Harvard Law School‘s Cyberlaw Clinic, based at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society, provides high-quality, pro-bono legal services to appropriate clients on issues relating to the Internet, new technology, and intellectual property. Students enhance their preparation for high-tech practice and earn course credit by working on real-world litigation, client counseling, advocacy, and transactional / licensing projects and cases. The Clinic strives to help clients achieve success in their activities online, mindful of (and in response to) existing law. The Clinic also works with clients to shape the law’s development through policy and advocacy efforts. The Cyberlaw Clinic was the first of its kind, and it continues its tradition of innovation in its areas of practice. The Clinic works independently, with law students supervised by experienced and licensed attorneys. In some cases, the Clinic collaborates with counsel throughout the country to take advantage of regional or substantive legal expertise.
From the Blog
On Tuesday, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued its ruling in Commonwealth v. Augustine (available here). The Court ruled that police officers need to obtain a warrant before they obtain information about your location from a cell phone service provider. The Cyberlaw Clinic filed a friend-of-the-court brief in this case on behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, arguing against warrantless collection of location records. The Court agreed that location data is sufficiently sensitive to require constitutional protection, building on its decision last year requiring warrants for GPS tracking. →
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. BUSA | Docket No. 1101cr005277 | Boston Muni. Ct. Centr. Div. May 21, 2012 | The Cyberlaw Clinic prepared this amicus brief (pdf) on behalf of the Digital Media Law Project in a case that involved a prosecution under Massachusetts’s anti-counterfeiting law, M.G.L. ch. 266 § 147 (“Section 147″). Section 147 punishes one who willfully “manufactures, uses, displays, advertises, distributes, offers for sale, sells or possesses with intent to sell or distribute any item or services bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark,” and it defines “counterfeit mark” to include “any unauthorized freproduction or copy of intellectual property.” The brief argued that Section 147′s definition of counterfeit mark — with no requirement that the mark be likely to cause confusion — criminalizes speech protected by the First Amendment and is thus unconstitutional.