Because of sunk investments in learning about the firm or their risk-preferences they are the most valuable investors to hold the assets they hold. A reorganized firm that does not have their appropriate participation may not be nearly as valuable as one that does. In fact, it may be better to liquidate the firm, even if reorganization could be efficient, than to reorganize it with the wrong owners.

…continue reading: A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganization

MD&A Disclosure and the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday August 22, 2013 at 8:54 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Bill Mayew, Mani Sethuraman, and Mohan Venkatachalam, all of the Accounting Area at Duke University.

In January 2012, the Financial Accounting Standards Board decided by a narrow margin of 4-3 not to require management to perform an assessment of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. By May 2012, the FASB reconsidered this requirement and in June 2013 issued an exposure draft that mandates going concern disclosures as part of the financial report. Proponents of this requirement contend that more information is needed from management to inform investors and creditors of impending firm failure, particularly given the spate of recent bankruptcies that have occurred seemingly without warning from either the management or the firm’s auditors. Opponents contend, among other reasons, that managers already disclose sufficient information in their MD&A voluntarily. As such, their view is that an additional disclosure mandate would be an unnecessary imposition on management. In our paper, MD&A Disclosure and the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we directly inform this debate by assessing whether, to what extent, and when existing disclosures in a firm’s MD&A inform about a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.

…continue reading: MD&A Disclosure and the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern

Central European Distribution Corporation’s Chapter 11 Plan Incorporates Dutch Auction

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Tuesday August 20, 2013 at 9:10 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Mark S. Chehi, a partner in the Corporate Restructuring Group of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Chehi, Glenn S. Walter, Jay M. Goffman, and Mark A. McDermott.

On May 13, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware confirmed a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan of reorganization in the case of Central European Distribution Corporation (CEDC) [1] that incorporated an unmodified reverse Dutch auction. A reverse Dutch auction is a type of auction employed when a single buyer accepts bids from numerous sellers, and lowest-priced seller bids are accepted as winning bids.

The CEDC plan is perhaps the first instance of a Dutch auction process being incorporated successfully into a Chapter 11 reorganization plan. This precedent provides guidance for the use of Dutch auctions that may offer creditors distribution alternatives and maximize the utility of limited cash (or other limited property) available for distribution under a plan.

…continue reading: Central European Distribution Corporation’s Chapter 11 Plan Incorporates Dutch Auction

Appellate Court: Madoff Trustee Lacks Authority to Go After Banks

Posted by John F. Savarese, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday June 27, 2013 at 9:30 am
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Editor’s Note: John Savarese is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savarese, Stephen R. DiPrimaEmil A. Kleinhaus, and Jonathon R. La Chapelle.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held today that the trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) lacks authority to pursue common-law claims for damages suffered by Madoff’s customers. Based on that ruling, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a variety of damages claims against JPMorgan, HSBC and other banks relating to Madoff’s historic Ponzi scheme. See Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 11-5044 (2d Cir. June 20, 2013). Our firm represented JPMorgan both in the district court and on appeal.

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Caplin v. Marine Midland, 406 U.S. 416 (1972), it has been well-established that a bankruptcy trustee — as the legal successor to the debtor — may not bring damages claims that belong to creditors. It is also well-established that, under the doctrine of in pari delicto, the bankruptcy trustee for a fraudulent debtor may not sue third parties for harms caused by the debtor’s own fraud.

…continue reading: Appellate Court: Madoff Trustee Lacks Authority to Go After Banks

The Costs of “Too Big To Fail”

Posted by Mark Roe, Harvard Law School, on Wednesday June 26, 2013 at 5:43 pm
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Editor’s Note: Mark Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches bankruptcy and corporate law. This post is Professor Roe’s most recent op-ed written for the international association of newspapers Project Syndicate, which can be found here.

The idea that some banks are “too big to fail” has emerged from the obscurity of regulatory and academic debate into the broader public discourse on finance. Bloomberg News started the most recent public discussion, criticizing the benefit that such banks receive — a benefit that a study released by the International Monetary Fund has shown to be quite large.

Bankers’ lobbyists and representatives dismissed the Bloomberg editorial for citing a single study, and for relying on rating agencies’ rankings for the big banks, which showed that several would have to pay more for their long-term funding if financial markets didn’t expect government support in case of trouble.

In fact, though, there are about ten recent studies, not just one, concerning the benefit that too-big-to-fail banks receive from the government. Nearly every study points in the same direction: a large boost in the too-big-to-fail subsidy during and after the financial crisis, making it cheaper for big banks to borrow.

But a recent research report released by Goldman Sachs argues the contrary — and deserves to be taken more seriously than the first dismissive views. The report concludes that, over time, big banks’ advantage in long-term funding costs relative to smaller banks has been one-third of one percentage point; that this advantage is small; that it narrowed recently (and may be reversing); that it comes from the big banks’ efficiency and their bonds’ liquidity; and that historically it has been mostly small banks, not big ones, that have failed.

…continue reading: The Costs of “Too Big To Fail”

Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday May 8, 2013 at 9:14 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Alan W. Kornberg, partner and chair of the Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

On March 27, 2013, Judge Sean Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the $11 billion merger of US Airways Group and AMR Corporation effective upon confirmation of the AMR debtors’ chapter 11 plan. Upon completion of the merger, a new entity – “Newco,” for present purposes – will survive. In his March 27 ruling, Judge Lane declined to approve a proposed $20 million severance payment by Newco to Thomas Horton, the current Chief Executive Officer of AMR Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Judge Lane issued a written opinion explaining his reasoning for denying the proposed severance payment and in it, foreclosed an attempt to approve a severance package free from the strict standards of Section 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Background

In connection with the proposed merger, the AMR debtors sought Bankruptcy Court approval of employee compensation and benefit arrangements (the “Employee Arrangements”) falling into three categories (i) Ordinary Course Changes; (ii) Employee Protection Arrangements; and (iii) the CEO severance payment. Though the US Trustee initially objected to all three Employee Arrangements, she eventually withdrew her objections to all but the CEO severance payment.

…continue reading: Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO

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