The conventional view in comparative corporate governance research holds that German corporations are characterized by the prevalence of large blockholders, making it the typical example for a system of concentrated ownership. In my recent paper, Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance and the Erosion of Deutschland AG, which has been made publicly available on SSRN, I show that the traditional ownership patterns in German corporations are currently undergoing a major change. The old “Deutschland AG”, a nationwide network of firms, banks, and directors, is eroding along three dimensions: the concentration of ownership is diffusing, the role of banks in equity participations is weakening, and the shareholder body is becoming increasingly international. It appears that these changes are more pronounced the larger the corporation. I present new data to support these developments and explore the consequences in governance and in law that have been taken or that need to be drawn from this finding.
Posts Tagged ‘Equity capital’
It is great to be here with you in New York to speak about our equity market structure and how we can enhance it.
While I know your views on particular issues may differ, you all certainly appreciate that investors and public companies benefit greatly from robust and resilient equity markets.
During my first year as Chair, not surprisingly, I have heard a wide range of perspectives on equity market structure, reflecting its inherent complexity, the relationships among many core issues, as well as the different business models of market participants. To frame the SEC’s review of these issues, I set out last fall certain fundamentals for addressing market structure policy. One of those is the importance of data and empirically based decision-making. At that time, we launched an interactive public website devoted to market structure data and analysis drawn from a range of sources. The website has grown to include work by SEC staff on important market structure topics, including the nature of trading in dark venues, market fragmentation, and high-frequency trading.
In our paper, In Short Supply: Equity Overvaluation and Short Selling, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use detailed equity lending data to examine the role of constraints on equity prices. We find that constrained stocks underperform, the short interest ratio (SIR) has a nonlinear association with constraints, constrained stocks have negative returns regardless of short interest ratio, high short interest yet unconstrained stocks do not underperform, yet low short interest unconstrained stocks outperform. Moreover, we show that limited supply is a key feature distinguishing constrained and unconstrained stocks, and that among constrained stocks, those with the lowest supply have the strongest negative returns. Our findings confirm that supply varies across firms (in contrast to SIR, which assumes supply is 100 percent of outstanding shares for all stocks) and short supply in the equity lending market has implications for the informational efficiency of equity prices.
Private equity deal activity ebbed and flowed, often unexpectedly, in 2013. Despite some slow periods, strong debt and equity markets helped support first nine-months numbers that are well ahead of 2012, although Q4 2013 is unlikely to match Q4 2012, where activity was stimulated by anticipated changes in the tax laws. Successful sponsors again demonstrated their ability to perceive and exploit changing market conditions. Moreover, the private equity industry posted its best fundraising numbers in years. It was a year that showed that Semper Paratus may indeed be the industry’s new motto.
As market professionals, you obviously live the U.S. equity markets first hand, day in and day out. As an association, you have used your voice to focus attention on the value of our equity markets—an all-important engine for capital formation, job creation, and economic growth.
Like you, I believe that we must constantly strive to ensure that the U.S. equity markets continue to serve the interests of all investors. That mutual challenge must come fully of age and address today’s, not yesterday’s, markets. And today, I will speak about the path forward.
In our paper, Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, we investigate the association between executive pay disparity and the cost of equity capital. Understanding the association is important because the cost of capital is one of the key considerations for managers in their capital budgeting and corporate financing decisions. In fact, the cost of capital is a more direct yardstick of corporate investment and financing decisions than firm valuation. A higher cost of capital means fewer positive net present value (NPV) projects, leading to fewer growth opportunities. In addition, the cost of capital summarizes an investor’s risk-return tradeoff in his resource allocation decision (Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008)).
In general, there are two perspectives on executive pay disparity. The tournament perspective views the large pay gap between the CEO and other executives as the prize for a tournament in which players compete for the CEO position (Lazear and Rosen (1981); Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009)). A large pay disparity motivates non-CEO senior executives to work hard and to invest in firm-specific human capital. This, in turn, helps build a large pool of skilled internal candidates for the CEO position. The availability of skilled internal candidates not only reduces the entrenchment of the incumbent CEO by increasing the bargaining power of the board, but also reduces CEO succession risk. Therefore, this perspective predicts a negative association between executive pay disparity and the cost of capital.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the “BCBS”)  recently issued a revised framework (the “Revised G-SIB Framework”) for assessing a common equity surcharge on certain designated global systemically important banks (“G-SIBs”)  that updates and replaces the framework for assessing the G-SIB capital surcharge issued by the BCBS in November 2011 (the “Prior G-SIB Framework”).  The Revised G-SIB Framework largely maintains the Prior G-SIB Framework’s indicator-based approach for determining when a capital surcharge will be applied and does not change the calibration of the surcharge. However, the Revised G-SIB Framework makes several noteworthy changes to, and clarifies important aspects of, the Prior G-SIB Framework, including:
In our paper, Financing Through Asset Sales, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we analyze a source of financing that is first-order in reality but relatively unexplored in the literature — selling non-core assets such as a division or a plant. Asset sales are substantial in practice: in 2010, there were $133bn of asset sales in the U.S., versus $130bn in seasoned equity issuance. In contrast, most existing research on a firm’s financing decisions studies the choice between debt and equity and ignores asset sales. We build a model that allows asset sales to be undertaken not only to raise capital, but also for operational reasons (dissynergies). We study the conditions under which asset sales are preferable to equity issuance and vice-versa, how financing and operational motives interact, and how firm boundaries are affected by financial constraints.
The firm comprises a core asset and a non-core asset. The firm must raise financing to meet a liquidity need, and can sell either equity or part of the non-core asset. Following Myers and Majluf (1984) (MM), we model information asymmetry as the principal driver of this choice. The firm’s type is privately known to its manager and comprises two dimensions. The first is quality, which determines the assets’ standalone (common) values. The value of the core asset is higher for high-quality firms. The value of the non-core asset depends on how we specify the correlation between the core and non-core assets. With a positive (negative) correlation, the value of the non-core asset is higher (lower) for high-quality firms. The second dimension is synergy — the additional value that the non-core asset is worth to its current owner.
Amid the current debate over tax policy in Washington, there is a bipartisan consensus on one issue: the corporate tax rate, which is currently 35 percent, should be reduced to roughly 25 percent. At the same time, budgetary pressures preclude any significant increase in the deficit to accomplish corporate tax reform.
In light of these competing demands, most corporate tax reformers advocate broadening the corporate tax base to pay for any rate reduction. Unfortunately, few politicians have put forth base-broadening measures that would generate revenue sufficient to significantly lower the corporate tax rate on a revenue-neutral basis.
In fact, revenue-neutral corporate income tax reform is likely to be very difficult, because corporate tax expenditures represent a relatively small portion of total corporate tax revenues. A preliminary analysis by the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested that the elimination of all corporate tax expenditures—except for the deferral of tax on foreign source profits, a provision whose repeal would be politically and economically infeasible—would allow for the corporate tax rate to be reduced to only 28 percent.
Therefore, if policymakers want to reduce the corporate tax rate on a revenue-neutral basis, they will likely have to adopt other types of reforms to broaden the corporate tax base. Ideally, those reforms should offer the potential for significant revenue gains and reduce economic distortions.
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR), an independent and nonpartisan research organization dedicated to improving regulation and enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. public equity capital markets, today released data from the third quarter of 2012. According to the new study, U.S. capital markets reversed the second quarter downgrade and showed slightly improved competitiveness, though most measures of competitiveness still fall short of historical averages. Hal S. Scott, Director of the Committee said, “While foreign companies continue to prefer non-U.S. financial markets for raising capital outside their home markets, and regulatory reform is still needed, this quarter’s data offers a promising sign that competitiveness can be restored to U.S. markets.”
Of the global initial equity offerings conducted outside a company’s home market, 18.3% of these IPOs, by value, were listed on a U.S. exchange. While this measure is at its highest level over the past five years, the U.S. share of this volume remains well below its historical average of 28.7% (1996-2006). These percentages include all IPOs by foreign companies listed on either U.S. public markets or issued through private Rule 144A offerings. Excluding global IPOs that use the Rule 144A markets, the percentage of global IPOs listed on a U.S. exchange rises to 55.9%. However, the total value of these IPOs has decreased from $79.8 billion in 2010 and $39.3 billion in 2011 to only $9 billion thus far in 2012.