Drugs, Law and Conflict

I’ve decided to move this blog straight to wordpress: http://drugsandconflict.wordpress.com/

Please, please take a moment to check out the new site, bookmark it and change your RSS feed!

I will no longer be updating here, but will instead be ramping up the posts and awesomeness on the new site. Promise.

Best,
N

[via : via]

**Day of the Dead offering in honor of female homicide victims from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Photo courtesy of Glen’s Pics.

The Division of Integrated Biodefense (DIB), part of the Imaging Science and Information Systems (ISIS) Center at Georgetown University, is seeking an intern for their project on civil violence in Mexico. See full description here.

Also at Georgetown: Daniel Sabet, whose research on successful police reform in Mexico is much needed and worth reading.

The Justice in Mexico Project has released the 20-page report “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009″ [ PDF (5.42 MB) ] :

“Mexico closed the decade with an unprecedented level of violence, and a record number of drug-related killings in 2009. In light of the spectacular nature of this violence and the challenge it represents for the Mexican state, it raises serious concerns for the Mexican public, for policy makers, and for Mexico’s neighboring countries. This report provides an overview of the trends found in available data on drug-related killings in Mexico, and offers some brief observations about the causes of violence and the effectiveness of recent efforts to combat organized crime.”

This wonderfully comprehensive article in the Wall Street Journal on the economics of the drug trade, focusing on Mexico, is a must-read. Here are some highlights:

• On the difference between Colombian and Mexican traffickers…

Before, the Colombian cartels told Mexicans what price they would pay for wholesale cocaine. Now, Mexican gangs play smaller Colombian suppliers off of each other to get the best price. Mexican gangs are “price setters” instead of “price takers”…

Unlike Colombian drug gangs in the 1980s, who relied almost entirely on cocaine, Mexican drug gangs are a one-stop shop for four big-time illicit drugs: marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin… This diversification helps them absorb shocks from the business. Sales of cocaine in the U.S., for instance, slipped slightly from 2006 to 2008. But that decline was more than made up for by growing sales of methamphetamines.

• On risk and innovation…

After Mexico restricted the importation of pseudoephedrine to slow the manufacture of methamphetamines, drug gangs found another way to make the drug using different, unrestricted chemicals widely used in the perfume industry. “I’ve always thought these guys had a good research and development arm,” says one exasperated Mexican official…

In many ways, illegal drugs are the most successful Mexican multinational enterprise, employing some 450,000 Mexicans and generating about $20 billion in sales, second only behind the country’s oil industry and automotive industry exports… The wholesale price of a single kilo of cocaine, for instance, costs $1,200 in Colombia, $2,300 in Panama, $8,300 in Mexico, and between $15,000 and $25,000 in the U.S., depending on how close you are to the Mexican border. At a retail level on the streets of New York, it can run close to $80,000.

• On the importance of marijuana…

Marijuana accounts for anywhere between 50% to 65% of Mexican cartel revenues, say Mexican and U.S. officials. While cocaine has higher profit margins, marijuana is a steady source of income that allows cartels to meet payroll and fund other activities.

Marijuana is also less risky to a drug gang’s balance sheet. If a cocaine shipment is seized, the Mexican gang has to write off the expected profits from the shipment and the cost of paying Colombian suppliers, meaning they lose twice. But because gangs here grow their own marijuana, it’s easier to absorb the losses from a seizure. Cartels also own the land where the marijuana is grown, meaning they can cheaply grow more supply rather than have to fork over more money to the Colombians for the next shipment of cocaine.

• On decriminalization versus legalization…

While [decriminalization] may make sense domestically for the U.S., Mexican officials say it is the worst possible outcome for Mexico, because it guarantees demand for the drug by eliminating the risk that if you buy you go to jail. But it keeps the supply chain illegal, ensuring that organized crime will be the drug’s supplier.

Making pot legal might actually increase violence south of the border even more in the short term, with drug gangs fighting over a smaller economic pie of the remaining illegal drugs. But it would eventually reduce the overall financial clout of cartels.

**Photo courtesy Antonio Sierra and the AP.

As widely reported, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, aka “El Barbas” and the self-proclaimed “jefe de jefes,” was killed in Cuernavaca last Thursday in an operation led by the Mexican Navy. The Mexican government has claimed the death as a major success against organized crime, and the operation indeed appeared well-planned and executed. Yet we must frame this incident in context and not overestimate its significance.

The DEA, for example, released a statement proudly asserting, “The reign of Arturo Beltran-Leyva is over.” Who, then, is responsible for the gruesome murder of three family members of an elite Mexican marine who participated in the raid soon after his public funeral? This is certainly a reprisal killing, and more can be expected. This is the cartel, after all, that brazenly assassinated the acting head of the Mexican federal police last year, and infiltrated Interpol.

**Graphic of cartel alliances circa summer 2008.

The LATimes posted an interesting article on the strategy behind the Mexican government’s publicity of the cartel leader’s death, comparing it to to the tactics used by drug traffickers. They quote Mexican security analyst Jorge Chabat, writing in El Universal:

“The humiliated corpse, with its pants lowered, covered with bloody bills in one photo and religious objects in another, showed the typical modus operandi of narco-traffickers… The only thing missing was a sign saying ’so that you learn to respect’ to confirm the unmistakable stamp of an act of narco revenge.

In this fight, public opinion does matter.

See more photos from the raid here and video from El Universal here.

They’re not only for the Middle East and Central Asia (oh, and Africa) anymore…

Latin America will soon see the friendly sight of some brand-spanking-new, $13.5 million dollar drones over their airspace. Noting that the use of drones on the US-Mexico border isn’t new (Homeland Security “praised” the aircraft’s contribution “to the seizing of more than 22,000 pounds of marijuana and the apprehension of 5,000 illegal immigrants”), the NYTimes reports on the plan to add several new maritime craft for tracking traffickers. It’s hard not to immediately think of the massive opportunity cost here: nearly $30 million dollars for alternative development, job creation or police reform in Latin America, or drug treatment and rehabilitation for US addicts.

At least the drones are safe, right? It’s not as if traffickers could intercept the drones’ video feeds by using $26 software purchased on the internet, or anything. That would just make the investment… totally worth it.

Also, see related: new CNAS report on private contractors in conflict.

**A schematic of US strategy in Afghanistan, courtesy of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The NYTimes reports that Xe Services (formerly Blackwater) has lost its contract with the CIA to load bombs on Predator drones used in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a program which I reported on here in August. The Times notes that the contract “sometimes led to disputes between the contractors and C.I.A. employees, as the spy agency sometimes accused Blackwater employees of poor weapon assembly… In one instance last year, a 500-pound bomb dropped off a Predator before the drone had launched its payload, leading to a frenzied search along the Afghan-Pakistani border.”

Also, for a needed humor break: Stephen Colbert on the home version of the war in Afghanistan, “Afghandyland.” The first move? Pick a game piece: “Opium grower, opium grower, warlord who grows opium, opium grower, and thimble… full of opium.”

So, so good.

Endless appreciation to Josh for sharing.

It’s really great to see NGOs and think-tanks focusing on the route ahead as we see some movements toward significant change in drug policy, both in the US and abroad.

In the same vein, the ever-wonderful Center for International Policy has released a 40-page report analyzing the first few years of the US-sponsored “Integrated Action” plan in Colombia. This plan, which both governments have touted as the new model for US aid to Colombia, is one move in the right direction away from Plan Colombia, but still in need of some serious evaluation and work.

Adam Isacson of the CIP’s Colombia program summarizes the recommendations:

* Civilianize the Integrated Action strategy as soon as security conditions allow it.
* Coordinate cooperation between disparate government institutions, and give political clout to the civilian coordinators so that they can compel participation.
* Consult with communities about every decision that affects them.
* Work carefully with, and be prepared to say “no” to, local political and economic elites.
* Act more quickly to resolve land tenure and property rights.
* Quickly and transparently investigate and punish any allegations of abuse, corruption or predatory behavior.
* Commit to sustainability by making clear that this effort is for the long haul.

See a longer description and a link to the html version here, and download a pdf of the report here.