Posts Tagged ‘Liquidity’

Money Market Fund Reform

Posted by Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on Friday July 25, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s remarks at a recent open meeting of the SEC, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Today’s [July 23, 2014] reforms will fundamentally change the way that most money market funds operate. They will reduce the risk of runs in money market funds and provide important new tools that will help further protect investors and the financial system in a crisis. Together, this strong reform package will make our financial system more resilient and enhance the transparency and fairness of these products for America’s investors.

…continue reading: Money Market Fund Reform

An Economist’s View of Market Evidence in Valuation and Bankruptcy Litigation

Posted by Yaron Nili, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Saturday June 28, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Faten Sabry, Senior Vice President at NERA Economic Consulting, and is based on a NERA publication by Ms. Sabry and William P. Hrycay.

Courts often face many challenges when assessing the solvency of a company whether public or privately held. Examples of difficult valuation questions include: would a company with a market capitalization of several hundred million dollars possibly be insolvent? Or, would publicly-traded debt at or near par be conclusive evidence that the issuer is solvent at the time? Or, would a company’s inability to raise funds or maintain its investment grade rating at a given time be sufficient to rule on solvency?

It is common in valuation and solvency disputes to have qualified experts with very different opinions on the fair market value of a company, often using the same standard approaches of discounted cash flows and comparables. How would the courts or the arbitrators decide and what is the role of contemporaneous market evidence in such disputes? In this article, we discuss the role of market evidence and possible misinterpretations of such evidence and highlight recent court decisions in the United States.

…continue reading: An Economist’s View of Market Evidence in Valuation and Bankruptcy Litigation

Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday June 20, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Richard Squire, Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law.

The Dodd-Frank Act established that certain swap contracts which previously were traded bilaterally (directly between buyers and sellers) must be traded through clearinghouses instead. Critics of this clearing mandate have mounted two main objections: a clearinghouse shifts risk instead of reducing it; and a clearinghouse could fail, requiring a bailout. In my article Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, recently published in the Cornell Law Review, I counter both objections by showing that clearinghouses engage in a socially valuable function that I term liquidity partitioning. Liquidity partitioning means that when one of its member firms becomes bankrupt, a clearinghouse keeps a portion of the firm’s most liquid assets, and a matching portion of its short‑term debt, out of the bankruptcy estate. The clearinghouse then applies the first toward immediate repayment of the second. Economic value is created because the surviving clearinghouse members are paid much more quickly than they would be in a bankruptcy proceeding. Meanwhile, the bankrupt member’s outside creditors are not paid any less quickly: they still are paid at the end of the bankruptcy proceeding, which the clearinghouse does nothing to prolong. These rapid cash payouts for clearinghouse members reduce illiquidity and uncertainty in the financial sector, the main causes of contagion in a crisis. And because the clearinghouse holds only liquid assets, it avoids the maturity mismatch between short‑term liabilities and long‑term assets that characterizes the balance sheets of many financial institutions. A clearinghouse therefore is much less likely than its members to fail during a crisis.

A clearinghouse achieves liquidity partitioning by engaging in netting. Thus, when a member fails, the clearinghouse uses short‑term debts owed to the member to immediately repay short‑term debts owed by the member. In this way, cash is intercepted on its way toward the bankruptcy estate and redirected toward other financial firms, who may be suffering their own liquidity shortages. The clearinghouse thereby shifts cash from lower-value to higher-value uses, decreasing liquidity pressure on the financial sector and thus the need during a crisis for a taxpayer-funded bailout.

…continue reading: Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning

Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for Foreign Banks with Limited US Footprints

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday March 26, 2014 at 9:02 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Luigi L. De Ghenghi and Andrew S. Fei, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including diagrams, tables, and flowcharts, is available here.

The Federal Reserve has issued a final rule adopting a tiered approach for applying Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards to foreign banking organizations (“FBOs”). Under the tiered approach the most burdensome requirements (e.g., the requirement to establish a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company) will only apply to FBOs with large U.S. operations, whereas fewer requirements will apply to FBOs with limited U.S. footprints.

We have summarized below the Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards that will apply to the following FBOs with limited U.S. footprints:

…continue reading: Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for Foreign Banks with Limited US Footprints

Final Federal Reserve Rules for Foreign Banking Organizations

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday March 23, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Joseph T. Lynyak, III and Rodney R. Peck, partners in the Financial Services Regulation practice at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP and is based on a Pillsbury publication by Messrs. Lynyak and Peck.

This post describes the final regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board (the “FRB”) on February 18, 2014, that radically modify the former requirements applicable to foreign banking organizations (“FBOs”) pursuant to the FRB’s Regulation K. The final rules (the “Final Rules”) impose various requirements on large FBOs that previously have been applied to large U.S. domestic bank holding companies and banks under the Dodd-Frank Act. In addition, however, the Final Rules also alter many of the former approaches to the regulation of FBOs in general, including the necessity for many FBOs to form “U.S. intermediate holding companies” for their U.S. operations.

Regardless of the category an FBO falls into, the Final Rules present significant additional compliance burdens.

…continue reading: Final Federal Reserve Rules for Foreign Banking Organizations

Enhanced Prudential Standards

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, and is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication by Andrew R. Gladin, Rebecca J. Simmons, Mark J. Welshimer, and Samuel R. Woodall III. The complete publication, including Annexes, is available here.

On February 18, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “FRB”) approved a final rule (the “Final Rule”) implementing certain of the “enhanced prudential standards” mandated by Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”). The Final Rule applies the enhanced prudential standards to (i) U.S. bank holding companies (“U.S. BHCs”) with $50 billion (and in some cases, $10 billion) or more in total consolidated assets and (ii) foreign banking organizations (“FBOs”) with (x) a U.S. banking presence, through branches, agencies or depository institution subsidiaries, and (y) depending on the standard, certain designated amounts of assets worldwide, in the United States or in U.S. non-branch assets. The Final Rule’s provisions are the most significant, detailed and prescriptive for the largest U.S. BHCs and the FBOs with the largest U.S. presence—those with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets and, in the case of FBOs, particularly (and with increasing stringency) for FBOs with combined U.S. assets of $50 billion or more or U.S. non-branch assets of $50 billion or more.

…continue reading: Enhanced Prudential Standards

Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor?

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday March 10, 2014 at 8:21 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Peter Roosenboom, Professor of Finance at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Frederik Schlingemann of the Finance Group at the University of Pittsburgh; and Manuel Vasconcelos of Cornerstone Research.

In our paper, Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we examine the role of liquidity as a monitoring incentive and its effect on firm value by analyzing the market reaction to takeover announcements. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that there is a tradeoff between monitoring via institutional intervention and liquidity for takeovers of private targets, but not for takeovers of public targets. This finding may be explained by the increased role of the disciplining effect of the threat of exit in connection to actions that on average destroy shareholder value, such as takeovers of public targets (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009).

…continue reading: Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor?

Enhanced Prudential Standards “First Take”

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday March 3, 2014 at 8:59 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Dan Ryan, Chairman of the Financial Services Regulatory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and is based on a PwC publication.

Our observations on the Federal Reserve’s final rule:

1. Delayed effective date and higher threshold: Foreign Banking Organizations (FBOs) eked out several small victories in the final rule—in particular, the July 2015 compliance date has been pushed to July 2016 and smaller FBOs (i.e., those with under $50 billion in US non-branch assets) are no longer required to form an Intermediate Holding Company (IHC). The changes reflect the Federal Reserve’s attempt to respond to FBOs’ concerns, especially that smaller FBOs did not pose as much risk to US financial stability.

…continue reading: Enhanced Prudential Standards “First Take”

Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banks

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday February 27, 2014 at 9:20 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Luigi L. De Ghenghi and Andrew S. Fei, and is based on two Davis Polk publications; the full publications, including visuals, tables, flowcharts and timelines, are available here (focusing on U.S. bank holding companies) and here (focusing on foreign banks).

Pursuant to Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve has issued a final rule to establish enhanced prudential standards for large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and foreign banking organizations (FBOs).

U.S. BHCs: The final rule represents the latest in a series of U.S. regulations that apply heightened standards to large U.S. BHCs. As the graphic below illustrates, under the emerging post-Dodd-Frank prudential regulatory landscape for U.S. BHCs, the number and stringency of prudential standards generally increase with the size of the banking organization.

…continue reading: Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banks

Basel III Framework: Net Stable Funding Ratio (Proposed Standards)

Editor’s Note: Barnabas Reynolds is head of the global Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Group at Shearman & Sterling LLP. This post is based on a Shearman & Sterling client publication. The complete publication, including annex, is available here.

A key new element of the Basel III framework for regulatory capital aims to improve banks’ management of their funding and liquidity profiles. Two new measures are proposed: a “net stable funding ratio”, and a “liquidity coverage ratio”. The net stable funding ratio has received relatively little attention due to its seemingly distant implementation date of 1 January 2018. However, its impact will be immediate and significant for many banking institutions.

…continue reading: Basel III Framework: Net Stable Funding Ratio (Proposed Standards)

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