Posts Tagged ‘Lucian Bebchuk’

The Short-Termism Debate at the Federalist Society Convention

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday November 17, 2014 at 9:16 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post relates to an empirical study of hedge fund activism issued by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and co-authored by Professor Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang. Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Alon Brav is Professor of Finance at Duke University and a Senior Fellow of the Program. Wei Jiang is Professor of Finance at Columbia Business School, and a Senior Fellow of the Program.

Last week, The Federalist Society’s 2014 National Lawyers Convention featured a session dedicated to the short-termism debate and the evidence put forward by Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang in their study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. The session began with a presentation by Professor Bebchuk that outlined the key findings and implications of the study. Three panelists then offered their reactions to the study: Jonathan Macey, Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law, Yale Law School; Robert Miller, Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Fellow in Corporate Law, University of Iowa College of Law; and Steven Rosenblum, a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The debate was moderated by E. Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court.

Professor Bebchuk’s presentation slides are available here. The Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study is available here, and posts about the study, including one published by critics of the study, are available on the Forum here.

Why Commissioner Gallagher is Mistaken about Disclosure of Political Spending

Posted by Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Columbia Law School, on Monday November 10, 2014 at 9:04 am
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Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Bebchuk and Jackson served as co-chairs of the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, which filed a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC require all public companies to disclose their political spending, discussed on the Forum here. Bebchuk and Jackson are also co-authors of Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, published last year in the Georgetown Law Journal. A series of posts in which Bebchuk and Jackson respond to objections to an SEC rule requiring disclosure of corporate political spending is available here.

Last week, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Daniel Gallagher took the unusual step of publishing a letter to the editor of the New York Times expressing his opposition to the SEC even considering companies’ disclosure of political spending. In his letter, the Commissioner vows “to fight to keep” the subject off the SEC’s agenda. As explained below, however, his letter fails to provide a substantive basis for his vehement opposition to transparency in corporate spending on politics.

…continue reading: Why Commissioner Gallagher is Mistaken about Disclosure of Political Spending

Short-Termism

Posted by Theodore Mirvis, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Friday October 10, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: Theodore N. Mirvis is a partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

Last Monday I ventured into the belly of the beast by presenting the attached decks (available here and here) in Professor Bebchuk’s class at Harvard Law School. The class and discussion focused on short-termism, using the Airgas case as a jumping off point (see first deck available here) to the broader governance issues canvassed by the second deck (available here). Once again there were no answers given to the “inconvenient questions” listed on the two pager available here.

Alibaba’s Governance Risks

Posted by Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, on Tuesday September 16, 2014 at 3:03 pm
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Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School.

Wall Street is eagerly watching what is expected to be one of the largest initial public offerings (IPOs) in history: the offering of the Chinese Internet retailer Alibaba at the end of this week. Investors have been described by the media as “salivating” and “flooding underwriters with orders.” It is important for investors, however, to keep their eyes open to the serious governance risks of investing in Alibaba.

In a New York Times DealBook column, posted today, I analyze these governance risks. I show that Alibaba’s ownership structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors. In particular, such investors should worry that, over time, a significant amount of the value created by Alibaba would not be shared with them. Investors participating in the IPO, I conclude, should recognize the significant governance risks they will be taking.

The column, Alibaba’s Governance Leaves Investors at a Disadvantage, is available here.

The Million-Comment-Letter Petition: The Rulemaking Petition on Disclosure of Political Spending Attracts More than 1,000,000 SEC Comment Letters

Posted by Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Columbia Law School, on Thursday September 4, 2014 at 11:00 am
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Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Bebchuk and Jackson served as co-chairs of the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, which filed a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC require all public companies to disclose their political spending, discussed on the Forum here. Bebchuk and Jackson are also co-authors of Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, published last year in the Georgetown Law Journal. A series of posts in which Bebchuk and Jackson respond to objections to an SEC rule requiring disclosure of corporate political spending is available here. All posts related to the SEC rulemaking petition on disclosure of political spending are available here.

In July 2011, we co-chaired a committee of ten corporate and securities law experts that petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission to develop rules requiring public companies to disclose their political spending. We are delighted to announce that, as reflected in the SEC’s webpage for comments filed on our petition, the SEC has now received more than a million comment letters regarding the petition. To our knowledge, the petition has attracted far more comments than any other SEC rulemaking petition—or, indeed, than any other issue on which the Commission has accepted public comment—in the history of the SEC.

…continue reading: The Million-Comment-Letter Petition: The Rulemaking Petition on Disclosure of Political Spending Attracts More than 1,000,000 SEC Comment Letters

Wachtell Keeps Running Away from the Evidence

Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. This post responds to a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long Term Value?, available on the Forum here. This memorandum criticizes a recently-issued empirical study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism. The empirical study is available here, and is discussed on the Forum here. Additional posts discussing the study, including critiques by Wachtell Lipton and responses by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, are available on the Forum here.

In a memorandum issued by the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Wachtell) last week, Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long Term Value?, the firm’s founding partner Martin Lipton and another senior partner of the law firm criticize again my empirical study with Alon Brav and Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. The memorandum announces triumphantly that Wachtell is not alone in its opposition to our study and that two staff members from the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (IGOPP) in Montreal issued a white paper (available here) criticizing our study. Wachtell asserts that the IGOPP paper provides a “refutation” of our findings that is “academically rigorous.” An examination of this paper, however, indicates that it is anything but academically rigorous, and that the Wachtell memo is yet another attempt by the law firm to run away from empirical evidence that is inconsistent with its long-standing claims.

…continue reading: Wachtell Keeps Running Away from the Evidence

Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long Term Value?

Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday July 22, 2014 at 3:55 pm
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Editor’s Note: Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum that replies to the recently-issued empirical study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism. The study is available here, and its results are summarized in a Forum post and in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article.

About a year ago, Professor Lucian Bebchuk took to the pages of the Wall Street Journal to declare that he had conducted a study that he claimed proved that activist hedge funds are good for companies and the economy. Not being statisticians or econometricians, we did not respond by trying to conduct a study proving the opposite. Instead, we pointed out some of the more obvious methodological flaws in Professor Bebchuk’s study, as well as some observations from our years of real-world experience that lead us to believe that the short-term influence of activist hedge funds has been, and continues to be, profoundly destructive to the long-term health of companies and the American economy.

…continue reading: Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long Term Value?

Bebchuk Included in the Thomson Reuters List of Most Influential Authors in all Research Fields

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday June 23, 2014 at 9:09 am
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Professor Lucian Bebchuk was recently included in the list of most highly cited authors in academic research during 2002-2012 issued by Thomson Reuters.

Spotlighting the standout researchers of the last decade, Thomson Reuters has issued Highly Cited Researchers, a compilation of influential names in science. These researchers earned the distinction by writing the greatest numbers of reports officially designated by Essential Science Indicators as Highly Cited Papers—ranking among the top 1% most cited for their subject field and year of publication—between 2002 and 2012. According to Thomsen Reuters, “the listings of Highly Cited Researchers feature authors whose published work in their specialty areas has consistently been judged by peers to be of particular significance and utility.”

…continue reading: Bebchuk Included in the Thomson Reuters List of Most Influential Authors in all Research Fields

Bebchuk and Coates Articles Selected Among the Top Ten Corporate and Securities Articles of 2013

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday May 12, 2014 at 9:33 am
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This year’s list of the Ten Best Corporate and Securities Articles, selected by an annual poll of corporate and securities law academics, includes two selections from Harvard Law faculty associated with the Program on Corporate Governance: Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Professor John Coates.

The top ten articles were selected from a field of 550 pieces. Professor Robert Thompson of Georgetown Law School conducted the annual poll, and the selected articles will be reprinted in an upcoming issue of the Corporate Practice Commentator.

…continue reading: Bebchuk and Coates Articles Selected Among the Top Ten Corporate and Securities Articles of 2013

Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday May 7, 2014 at 9:04 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post is based on a recent Columbia Law Review article, earlier issued as a working paper of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and a Senior Fellow of the Program. The article, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, is available here. The article is a response essay to an earlier Columbia Law Review article by Professor Lucian Bebchuk, available here and discussed on the Forum here.

Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Review and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, recently published in the Columbia Law Review a response essay to an essay by Professor Lucian Bebchuk published in the Columbia Law Review several months earlier. Professor Bebchuk’s essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, is available here and was featured on the Forum here. Chief Justice Strine’s essay, titled Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, is available here.

The abstract of Chief Justice Strine’s essay summarizes it briefly as follows:

…continue reading: Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law

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