The board of directors is a collective body, whose members have diverse expertise in various aspects of the company’s business. Therefore, communication between directors is critical to successful board functioning. In recent years, regulators, shareholders, and directors themselves have been paying increased attention to decision-making policies that could increase the quality of board discussions. Executive sessions that exclude the management, separation of the CEO and chairman positions, board retreats, and separate committees on specific topics have been put in place to promote more effective communication. As governance experts Carter and Lorsch (2004) emphasize, “If we could offer only one piece of advice, it would be to strive for open communication among board members.”
Posts Tagged ‘Decision making’
When we convened our Corporate Governance Symposium last year (October 2012), we highlighted the increasingly important role shareholders were playing in the corporate decision-making process, commenting as follows:
“Over the course of the past year, we have continued to see shareholders making their voices heard, in some cases rather forcefully and effectively, on a broad range of corporate issues. In many ways, the recent developments in corporate governance reinforce the growing perception that we are, and have been for several years, experiencing a potentially fundamental shift in the balance of authority, or influence, between boards of directors and shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, moving further away from the longstanding board primacy model of corporate governance.”
Reputation concerns create strong incentives for independent directors to be viewed externally as capable monitors as well as to retain their most valuable directorships. In our paper, Reputation Incentives of Independent Directors: Impacts on Board Monitoring and Adverse Corporate Actions, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we extend this literature significantly by examining the effects of differential reputation incentives across firms that arise when a director holds multiple directorships.
Firms having boards composed of a greater portion of independent directors for whom this directorship represents one of their most prestigious are associated with firm actions known to reward directors and are negatively associated with firm actions known to be costly to director reputations. Specifically, they are associated with a lower likelihood of covenant violations, earnings management, earnings restatements, shareholder class action suits and dividend reductions. In addition, we also find they are positively associated with stock repurchases and dividend increases.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a dizzyingly complex and inefficient process. Voting on potential reorganization plans take place by class, rules are based on achieving majorities and super-majorities by different standards, and a judge must evaluate the plan to ensure it respects pre-bankruptcy entitlements appropriately. Plan proponents can gerrymander plans in order to isolate creditors; hedge funds can buy positions that pay off if plans fail while allowing them to exert influence over the negotiation process; and judges are often unable to stop such gaming. To cut through this morass, lawyers and economists have proposed reforms, such as holding an auction for the firm or offering options to junior creditors that enable them to buy out senior creditors.
While these reforms could make important steps towards improving Chapter 11, they neglect a crucial problem the current system is designed to address: that of collective action. The current owners of various claims on the firm are usually well-suited to play the particular roles they are playing within the capital structure. Because of sunk investments in learning about the firm or their risk-preferences they are the most valuable investors to hold the assets they hold. A reorganized firm that does not have their appropriate participation may not be nearly as valuable as one that does. In fact, it may be better to liquidate the firm, even if reorganization could be efficient, than to reorganize it with the wrong owners.
In our paper, Looking in the Rear View Mirror: The Effect of Managers’ Professional Experience on Corporate Cash Holdings, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study the role of managers’ professional experience in financial decision making, focusing on one of the most debated corporate policies in recent years – cash savings.
We focus our analysis on corporate cash policies because firms hold unprecedented, increasing levels of cash. In 1980, firms held $234.6 billion (in 2011 dollars) in cash, amounting to 12% of assets. By 2011, the amount of cash grew to $1,500 billion, or 22% of assets. The predominant approach to understanding corporate cash holdings is the precautionary savings motive. According to this motive, firms hold liquid assets to hedge against future states of nature in which adverse cash flow shocks, coupled with external finance frictions, may lead to underinvestment or default. While prior research shows that the precautionary savings motive explains much of the cash policy of firms, some suggest that managers are overly conservative in their decision to hold high levels of cash.
Motivated by psychological evidence, which shows that past experience affects individual decision-making, we argue that managers may behave conservatively because they experienced financial difficulties in their professional career. To test this hypothesis, we collect detailed data on managers’ employment histories and construct four measures of experience at firms that faced financial difficulties. These measures capture financial constraints and adverse shocks to cash flows and stock returns. To separate firm and CEO effects, the measures are based on prior employment at other firms.
In the paper, Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether key subordinate executives can restrain the extent of real earnings management. We focus on key subordinate executives, i.e., the top five executives with the highest compensation other than the CEO, because we hypothesize that they are the most likely group of employees that have both the incentives and the ability to influence the CEO in corporate decisions. As argued in Acharya et al. (2011), key subordinate executives have strong incentives not to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term firm value. This tradeoff between current and future firm value is particularly salient in the case of real earnings management (as compared to accruals earnings management) because over production and cutting of R&D expenditures are costly and can reduce the long term value of the firm.
The motivation for the research question is twofold. First, the majority of the papers in the literature explicitly or implicitly assume that the CEO is the sole decision maker for financial reporting quality and the impact of other executives has been generally overlooked. Recent studies argue that subordinate executives usually have longer horizons and they can influence corporate decisions through various means. We hypothesize that differential preferences arising from differential horizons can affect the extent of real earnings management. Second, while there are studies focusing on the impact of external corporate governance (e.g., board independence and institutional ownership), little is known about whether there are checks and balances within the management team. This lack of knowledge is an important omission because control is not just imposed from the top-down or from the outside, but also from bottom-up (Fama 1980).
In the paper, Managers Who Lack Style: Evidence from Exogenous CEO Changes, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study managerial style effects in firm decisions by examining exogenous CEO changes in a panel of 8,615 Compustat firms from 1990 to 2007. The hypothesis that managers have varying preferences or traits that affect their corporate decisions has a great deal of intuitive appeal and is implicit in many discussions of leadership. Prior empirical evidence lends support to this general hypothesis and suggests that managerial style effects play a substantive role in firms’ investment and financing choices. This raises the possibility that much of the unexplained variation in these and related choices is driven by the identities of a firm’s leaders rather than more traditional factors such as various economic tradeoffs.
While prior research on this issue has generated many interesting findings, a major weakness arises from the fact that endogenous leadership changes are used to identify style effects. In this paper we overcome this weakness by identifying a large set of exogenous CEO changes arising from deaths, health concerns, and, in some parts of the analysis, natural retirements. Quite surprisingly, we find no significant evidence of abnormal changes in asset growth, investment intensity, leverage, or profitability subsequent to exogenous CEO changes.
The widespread public criticism of boards of directors arising from the financial crisis, and the ensuing governance reform initiatives, should not have come as a surprise to those following trends in corporate governance. Instead, they should be seen as part of a series of developments in the evolving relationship between shareholders and their boards in the United States that has been underway for the past two decades. As the shareholder base has largely consolidated into the institutional investor community and those investors have become more organized and focused on exerting the influence inherent in their substantial ownership stakes, we have seen in recent years an accelerating shift in the “balance of authority” exercised by boards and shareholders in the corporate decision-making process.
There is no indication that this trend will reverse or even slow down significantly. Accordingly, directors should understand the origins and key drivers involved, and determine how they can most effectively adapt to this changing environment and secure the confidence and support of their companies’ shareholders.
In the paper, Managerial Miscalibration, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated as well as the determinants of their miscalibration. Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in psychology, economics, and law. Although it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in practice.
Over the past nine years, we collected over 11,600 S&P 500 forecasts as well as 80% confidence intervals from Chief Financial Officers. The width of the confidence interval gives us a measure of miscalibration. Importantly, the CFOs are forecasting a common market-wide measure. This allows us to exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in both optimism and miscalibration. By comparing forecasts to realizations over many periods, we also present a simple measure of miscalibration.
In our paper Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms, which was recently published on SSRN, we examine the allocation of capital and the delegation of decision-making authority within firms. Theoretical research examines how decision-making authority is delegated within groups. While the theoretical implications are far-ranging, there is a scarcity of empirical evidence about the delegation of authority within corporations (as noted by Prendergast (2002) and others). This paper provides some of the first empirical evidence that focuses on the delegation of decision-making authority with respect to major corporate policies. In particular, we study whether the chief executive makes decisions on her own versus delegating to lower-level executives and divisional managers.
We survey more than 1,000 CEOs and CFOs around the world to determine who within the firm makes five different corporate decisions: capital allocation, capital structure, investment, mergers and acquisitions, and payout. Most of our analysis focuses on the 950 CEO and 525 CFO survey respondents who work in U.S.-based companies, though we also examine smaller samples of Asian and European executives. Knowing the job title of the corporate decision-maker is important, given recent evidence that executive-specific fixed effects appear to drive some corporate policies.