The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery erred by failing to give preclusive effect to an earlier with-prejudice dismissal of a parallel derivative suit in another state, and by creating a presumption that all plaintiffs who file derivative suits without first conducting books-and-records inspections are inadequate representatives. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 380, 2012 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013). The decision stresses the importance of interstate comity and the need to give full faith and credit to the decisions of other courts.

Allergan is a drug company that incurred losses in resolving civil and criminal investigations of off-label drug marketing. Derivative suits were filed in both federal court in California and the Court of Chancery alleging that Allergan’s directors were liable for the losses because they failed to properly monitor the company’s marketing practices. The Delaware shareholder plaintiff obtained documents through a books-and-records inspection under 8 Del. C. § 220 before filing suit. The California plaintiffs did not, but later amended their complaints when the Delaware plaintiff shared the documents. Defendants moved to dismiss in both jurisdictions. The California federal court ruled first, dismissing with prejudice for failure to establish demand futility. The Court of Chancery refused to give preclusive effect to that ruling, applying Delaware law to the preclusion question. Turning to the merits, Chancery disagreed with the federal court, holding that demand was futile and that the case should proceed.

…continue reading: Delaware Court Limits Non-Delaware Dismissal

The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) recently proposed changes to Canada’s early warning regime for the disclosure of substantial blockholdings, including to lower the initial reporting trigger to 5% from 10%, to require disclosure no later than the opening of trading on the next business day, and to include equity equivalent derivatives and securities lending arrangements in the ownership calculation. Separately, the CSA proposed a new policy of greater flexibility as to rights plans, including in connection with unsolicited takeover bids. These proposals reflect sensible and necessary improvements to Canadian market regulation, to protect shareholders from the sorts of activist and takeover techniques and abuses that militate for changes in the U.S.’s Section 13(d) rules, and which, in the context of unsolicited takeover bids, the U.S. acceptance of rights plans have largely banished from the U.S.

…continue reading: Canada Proposes Improvements in Early Warning Disclosure, Rights Plans

In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value. Prominent academics are serving the narrow interests of activist hedge funds by arguing that the activists perform an important service by uncovering “under-valued” or “under-managed” corporations and marshaling the voting power of institutional investors to force sale, liquidation or restructuring transactions to gain a pop in the price of their stock. The activist hedge fund leads the attack, and most institutional investors make little or no effort to determine long-term value (and how much of it is being destroyed). Nor do the activist hedge funds and institutional investors (much less, their academic cheerleaders) make any effort to take into account the consequences to employees and communities of the corporations that are attacked. Nor do they pay any attention to the impact of the short-termism that their raids impose and enforce on all corporations, and the concomitant adverse impact on capital investment, research and development, innovation and the economy and society as a whole.

…continue reading: Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds

NYSE Euronext, the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals and the National Investor Relations Institute have jointly filed a rulemaking petition with the SEC, seeking prompt updating to the reporting rules under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as supporting a more comprehensive study of the beneficial ownership reporting rules under Section 13. The petitioners urge the SEC to shorten the reporting deadline under Rule 13f-1 from 45 days to two business days after the relevant calendar quarter, and also suggests amending Section 13(f) itself to provide for reporting on at least a monthly, rather than quarterly, basis, to correspond with Dodd-Frank’s mandate for at least monthly disclosure of short sales. We applaud the petitioners for urging the SEC to modernize Section 13’s reporting rules, both with respect to Section 13(f) and more generally.

…continue reading: Rulemaking Petition Calls for Modernization of Section 13 Reporting Rules

In our article Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power forthcoming in Harvard Business Law Review, Spring 2012, and available at SSRN, we discuss the debate that has ensued following the March 2011 petition by our law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to the Securities and Exchange Commission to modernize the blockholder reporting rules under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The petition sought to ensure that the reporting rules would continue to operate in a way broadly consistent with the statute’s clear purposes that an investor must promptly notify the market when it accumulates a block of publicly traded stock representing more than 5% of an issuer’s outstanding shares, and that loopholes that have arisen by changing market conditions and practices since the statute’s adoption over forty years ago could not continue to be exploited by stockholder activists, to the detriment of market transparency and fairness to all security holders. Among other things, the petition proposed that the time to publicly disclose such block acquisitions be reduced from ten days to one business day, given activists’ current ability to take advantage of the ten-day window to accumulate positions well above 5% prior to any public disclosure, in contravention of the clear purposes of the statute.

…continue reading: Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power

The HLS Forum recently published a post by Martin Lipton and Theodore Mirvis titled “Harvard Shareholder Rights Project is Wrong.” The post was based on a memorandum issued by their law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rozen & Katz (“Wachtell”), and signed by the authors of the post and two other top partners at the firm. The memo and post offer a strongly worded critique of Harvard Law School for permitting the operation of the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) clinical program. The objections were twofold: First, the results achieved by the clinic – agreements by 42 large public companies to propose charter amendments declassifying their boards – are undesirable as a public policy matter. Second, the clinic was wrong to represent public pension funds and charitable endowments because this representation went beyond “provid[ing] educational opportunities while benefiting impoverished or underprivileged segments of society for which legal services are not readily available.”

I think the Wachtell memo-writers’ strongly held belief about the virtue of classified boards as a governance feature of large public firms has spilled over into an unfair attack on the Harvard SRP clinic based on a straitjacketed conception of clinical legal education not followed by leading American law schools. Wachtell has, of course, long been known for its invention of the poison pill and its expertise in takeover defenses. Because staggered boards make poison pills more powerful and fortify takeover defenses, it is understandable that Wachtell, and some of the clients it serves, do not welcome large-scale declassification of boards. Whether such declassification would benefit shareholders and the American economy is a legitimate question for debate. However, criticizing Harvard Law School for permitting the SRP to operate should not be part of this debate.

…continue reading: Wachtell Lipton’s Critique of Harvard Law School

The Harvard Law School Shareholders Rights Project (SRP) recently issued joint press releases with five institutional investors, principally state and municipal pension funds, trumpeting SRP’s representation of and advice to these investors during the 2012 proxy season in submitting proposals to more than 80 S&P 500 companies with staggered boards, urging that their boards be declassified. The SRP’s “News Alert” issued concurrently reported that 42 of the companies targeted had agreed to include management proposals in their proxy statements to declassify their boards – which reportedly represented one-third of all S&P 500 companies with staggered boards. The SRP statement “commended” those companies for what it called “their responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”

This is wrong. According to the Harvard Law School online catalog, the SRP is “a newly established clinical program” that “will provide students with the opportunity to obtain hands-on experience with shareholder rights work by assisting public pension funds in improving governance arrangements at publicly traded firms.” Students receive law school credits for involvement in the SRP. The SRP’s instructors are two members of the Law School faculty, one of whom (Professor Lucian Bebchuk) has been outspoken in pressing one point of view in the larger corporate governance debate. The SRP’s “Template Board Declassification Proposal” cites two of Professor Bebchuk’s writings, among others, in making the claim that staggered boards “could be associated with lower firm valuation and/or worse corporate decision-making.”

…continue reading: Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project is Wrong

Here are slides on the Airgas case and slides on the underlying gating issue of long/short term perspective that drives much of the corporate governance debates and is rarely confronted by the “governistas” that advocate all sorts of standardized practices they consider to be value enhancing. I used these materials this month in a class co-taught by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst at Harvard Law School – hence, the reference to being “in the belly of the beast.” The slides are available here and here.

The Delaware Court of Chancery has refused to enjoin an all-cash merger transaction negotiated by an actively engaged and independent board of directors, despite the fact that the sales process did not include customary features such as a fairness opinion or a fiduciary out, and the transaction was effectively locked up within a day by the execution of written consents by a majority of the stockholders. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).

OPENLANE is a thinly-traded company with a highly concentrated shareholder base: 68.5 percent of its stock is held by a sixteen-person group of management and directors. Anticipating adverse market conditions in its principal business, the board negotiated with three potential strategic buyers in the first part of 2011, but did not undertake a broad auction or contact any possible financial buyers. In September, the board signed an agreement with the top bidder. Although no voting agreement was entered into as part of the merger, a majority of the company’s shareholders executed written consents approving the merger the very next day.

…continue reading: Delaware Court Recognizes Need for Flexibility in Reviewing Sales Processes

Recently, there was the announcement of a proposed $89.4 million settlement of shareholder claims arising out of the buyout of Del Monte Foods Company. The shareholders had alleged that the sales process was tainted by collusion between the buyers and Del Monte’s banker, which had sought to provide financing to the buyout group. The settlement follows the closing of the transaction and will be funded by both the new owners of the company and the banker.

The $89.4 million payment is one of the larger settlements to occur in Delaware shareholder litigation. The driver of the settlement was the Court of Chancery’s February ruling granting a motion for a preliminary injunction. (See our memo of February 15, 2011 on the decision.) The case highlights the following considerations relevant to sale-of-a-company processes:

…continue reading: Del Monte Settlement Highlights Risk of Conflicts in Buyout Financing