Two articles (among several) in a comprehensive proposal to revise EU corporate governance would have a significant beneficial impact if they were to be adopted in the United States. In large measure they mirror recommendations by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., in two essays: Can We do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Columbia Law Review 449 (Mar. 2014) and One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? 66 Business Lawyer 1 (Nov. 2010).
Posts Tagged ‘EU’
A recent and groundbreaking decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasburg might shatter the entire structure of the Italian and European regulation of market abuse (insider trading and market manipulations). The case is “Grand Stevens and others v. Italy”, and was decided on March 4, 2014.
The facts can be briefly summarized as follows. In 2005, the corporations that controlled the car manufacturer Fiat, renegotiated a financial contract (equity swap) with Merrill Lynch. One of the goals of the agreement was to maintain control over Fiat without being required to launch a mandatory tender offer. Consob, the Italian securities and exchange commission, initiated an administrative action against the corporation and some of its managers and consultants, accusing them of not having properly disclosed the renegotiation of the contract to the market. The procedure resulted in heavy financial fines (for some individuals, up to 5 million euro), and additional measures prohibiting some of the people involved from serving as corporate directors and practicing law. At the same time, a criminal investigation was launched for the same facts. It is not necessary here to discuss the merits of the controversy, it is sufficient to mention that the sanctioned parties challenged the sanctions in Italian courts, but did not prevail.
There has been no shortage of press coverage about the lack of employment diversity in the financial services sector. Now, both the US Congress and the European Union have taken action in an attempt to remedy historical practices. The increased focus on the adequacy of an institution’s diversity and inclusion initiatives warrants their reexamination in light of regulatory developments and evolving best practices.
Background—The Statutory Requirements of Section 342 of Dodd-Frank
Section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Section 342”) was adopted to help correct racial and gender imbalances at financial institutions and their regulators by prescribing inclusion requirements at the specified US government agencies that regulate the financial services sector, entities that contract with the agencies and the private businesses they regulate. Congresswoman Maxine Waters of California, the author of Section 342, noted that “many industries lack the inclusion and participation” of minorities and women, with none “more egregiously … than the financial services sector.” Section 342 provides the opportunity to “not only give oversight to diversity, but to help the Agencies understand how to do outreach [and] how to appeal to different communities.”
EU proposal for a regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions
1. On 29 January 2014 the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council “on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions”. This proposed legislation is the EU’s equivalent of Volcker and Vickers. It was initiated by the Liikanen report published on 2 October 2012 but the legislative proposal departs in a number of ways from the report’s conclusions. There are two significant departures: the legislative proposal contains a Volcker-style prohibition, which also departs from the individual EU Member States’ approach, and, although the proposal contains provisions which mirror the Vickers “ring-fencing” approach they are not, in direct contradiction to Liikanen’s recommendation, mandatory.
A key new element of the Basel III framework for regulatory capital aims to improve banks’ management of their funding and liquidity profiles. Two new measures are proposed: a “net stable funding ratio”, and a “liquidity coverage ratio”. The net stable funding ratio has received relatively little attention due to its seemingly distant implementation date of 1 January 2018. However, its impact will be immediate and significant for many banking institutions.
Capitalism is abundant in contradictions that result in the production of crises. During such crises capital goes through devaluations that give rise to unemployment, bankruptcies and income inequality. The ability of a nation to resist the forces of devaluation depends on the array of institutional or spatio-temporal fixes it possesses, which can buffer the effects of the crisis, switch the crisis to other nations or defer its effects to the future. Corporate governance configurations in a given social order can function as institutional or spatio-temporal fixes provided they are positioned within an appropriate institutional environment that can give rise to beneficial complementarities.
The present article, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Recovery Proceedings for Cross-Border Banking Groups, examines recovery proceedings for cross-border banking groups under European Union law. Recovery (or “early intervention”) includes measures intended to stabilize a bank (or banking group) and enable its recovery from financial stress. Recovery is targeted at a stage before resolution, when the bank (or group) in question has not breached the triggers for resolution, and therefore its economic recovery is still possible. The focus of this paper is primarily on three group recovery mechanisms under EU law: group recovery plans, intra-group financial assistance and coordination of early intervention measures regarding groups.
While the number of women directors on U.S. public company boards has not risen dramatically since 2012, the issue of gender diversity on boards continued to gain momentum and global prominence over the last 12 months. Since we last discussed this issue, new legislative and non-governmental initiatives around the world have resulted in growing numbers of women directors and greater shareholder focus on board diversity and related disclosures. This issue is likely to become increasingly significant in 2014 and beyond, both in the United States and abroad.
Earlier this month, the European Commission moved a step closer to imposing a form of gender quota on major public companies in the European Union. Two committees of the European Parliament voted in favor of a proposal by the European Commission to require certain public companies to increase the representation of women on their boards. The proposed law applies only to large public companies, with no exceptions even for companies in which women compose less than 10 percent of the workforce, and, if adopted, provides for obligatory sanctions for failure to follow the proposed requirements.
The US and EU rules implementing Basel III follow many aspects of Basel III closely, but there are major differences in approach in several key areas. Financial institutions have been engaged in a “race to the top” to show strong capital ratios but rules on leverage appear to be the most challenging and may require significant business restructuring. The interplay between the US and EU implementation of Basel III and the gradual “phase in” of certain rules, particularly on liquidity and leverage, will have a profound impact on the relative competitiveness of relevant US and EU financial institutions. This client publication, and the accompanying US/EU comparison and summary table, highlight points of international consistency and divergence.
Basel III establishes a new set of global standards for capital adequacy and liquidity for banking organizations. Although principally aimed at banks, these standards also apply to certain other types of financial institution (e.g., EU investment firms) as well. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the “Basel Committee”) developed Basel III to supplement and, in certain respects, replace, the existing Basel II standards, the composite version of which was issued in 2006 as an update to Basel I.  The core elements of Basel III were finalized at the international level in 2010 and implementing rules have now been issued in 25 of the 27 jurisdictions that comprise the Basel Committee. 
The English scheme of arrangement has existed for over a century as a flexible tool for reorganising a company’s capital structure. Schemes of arrangement can be used in a wide variety of ways. In theory a scheme of arrangement can be a compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or members about anything which they can properly agree amongst themselves. It is common to see both member-focused schemes and creditor-focused schemes. In practice the most common schemes are those which seek to transfer control of a company, as an alternative to a takeover offer, and those which restructure the debts of a financially distressed company with a view to rescuing the company or its business.
In recent years schemes of arrangement have proved popular as a restructuring tool not only for English companies but also for non-English companies. A number of recent high profile cases have allowed non-English companies to make use of the English scheme jurisdiction to restructure their debts, including Re Rodenstock GmbH  EWHC 1104 (Ch), Primacom Holdings GmbH  EWHC 164 (Ch), Re NEF Telecom Co BV  EWHC 2944 (Comm), Re Cortefiel SA  EWHC 2998 (Ch) and Re Seat Pagine Gialle SpA  EWHC 3686 (Ch). Typically, these cases involve financially distressed companies registered in another EU Member State making use of an English scheme of arrangement without moving either their seat or Centre of Main Interest (COMI). In general, the main connection to England is the senior lenders’ choice of English law and English jurisdiction as governing their lending relationship with the company.