A large body of prior literature examines the relation between managerial equity incentives and financial misreporting but reports mixed results. This literature argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if managers are risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, managers face a risk/return tradeoff when making a misreporting decision. In this case, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price, or portfolio delta, will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager’s equity portfolio to changes in risk, or portfolio vega, will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. Accordingly, when managers are risk-averse, it is important to jointly consider both portfolio delta and portfolio vega when assessing the relation between equity incentives and misreporting.

In our paper, The Relation Between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we show that jointly considering both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in the literature. Specifically, we find inferences in studies reporting either a positive relation or no relation between portfolio delta and misreporting are not robust to controlling for vega.

…continue reading: The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting

As discussed in our previous memo, in January 2013, the SEC approved amendments to the NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards relating to compensation committees and their advisers. Unless they have already done so, companies should begin implementing the new requirements with respect to compensation committees and their advisers that take effect on July 1, 2013. Compensation committee action is required in order to comply with these requirements.

Companies should note that, while the new rules require compensation committees to consider the independence of their advisers, the rules do not require that such advisers be independent, nor is any aspect of the mandated independence review required to be disclosed publicly (other than proxy disclosure concerning compensation consultants to a company or its compensation committee).

Companies should also note that this independent assessment applies only to advisers; there will be a separate independence assessment of directors required later, as noted below.

…continue reading: Compensation Committee and Adviser Implementation Begins July 1, 2013

Early Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season

As Skadden monitors the initial weeks of the 2013 proxy season, we are seeing the following preliminary trends:

Vote Results

Of the first 279 companies of the Russell 3000 to report the results of say-on-pay proposals, approximately:

• 72 percent have passed with over 90 percent support;
• 22 percent have passed with between 70.1 percent and 90 percent support;
• 4 percent have passed with between 50 percent and 70 percent support; and
• 2 percent (six companies) obtained less than 50 percent support.

…continue reading: Emerging Say-on-Pay Trends and Litigation Developments

Almost half a decade after the onset of the financial crisis, populist sentiment and the resulting political environment continue to fuel stricter regulation of executive and director compensation, with the latest wave in Europe including substantive restrictions on compensation in the financial services industry and “say-on-pay” initiatives (i.e., initiatives providing for shareholder approval of compensation). This post describes these recent European compensation developments, namely:

• The so-called “banker bonus cap” – substantive limits on the amount of variable compensation that can be paid to certain employees at financial institutions; and
• Say-on-pay developments in the E.U. and Switzerland.

…continue reading: European Compensation Developments: Financial Institutions and Beyond

About a year ago we restated Vanguard’s mission to read: “To take a stand for all investors, treat them fairly, and give them the best chance for investment success.” While the words were new, the ideals were not; they’ve been the consistent principles by which we’ve managed our enterprise since our founding.

As we stand on the cusp of “proxy season”—when investors in most U.S. companies will vote at shareholder meetings on matters including the election of directors and the approval of compensation plans—it strikes me that nothing better exemplifies our mission in action than our efforts to ensure that the companies in which our funds invest are subject to the highest standards of corporate governance.

…continue reading: Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners

Today’s column focuses on new rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) concerning independence requirements for directors who are members of compensation committees. The new rules must be complied with by listed companies by the earlier of the first annual meeting of shareholders after Jan. 15, 2014, or Oct. 31, 2014. [1]

NYSE Section

NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.02(a)(ii) contains the following requirements regarding compensation committee member independence (references to an NYSE Listed Company Manual Section hereinafter will be referred to as NYSE Section):

[I]n affirmatively determining the independence of any director who will serve on the compensation committee of the listed company’s board of directors, the board of directors must consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the listed company which is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including, but not limited to:

…continue reading: Exchange Rules on Independence of Compensation Committee Members

On March 27, 2013, Judge Sean Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the $11 billion merger of US Airways Group and AMR Corporation effective upon confirmation of the AMR debtors’ chapter 11 plan. Upon completion of the merger, a new entity – “Newco,” for present purposes – will survive. In his March 27 ruling, Judge Lane declined to approve a proposed $20 million severance payment by Newco to Thomas Horton, the current Chief Executive Officer of AMR Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Judge Lane issued a written opinion explaining his reasoning for denying the proposed severance payment and in it, foreclosed an attempt to approve a severance package free from the strict standards of Section 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Background

In connection with the proposed merger, the AMR debtors sought Bankruptcy Court approval of employee compensation and benefit arrangements (the “Employee Arrangements”) falling into three categories (i) Ordinary Course Changes; (ii) Employee Protection Arrangements; and (iii) the CEO severance payment. Though the US Trustee initially objected to all three Employee Arrangements, she eventually withdrew her objections to all but the CEO severance payment.

…continue reading: Bankruptcy Court Denies $20 Million Severance for American Airlines CEO

In our paper, CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we contribute a new perspective on executive compensation research by studying changes to CEO employment contracts implemented by some of the most sophisticated and financially savvy principals in U.S. capital markets: private equity sponsors. If the changes in a firm’s governance structure following a leveraged buyout (LBO) allow for arm’s-length bargaining between private equity (PE) sponsors, as ‘‘strong principals,’’ and the CEOs of the portfolio companies as their agents, we may observe changes to contract features of importance to the private equity sponsors.

Our objective in this paper is to answer three questions. First, do the strong principals redesign CEO contracts? If they do, which contract features do they change? We examine a comprehensive set of features of CEO contracts in addition to cash pay, such as perquisites, equity incentives, vesting conditions, and severance pay. Second, how do the CEO contracts designed by PE sponsors square with contracting theories? Finally, do the CEO contracts we study avoid some of the most criticized compensation practices in U.S. public firms? Regulators and shareholder interest groups should be interested in whether their proposals differ markedly from contracts where a shareholder with significant ownership and financial expertise bargains with a CEO.

…continue reading: CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?

I am particularly pleased to be at a conference that focuses on the role of institutional investors and their impact on corporate control, market liquidity, and systemic risk. The SEC has a great deal of interest in these areas and I hope that you will provide us with any observations that can help inform the SEC’s understanding.

Role Played by Institutional Investors

The topic of your conference recognizes the important role played by institutional investors and the great influence they exert in our capital markets. The role and influence of institutional investors has grown over time. For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67 % in 2010. The shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).

Institutional investor ownership is an even more significant factor in the largest corporations: In 2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate 73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.

…continue reading: Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility

Say on Pay Continues to Shape the Executive Pay Landscape

An overwhelming 97% of Russell 3000 companies that conducted a Say on Pay (SOP) vote in 2012 received majority shareholder support. [1] While support levels rival those for management proposals to ratify auditors, companies do not take SOP vote outcomes for granted. Rather, the prospects for low shareholder support for SOP proposals have caused most companies to devote a tremendous amount of time, resources, and consideration to the administration and disclosure of executive compensation programs. This paper serves to highlight the key issues compensation committees faced in 2012 and the implications for action in 2013 and beyond.

…continue reading: Executive Compensation 2012 Year in Review and Implications