Posts Tagged ‘Stock options’

Compensating for Long-Term Value Creation in U.S. Public Corporations

Editor’s Note: Joseph Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder, with assistance from Andy Tsang, which first appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Three categories of performers are rewarded for value creation in U.S. public corporations. They are: (1) the executives who manage the corporations; (2) the directors who oversee the performance of these corporations; and (3) the individual asset managers and others who provide investment services to investors who own, directly or indirectly, these corporations.

The following post takes a look at the correlation between the long-term incentive compensation of these three categories of performers and long-term value creation in U.S. public corporations that is attributable to them. In fact, such correlation appears to be limited. In addition, the article will consider a definition of “long-term” value creation, the roles of these three categories of performers in creating “long-term” value and the methods of compensating these different categories of performers in their respective roles in “long-term” value creation.

…continue reading: Compensating for Long-Term Value Creation in U.S. Public Corporations

Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday July 11, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Philipp Geiler of the Department of Economics, Finances, and Control at EMLYON Business School and Luc Renneboog, Professor of Finance at Tilburg University.

Corporations rely on dividends, share repurchases, or a combination of both payout methods to return earnings to their shareholders. Over the last decade, the importance of the dominating payout method—dividends—seems to be somewhat eroded at UK firms, with an increasing number of firms combining share repurchases with dividends. What explains the surge in the use of combined share repurchases and dividends in the UK? Is there a link between firm’s payout decision and executive remuneration?

…continue reading: Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision

Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation

Posted by Robert C. Pozen, Harvard Business School, on Thursday May 8, 2014 at 9:21 am
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Editor’s Note: Robert Pozen is a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The protest against short termism in corporate America is rising. Business and political leaders are decrying the emphasis on quarterly results—which they claim is preventing corporations from making long-term investments needed for sustainable growth.

However, these critics of short termism have a skewed view of the facts and there are logical flaws in their arguments. Moreover, their proposals would dramatically cut back on shareholder rights to hold companies accountable.

The critics of short termism stress how much the average daily share volume has increased over the last few decades. Although this is factually correct, this sharp average increase is caused primarily by a tremendous rise in intraday trading.

…continue reading: Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation

Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday February 12, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Nina Baranchuk and Robert Kieschnick, both of the Finance and Managerial Economics Area at the University of Texas at Dallas, and Rabih Moussawi of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.

How do shareholders motivate managers to pursue innovations that result in patents when substantial potential costs exist to managers who do so? This question has taken on special importance as promoting these kinds of innovations has become a critical element of not only the competition between companies, but also the competition between nations. In our paper, Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we address this question by providing empirical tests of predictions arising from recent theoretical studies of this issue.

…continue reading: Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms

Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday January 29, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Ingolf Dittmann, Professor of Finance at Erasmus University Rotterdam; Ernst Maug, Professor of Finance at the University of Mannheim; and Oliver Spalt of the Department of Finance at Tilburg University.

Standard principal-agent theory prescribes that managers should not be compensated on exogenous risks, such as general market movements. Rather, firms should index pay and use contracts that filter exogenous risks (e.g., Holmstrom 1979, 1982; Diamond and Verrecchia 1982). This prescription is intuitive and agrees with common sense: CEOs should receive exceptional pay only for exceptional performance, and “rational” compensation practice should not permit CEOs to obtain windfall profits in rising stock markets. However, observed compensation contracts are typically not indexed. Specifically, stock options almost never tie the strike price of the option to an index that reflects market performance or the performance of peers. Commentators often cite this glaring difference between theory and practice as evidence for the inefficiency of executive compensation practice and, more generally, as evidence for major deficiencies of corporate governance in U.S. firms (e.g., Rappaport and Nodine 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). This paper therefore contributes to the discussion about which compensation practices reveal deficiencies in the pay-setting process.

…continue reading: Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday January 24, 2014 at 9:00 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Deniz Anginer of the Department of Finance at Virginal Tech, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Director of Research at the World Bank; Harry Huizinga, Professor of Economics at Tilburg University; and Kebin Ma of the World Bank.

In our paper, How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how corporate governance and executive compensation affect bank capitalization strategies for an international sample of banks over the 2003-2011 period.

We find that ‘good’ corporate governance—or corporate governance that causes the bank to act in the interests of bank shareholders—engenders lower levels of bank capital. Specifically, we find that bank boards of intermediate size (big enough to escape capture by management, but small enough to avoid free rider problems within the board), separation of the CEO and chairman of the board roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions lead to lower capitalization rates. ‘Good’ corporate governance thus may be bad for bank stability and potentially entail high social costs. This disadvantage of ‘good’ corporate governance has be balanced with presumed benefits in terms of restricting management’s ability to perform less badly in other areas—for instance, by shirking or acquiring perks—at the expense of bank shareholders.

…continue reading: How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?

CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday November 7, 2013 at 9:07 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Todd Gormley of the Department of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, David Matsa of the Department of Finance at Northwestern University, and Todd Milbourn, Professor of Finance at Washington University in St. Louis.

Every firm is exposed to business risks, including the possibilities of large, adverse shocks to cash flows. Potential sources for such shocks abound—examples include disruptive product innovations, the relaxation of international trade barriers, and changes in government regulations. In our paper, CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, we examine (1) how boards adjust CEOs’ exposure to their firms’ risk after the risk of such shocks increase and (2) how incentives given by the CEOs’ pre-existing portfolios of stock and options affect their firms’ response to this risk. Specifically, we study what happens when a firm learns that it is exposing workers to carcinogens, which increase the risks of significant corporate legal liability and costly workplace regulations.

The results presented in this paper suggest that corporate boards respond quickly to changes in their firms’ business risk by adjusting the structure of CEOs’ compensation, but that the changes only slowly impact the overall portfolio incentives CEOs face. After the unexpected increase in left-tail risk, corporate boards reduce CEOs exposure to their firms’ risk; the sensitivities of the flow of managers’ annual compensation to stock price movements and to return volatility decrease. Various factors likely contribute to the board’s decision, including CEOs’ reduced willingness to accept a large exposure to their firms’ risk and the decline in shareholders’ desired investment after left-tail risk increases. Indeed, managers act to further reduce their exposure to the firm’s risk by exercising more options than do managers of unexposed firms. These changes, however, only slowly move CEOs’ overall exposure to their firm’s risk because the magnitude of their pre-existing portfolios continues to influence their financial exposure to the firm.

…continue reading: CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk

Rich-Hunt: The Speech

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday October 15, 2012 at 8:55 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Roger Donway, program director of the Atlas Society’s Business Rights Center. This post is based on an edited version of Mr. Donway’s remarks at the Atlas Society’s 2012 summer conference, available here.

My monograph Rich-Hunt is subtitled “The Backdated Options Frenzy and the Ordeal of Greg Reyes.” But if you have not read the monograph, and if you missed the whole frenzy of 2005–2011, you may well wonder: What is a backdated option? Indeed, you may not even be quite sure about what an option is and how it works. So, let me start there.

An option is a type of security that gives a person the right to buy a share of a company’s stock at a specified price. For example, an option might give you the right to buy a share of Google at $5. That would be a very valuable option. Or an option might give you the right to buy a share of Google at $5,000. That would not be so valuable.

Typically, when a company gives options to its employees as a form of compensation, the employees are allowed to buy shares in the company (which is called “exercising the options”), and the price at which they may buy the stock is called the option’s “exercise price,” or “strike price.” Typically, however, they can exercise their options only after a defined span of time (called “the vesting period”) and before a certain date (called “the expiration date”).

So, the value of such option grants rests entirely on the possibility that the stock will be selling above the strike price during the period of time that the employee is permitted to use the option to buy a share. If the stock price is higher than the exercise price, the employee can reap a profit by purchasing a share of stock at the exercise price and then immediately selling that share on the stock market. Of course, if the stock price does not rise above the strike price between the time that the options vest and the time that they expire, then the options are forever worthless.

…continue reading: Rich-Hunt: The Speech

Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk Taking

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday April 4, 2012 at 10:07 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Rachel Hayes, Professor of Accounting at the University of Utah; Michael Lemmon, Professor of Finance at the University of Utah; and Mingming Qiu of the Department of Finance at the University of Utah.

In our forthcoming Journal of Financial Economics paper, Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk Taking, we exploit the change in the accounting treatment of stock-based compensation under FAS 123R, which was issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and took effect in December 2005, to provide new evidence on the role that convexity in compensation contracts plays in providing incentives for risk taking by managers.  An additional rationale that is often stated for the dramatic rise in option-based compensation over time revolves around how stock options were treated for accounting purposes. Prior to the implementation of FAS 123R, firms were allowed to expense stock options at their intrinsic value. Because nearly all firms granted stock options at-the-money, no expenses for option-based compensation were generally reported on the income statement.

Hall and Murphy (2003) argue that, due to their favorable accounting treatment and the fact that there is no cash outlay at the time of the grant, firms act as though the perceived cost of options is lower than their true economic cost. If firms make decisions based on the perceived costs instead of the economic costs, they grant more options than they would otherwise, and options with their favorable accounting treatment are preferred to possibly better incentive plans with less favorable accounting treatment. Consistent with this view, Carter, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) provide evidence that the accounting treatment of stock options affected their use, showing that a comprehensive proxy for financial reporting concerns was positively related to the use of stock options prior to FAS 123R. The implementation of FAS 123R eliminated the ability to expense options at their intrinsic value and instead required firms to begin expensing stock-based compensation at its fair value, effectively eliminating any accounting advantages associated with stock options.

…continue reading: Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk Taking

Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday January 25, 2012 at 10:09 am
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Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Christopher Armstrong and Rahul Vashishtha, both of the Accounting Department at the University of Pennsylvania.

In our paper, Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we examine how executive stock options (ESOs) give chief executive officers (CEOs) differential incentives to alter their firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Since ESOs give CEOs incentives to alter their firms’ risk profile through both their sensitivity to stock return volatility, or vega, and their sensitivity to stock price, or delta, we examine both effects.

Theory suggests that vega gives risk-averse managers more of an incentive to increase total risk by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk, since, for a given level of vega, an increase in systematic risk always results in a greater increase in a CEO’s subjective value of his or her stock-option portfolio than does an equivalent increase in idiosyncratic risk. This differential risk-taking incentive manifests because a CEO who can trade the market portfolio can hedge any unwanted increase in the firm’s systematic risk. Consistent with this prediction, we provide evidence of a strong positive relationship between vega and the level of both total and systematic risk. However, we do not find vega and idiosyncratic risk to be significantly related.

…continue reading: Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value

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