Posts Tagged ‘Espen Eckbo’

Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday May 1, 2014 at 9:18 am
  • Print
  • email
  • Twitter
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from B. Espen Eckbo, Professor of Finance at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.

In the paper, Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency, written for the Annual Review of Financial Economics, I review recent takeover research which advances our understanding of the role of M&A in the drive for productive efficiency. Much of this research places takeovers in the context of industrial organization, tracing with unprecedented level of detail “who buys who” up and down the supply chain and within industrial networks. I also review recent research testing the rationality of the bidding process, including whether the sales mechanism promotes a transfer of control of the target resources to the most efficient buyer. This literature draws on auction theory to describe optimal bidding strategies and it uses sophisticated econometric techniques to generate counterfactuals, exogenous variation, and causality. The review is necessarily selective, with an emphasis on the most recent contributions: half of the referenced articles were drafted or published within the past five years.

…continue reading: Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency

Corporate Funding: Who Finances Externally?

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday June 5, 2013 at 9:29 am
  • Print
  • email
  • Twitter
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from B. Espen Eckbo, Professor of Finance at Dartmouth College, and Michael Kisser of the Department of Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics.

In our paper, Corporate Funding: Who Finances Externally?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide new information on security issues and external financing ratios derived from annual cash flow statements of publicly traded industrial companies over the past quarter-century. Our use of cash flow statements permits us to differentiate between competing forms of internal financing, including operating profits, cash draw-downs, reductions in net working capital, and sale of physical assets. Unlike leverage ratios which dominate the focus of the extant capital structure literature, our cash-flow-based financing ratios are measured using market values (cash) and are unaffected by the firm’s underlying asset growth rate.

The empirical analysis centers around three main issues, the first of which is to establish the importance of external finance in the overall funding equation. In our pool of nearly 11,000 (Compustat) non-financial firms, the net contribution of external cash raised (security issues net of repurchases and dividends) was negative over the sample period. Moreover, the average (median) firm raised merely 12% of all sources of funds externally. Also, annual funds from total asset sales contributed more to the overall funding equation than net proceeds from issuing debt.

…continue reading: Corporate Funding: Who Finances Externally?

How Costly Is Corporate Bankruptcy for Top Executives?

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday January 30, 2013 at 1:17 pm
  • Print
  • email
  • Twitter
Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from B. Espen Eckbo, Professor of Finance at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College; Karin Thorburn, Professor of Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics; and Wei Wang, Assistant Professor of Finance at Queen’s School of Business.

To what extent are CEOs filing for bankruptcy tainted by the bankruptcy event? On the one hand, the CEO bears a major responsibility for the firm going broke. After all, the filing might have been avoided if the CEO had managed to reduce firm leverage or otherwise reorganize debt claims in time to stay out of court. On the other hand, CEOs going through bankruptcy likely gain valuable experience from the crisis. The net impact of these two opposing effects on executive reputation is an open empirical question.

In the paper, How Costly is Corporate Bankruptcy for Top Executives?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide some first systematic estimates of top executives’ personal costs of corporate bankruptcy. The estimates are based on 324 large public companies filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past two decades.

The study provides evidence on the following three questions. First, do top executives experience large personal losses (both income and wealth) when filing for bankruptcy? Second, do creditor control rights influence the probability of CEO departure and the income losses? Third, do ex ante predicted personal losses affect CEO’s decision to leave the firm and their compensation contract design?

…continue reading: How Costly Is Corporate Bankruptcy for Top Executives?

 
  •  » A "Web Winner" by The Philadelphia Inquirer
  •  » A "Top Blog" by LexisNexis
  •  » A "10 out of 10" by the American Association of Law Librarians Blog
  •  » A source for "insight into the latest developments" by Directorship Magazine