There are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy in corporate governance. The other is a lack of empirical knowledge among commentators about the corporate landscape and the way that today’s stock markets influence the conditions for exercising long term and value creating corporate governance. This paper tries to mitigate some of this confusion and to increase awareness in both respects.

In terms of public policy it is important to understand that the general corporate governance discussion usually takes place on two different levels. And both are legitimate. One is concerned with the everyday workings of individual companies: how they organize their internal procedures, staff their company organs and build their corporate culture. Much of this is unique to the company in question. The choices to be made are often a matter of business judgment and are seldom in a domain where policy makers and regulators have any specific expertise.

…continue reading: Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets

In the paper, Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, my co-authors (Oliver Gottschalg, Moritz Hahn, and Conor Kehoe) and I attempt to bridge two strands of literature concerning PE, the first of which analyzes the operating performance of acquired companies, and the second that analyzes fund IRRs. In addition, we investigate how human capital factors are associated with value creation in PE deals. We focus on the following questions: (i) Are the returns to equity investments by large, mature PE houses simply due to financial leverage and luck or market timing from investing in well-performing sectors, or do these returns represent the value created at the enterprise level in the so-called portfolio companies, over and above the value created by the quoted sector peers? (ii) What is the effect of ownership by large, mature PE houses on the operating performance of portfolio companies relative to that of quoted peers, and how does this operating performance relate to the financial value created (if any) by these houses? (iii) Are there any distinguishing characteristics based on the background and experience of PE houses or partners involved in a deal that are best associated with value creation?

…continue reading: Corporate Governance and Value Creation

The high pay of U.S. CEOs relative to their foreign counterparts has been cited as evidence of excesses in U.S. executive compensation practices. This perception of a “pay divide” between the United States and the rest of the world is usually based on estimates provided by professional services firms like Towers Watson that receive a good deal of press coverage. However, attempts to understand the magnitude and determinants of the U.S. pay premium have been plagued by data limitations due to international differences in rules regulating the disclosure of executive compensation.

In our paper, Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we use new data to compare CEO pay in 1,648 U.S. firms versus 1,615 firms from 13 foreign countries. Thanks to recently expanded disclosure rules, our sample includes publicly listed firms from both Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries that had mandated disclosure of CEO pay by 2006. It covers nearly 90% of the market capitalization of firms in these markets and, importantly, comprises firms with different corporate governance arrangements.

…continue reading: (Why) Are US CEOs Paid More?

The SEC recently issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G providing additional guidance on shareholder proposals submitted to companies pursuant to Rule 14a-8. The guidance is in response to several issues that came up during the 2012 proxy season.

Proof of ownership

In a prior bulletin, SLB No.14F, the SEC had reconsidered its view as to who constitutes a “record holder” for purposes of Rule 14a-8 and indicated that only DTC participants may provide adequate proof of ownership for shareholder proponents. Consistent with its no-action letter decisions during 2012, the Staff indicated in this bulletin that it would also view ownership letters from affiliates of DTC participants as satisfying the proof of ownership requirement.

Also, the Staff indicated that a shareholder who holds securities through a securities intermediary that is not a broker or a bank can satisfy Rule 14a-8’s documentation requirement by submitting a proof of ownership letter from that securities intermediary. If the securities intermediary is not a DTC participant or an affiliate of a DTC participant, then the shareholder will also need to obtain a proof of ownership letter from the DTC participant, or an affiliate of the DTC participant, that can verify the holdings of the securities intermediary.

…continue reading: SEC Legal Bulletin on Shareholder Proposals

In our forthcoming American Economic Review paper, Innovation and Institutional Ownership, we examine the incentives to innovate at the firm level by studying the relationship between innovation and institutional ownership. Innovation is the main engine of growth. But what determines a firm’s ability to innovate? Innovating requires taking risk and forgoing current returns in the hope of future ones. Furthermore, while any type of financing is plagued by moral hazard and adverse selection, the financing of innovation is probably the most vulnerable to these problems (Arrow, 1962) since the information that needs to be conveyed is hard to communicate to outsiders. This paper is an attempt at analyzing the corporate governance of innovation and more specifically the role of institutional owners in fostering (or hindering) innovation.

While the ability to diversify risk across a large mass of investors makes publicly traded companies the ideal locus for innovation, managerial agency problems might undermine the innovation effort of these companies. In publicly traded companies, the pressure for quarterly results may induce a short-term focus (Porter, 1992). And the increased risk of managerial turnover (Kaplan and Minton, 2008) might dissuade risk-averse senior managers from this activity. Finally, innovation requires effort and “lazy” managers might not exert enough of it. Hence, it is especially important to study the governance of innovation in publicly traded companies, which account for a large share of the private investments in research and development (R&D).

…continue reading: Innovation and Institutional Ownership

In our recent NBER working paper, Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance, we use a large, proprietary database of private equity funds to study the links between the terms of private equity management contracts and the subsequent cash flow behavior and performance of the funds. The database is the largest and most recent source of private equity compensation terms available to date, and is the first to provide information on manager ownership and to include cash flow information along with the terms of management contract.

We use these data to contrast two views of the state of managerial compensation practices in private equity. The first is that highly compensated GPs, or those with little skin in the game, extract excessive rents and have inadequate incentives, which ultimately spells poor returns for limited partners. The second view is that the management contracts we observe reflect (potentially constrained) efficient bargaining outcomes between sophisticated parties, and that management contracts reflect the productivity of GP skills and the agency problems that LP’s face.

…continue reading: Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees?

In the paper, Managing Agency Problems in Early Shareholder Capitalism: An Exploration of Liverpool Shipping in the 18th Century, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use historical data on Liverpool transatlantic shipping to examine the effect of equity ownership on top manager behavior. We found that the pattern of equity ownership by captains in the vessels that they piloted was not random. Rather, vessels that were at particular risk of attack by enemy privateers were significantly more likely to have captains who were also part-owners. This is consistent with an agency view of equity ownership. Owners preferred that captains resist privateers fiercely, but it was difficult to construct contractual incentives to elicit such behavior. Partial ownership of the vessel by the captain was one mechanism by which to align captains’ and owners’ incentives regarding the privateer threat, and consequently to elicit desired behavior from captains.

We found that equity ownership was associated with a lower likelihood that a vessel would be captured by privateers. Difference of means tests indicated a statistically significant reduction. Multivariate estimation indicated a stable, negative effect of captain-ownership on the likelihood of being captured by privateers, although the statistical significance of this relation-ship varied across models. Overall, the use of equity ownership by Liverpool vessel owners, and the effect of equity ownership on vessel captains’ behavior, appears to be largely consistent with agency theory’s predictions about the modern use and effect of equity on shareholder and top management behavior.

…continue reading: Managing Agency Problems in Early Shareholder Capitalism

An emerging literature in accounting and finance demonstrates the economic benefits of geographical proximity. Another distinct strand of literature on shareholder activism shows that large institutional investors may influence corporate policies. In our paper, Local Investors and Corporate Governance, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, we link these two strands of research and examine whether physical proximity between firms and investors allows large institutions to monitor corporate activities more effectively. Specifically, we examine whether firms with more local shareholders are better governed and are less likely to engage in corporate misbehavior. We also investigate whether monitoring activities of local investors affect the profitability of local firms. Although there is an obvious free-riding problem associated with the monitoring of geographically proximate firms, the potential benefits from monitoring can outweigh the monitoring costs, especially for large shareholders (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).

Our key conjecture is that in an economic setting where monitoring costs vary inversely with distance, firms with high local institutional ownership would have better governance characteristics. In particular, firms with more proximate shareholders would exhibit a lower propensity to engage in undesirable corporate behavior like option backdating or aggressive earnings management. As a result of better monitoring, firms with high local institutional ownership would have a lower propensity to be a target of class action lawsuits. Further, because of geographical proximity, local institutions are more likely to attend shareholder meetings and introduce shareholder proposals, facilitate CEO turnover, or limit excess CEO pay. This form of local activism could also have an indirect influence on the selection of board members and the structure of compensation contracts.

…continue reading: Local Investors and Corporate Governance

In our paper, Surviving the Global Financial Crisis: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance, forthcoming in the AEJ: Economic Policy, we examine the differential response of establishments to the recent global financial crisis with particular emphasis on the role of foreign ownership. In 2007-2008, the world economy entered the deepest financial crisis since World War II. Countries around the globe witnessed major declines in output, employment, and trade. GDP in industrial countries fell by 4.5 percent while average GDP growth in emerging economies dropped from 8.8 percent in 2007 to 0.4 percent. The unemployment rate rose to 9 percent across OECD economies, and reached double digits in a mix of industrial and developing nations. World trade volume plummeted by over 40 percent in the second half of 2008, collapsing at a rate that outpaced the fall of total output.

The severity of what has been labeled as the Global Financial Crisis led many economists to explore its macro patterns and causes. Rose and Spiegel (2010), for example, investigate the potential causes for the differential extent of the crisis across countries. Using a large country-level dataset, they do not find international trade and financial linkages and other major economic indicators to be clearly associated with incidences of the crisis. Eaton et al. (2009), Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010), and Chor and Manova (2011), among others, examine the potential causes of the great trade collapse, a phenomenon that received particular attention, and find, respectively, manufacturing demand, vertical specialization, and credit conditions to play important roles.

…continue reading: Surviving the Global Financial Crisis

In our paper, Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, we study the impact of SOX on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. A significant part of SOX and other exchange requirements increase the role of independent board members. Given that prior academic research suggests there is no positive relationship between board independence and firm performance, the above regulatory efforts are especially notable.

We find a shift in the relationship between board independence and firm performance after 2002. Prior to 2002, we document a negative relationship between board independence and operating performance. After 2002, we find a positive relationship between independence and operating performance. We find this result is driven by firms that increase their number of independent directors. An event study provides independent evidence supportive of the above results – specifically, when a company goes from being non-compliant to being compliant with SOX’s board independence requirement, the market response is significantly positive. Why might SOX be related to this positive performance? SOX and the listing standards impose new responsibilities on firms’ directors, such as regular meetings of the independent directors, approval of director nominations by independent directors, and approval of CEO compensation by independent directors. As a consequence of these policies boards began including more independent directors, and, perhaps the independent directors became more engaged in the firm’s governance processes. For example, we find that firms with greater board independence (and stock ownership of board members) are less likely to engage in a value-destroying activity, namely, acquisitions.

…continue reading: Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance