In his thirty-minute speech tonight, President George W. Bush did nothing to squelch the rumors (started here) that his current Exit Strategy is to find a transitional government that will ask for a pull-out of all coalition forces after June 30th. Indeed, he stressed that the new government would have “full sovereignty,” while giving no pullout timetable (See Reuters, “Bush Tries to Allay Mounting Doubts Over Iraq,” 05-24-04)
- Hmmmmm.
- Update (05-25-04): Somebody needs to remind TChirs at TalkLeft that Colin Powell has already told the nation that we would pull out American troops when the new Iraqi government asks us to do so. All the vagueness about a withdrawal timetable will just make it easier for the Aministration to say it’s surprised when the new government asks us to leave, and we “reluctantly” acquiesce to their full sovereignty.
At pyj, we dislike poor analogies almost as much as we dislike the poor treatment of young lawyers by law firms. So, we want to respond to a comment by Williams & Jensen partner William Canfield in today’s Legal Times. In an article about lawyer contributions to presidential campaigns (”Lawyers Fill Candidates’ Coffers,” by Lily Henning, 05-24-04), Canfield is cited as seeing no need for law firms to have written policites about partners seeking political contributions from subordinates: Acording to the Legal Times (emphasis added):
“[Canfield] says firms don’t need explicit policies. He likens political campaign fund raising to collecting money for a charity. ‘It’s not different than having a partner going around raising money for the United Way,’ Canfield says.”
There’s no difference between collecting for a favorite charity and asking an associate to give money in support of Bush or Kerry or their respective parties? I bet that any mediocre lawyer (or grade school student) could come up with some very good reasons why the analogy is far from perfect — not at all on all fours (with or without a leash).
Should we be concerned that Election Law expert Canfield is currently the Chair of the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Election Law? The Committee states its Mission to be ”representing the Association’s commitment to ensure that the nation’s election laws are legally sound and are drafted to permit the broadest, least restrictive access by Americans to the ballot box.”
It’s heartening to see that Gibson-Dunn partner William Kilberg, who has raised over $200,000 for President George W. Bush’s re-election campaign, ”as a rule” doesn’t ask associates for contributions. According to the Legal Times article:
“You don’t want to give people the impression that this is something that they need to do,” Kilberg says. “It’s fairly common sense that you don’t solicit people who report to you or someone over whose career you have influence. It wouldn’t be fair.”
Of course, Kilberg is also quoted saying “We have money, we have awareness, and we have interest.” The wise Gibson, Dunn subordinate might know how to keep his or her boss happy.
Brett Kappel, a federal election law expert at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy’s D.C. office, notes that putting the arm on subordinates for political contributions ”might not be fair, but it isn’t against the law either.” We hate to sound monotonous, but we’d like to think that lawyers don’t merely avoid law-breaking when dealing with their employees (or their clients).
- See Votelaw’s post quoting Kappel on how easily a corporation can violate the anti-facilitation rules under the Federal election campaign laws.
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At pyj, we dislike poor analogies almost as much as we dislike the poor treatment of young lawyers by law firms. So, we want to respond to a comment by Williams & Jensen partner William Canfield in today’s Legal Times. In an article about lawyer contributions to presidential campaigns (”Lawyers Fill Candidates’ Coffers,” by Lily Henning, 05-24-04), Canfield is cited as seeing no need for law firms to have written policites about partners seeking political contributions from subordinates: Acording to the Legal Times (emphasis added):
“[Canfield] says firms don’t need explicit policies. He likens political campaign fund raising to collecting money for a charity. ‘It’s not different than having a partner going around raising money for the United Way,’ Canfield says.”
There’s no difference between collecting for a favorite charity and asking an associate to give money in support of Bush or Kerry or their respective parties? I bet that any mediocre lawyer (or grade school student) could come up with some very good reasons why the analogy is far from perfect — not at all on all fours (with or without a leash).
Should we be concerned that Election Law expert Canfield is currently the Chair of the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Election Law? The Committee states its Mission to be ”representing the Association’s commitment to ensure that the nation’s election laws are legally sound and are drafted to permit the broadest, least restrictive access by Americans to the ballot box.”
It’s heartening to see that Gibson-Dunn partner William Kilberg, who has raised over $200,000 for President George W. Bush’s re-election campaign, ”as a rule” doesn’t ask associates for contributions. According to the Legal Times article:
“You don’t want to give people the impression that this is something that they need to do,” Kilberg says. “It’s fairly common sense that you don’t solicit people who report to you or someone over whose career you have influence. It wouldn’t be fair.”
Of course, Kilberg is also quoted saying “We have money, we have awareness, and we have interest.” The wise Gibson, Dunn subordinate might know how to keep his or her boss happy.
Brett Kappel, a federal election law expert at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy’s D.C. office, notes that putting the arm on subordinates for political contributions ”might not be fair, but it isn’t against the law either.” We hate to sound monotonous, but we’d like to think that lawyers don’t merely avoid law-breaking when dealing with their employees (or their clients).
- See Votelaw’s post quoting Kappel on how easily a corporation can violate the anti-facilitation rules under the Federal election campaign laws.
Comments Off
Although facing raging nannyism (over sex with clients) and enraged ninnyism (over advertising by lawyers), the Florida Supreme Court has issued revised rules of professional conduct for lawyers that demonstrate a belief that clients who have reached their majority are indeed adults. The rules suggest that lawyers might be responsible adults, too. (See Amendment to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 5/20/2004. As usual, Tim Chinaris has done an excellent job at sunEthics, summarizing the rule changes and linking to relevant materials).
As for the nannyism, see the concurring opinion of Justice Pariente [apt name] in Florida Bar v. Bryant, 813 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2002), where the judge recommends the total prohibition of sexual relationships between a lawyer and client during the lawyer-client relationship (leaving no loophole for prior relationships — nor even mentioning spouses.) Justice Pariente favorably quotes a law review article stating:
Even an arguably “consensual” relationship could end up with a client alleging she was coerced or manipulated into the relationship. An express rule would protect the client from the attorney and the attorney from the client, thereby preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
Note: the Bryant opinion should be R-rated, but please finish reading this posting before checking it out. Sneak preview: Lawyer Bryant told his client, “the happier you keep me, the harder I will work.”) ethicalEsq fully explained his disagreement with absolute prohibitions here, and the current Editor, not surprisingly, concurs.
The prior rule in Florida banned sexual relations that “exploit” a client. sunEthics (05/20/04) has a good summary of the changes:
The revised rule provides that a lawyer may not “engage in sexual conduct with a client or a representative of a client that exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship.” Rule 4-1.8(i). New language provides examples of offending conduct, including demanding sexual relations as a condition of representation, coercing or intimidating a client into acquiescing to sexual relations, or allowing the sexual relationship to cause the lawyer to render incompetent representation. New language in the Comment provides that a “client” means not only an individual but “a representative of the client..
Justice Pariente continues her nanny role with another concurrence (at page 26), in which she requests “that this rule be assessed periodically to ensure that it operates to guarantee that the attorney-client relationship is not compromised in any regard as a result of an ongoing sexual relationship.” Wouldn’t that be a great use of scare bar counsel resources?
On the subject of
ninnyism over lawyer advertising, see our
recent posting, concerning the current legislative push to ban virtually all advertising that “solicits” litigation. Instead of caving to this legislative pressure to further limit advertising, the Florida Supreme Court chose to remove many restrictions on television and radio advertising, while banning features that are “deceptive, misleading, manipulative, or . . . likely to confuse the viewer,” and insisting that all statements that are required to be included in lawyer ads be “clearly legible if written or intelligible if spoken aloud.”
Existing paternalistic prohibitions have been eliminated, including:
The requirement that verbal and visual portrayals or depictions be “objectively relevant to the selection of an attorney” is eliminated. (Former Rule 4-7.2(b)(4).
The requirement that illustrations be “directly related and objectively relevant to a viewer’s possible need for legal services” is eliminated. (Former Rule 4-7.2(c)(1).)
As sunEthics explains, under the new rules, “A non-lawyer spokesperson may speak or appear in TV and radio ads, provided the spokesperson ‘is not a celebrity recognizable to the public’ and makes ‘a spoken disclosure identifying the spokesperson as a spokesperson and disclosing that the spokesperson is not an attorney.’” (New Rule 4-7.2(b)(2).)
One final issue: Fla. Bar Rule 4-1.5 has also been amended to provide that a lawyer’s costs must be reasonable, and listing factors to be considered in determining reasonable costs. sunEthics points out (emphasis added) that:
This new rule can benefit lawyers in at least 2 ways. First, it contains a “safe harbor” provision specifying that a lawyer’s costs “shall be presumed reasonable” when there is a written attorney-client contract “in which the method is established for charging costs.” Amended Rule 4-1.5(b). Second, new language in the Comment to Rule 4-1.5 approves the practice of lawyers using charges for “in-house costs” (such as “copying, faxing, long distance telephone, and computerized research”) and “in-house services” (such as “paralegal services, investigative services, accounting services, and courier services”) as profit centers. Amended Rule 4-1.5(a), (b) and Comment.
While the pyj team believes that a lawyer can ethically enter into an agreement with a client that includes specific charges for in-house costs and services, we want to emphasize that determining reasonableness starts with looking at “the nature and extent of the disclosure made to the client about the costs.” Therefore, the revised Comment to the Florida rule stresses (1) general overhead should be accounted for in the lawyer’s fee, and (2) “The lawyer should sufficiently communicate with the client regarding the costs charged to the client so that the client understands the amount of costs being charged or the method for calculation of those costs.“
The lawyer should not take advantage of the “captive” nature of the client as a customer of in-house services and costs. Using an analogy to candy: the price should be similar to that found at your local drug store and supermarket (including mulit-packs and bulk discounts), and not like the cost at the counter of a movie theater.
Comments Off
Although facing raging nannyism (over sex with clients) and enraged ninnyism (over advertising by lawyers), the Florida Supreme Court has issued revised rules of professional conduct for lawyers that demonstrate a belief that clients who have reached their majority are indeed adults. The rules suggest that lawyers might be responsible adults, too. (See Amendment to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 5/20/2004. As usual, Tim Chinaris has done an excellent job at sunEthics, summarizing the rule changes and linking to relevant materials).
As for the nannyism, see the concurring opinion of Justice Pariente [apt name] in Florida Bar v. Bryant, 813 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2002), where the judge recommends the total prohibition of sexual relationships between a lawyer and client during the lawyer-client relationship (leaving no loophole for prior relationships — nor even mentioning spouses.) Justice Pariente favorably quotes a law review article stating:
Even an arguably “consensual” relationship could end up with a client alleging she was coerced or manipulated into the relationship. An express rule would protect the client from the attorney and the attorney from the client, thereby preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
Note: the Bryant opinion should be R-rated, but please finish reading this posting before checking it out. Sneak preview: Lawyer Bryant told his client, “the happier you keep me, the harder I will work.”) ethicalEsq fully explained his disagreement with absolute prohibitions here, and the current Editor, not surprisingly, concurs.
The prior rule in Florida banned sexual relations that “exploit” a client. sunEthics (05/20/04) has a good summary of the changes:
The revised rule provides that a lawyer may not “engage in sexual conduct with a client or a representative of a client that exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship.” Rule 4-1.8(i). New language provides examples of offending conduct, including demanding sexual relations as a condition of representation, coercing or intimidating a client into acquiescing to sexual relations, or allowing the sexual relationship to cause the lawyer to render incompetent representation. New language in the Comment provides that a “client” means not only an individual but “a representative of the client..
Justice Pariente continues her nanny role with another concurrence (at page 26), in which she requests “that this rule be assessed periodically to ensure that it operates to guarantee that the attorney-client relationship is not compromised in any regard as a result of an ongoing sexual relationship.” Wouldn’t that be a great use of scare bar counsel resources?
On the subject of
ninnyism over lawyer advertising, see our
recent posting, concerning the current legislative push to ban virtually all advertising that “solicits” litigation. Instead of caving to this legislative pressure to further limit advertising, the Florida Supreme Court chose to remove many restrictions on television and radio advertising, while banning features that are “deceptive, misleading, manipulative, or . . . likely to confuse the viewer,” and insisting that all statements that are required to be included in lawyer ads be “clearly legible if written or intelligible if spoken aloud.”
Existing paternalistic prohibitions have been eliminated, including:
The requirement that verbal and visual portrayals or depictions be “objectively relevant to the selection of an attorney” is eliminated. (Former Rule 4-7.2(b)(4).
The requirement that illustrations be “directly related and objectively relevant to a viewer’s possible need for legal services” is eliminated. (Former Rule 4-7.2(c)(1).)
As sunEthics explains, under the new rules, “A non-lawyer spokesperson may speak or appear in TV and radio ads, provided the spokesperson ‘is not a celebrity recognizable to the public’ and makes ‘a spoken disclosure identifying the spokesperson as a spokesperson and disclosing that the spokesperson is not an attorney.’” (New Rule 4-7.2(b)(2).)
One final issue: Fla. Bar Rule 4-1.5 has also been amended to provide that a lawyer’s costs must be reasonable, and listing factors to be considered in determining reasonable costs. sunEthics points out (emphasis added) that:
This new rule can benefit lawyers in at least 2 ways. First, it contains a “safe harbor” provision specifying that a lawyer’s costs “shall be presumed reasonable” when there is a written attorney-client contract “in which the method is established for charging costs.” Amended Rule 4-1.5(b). Second, new language in the Comment to Rule 4-1.5 approves the practice of lawyers using charges for “in-house costs” (such as “copying, faxing, long distance telephone, and computerized research”) and “in-house services” (such as “paralegal services, investigative services, accounting services, and courier services”) as profit centers. Amended Rule 4-1.5(a), (b) and Comment.
While the pyj team believes that a lawyer can ethically enter into an agreement with a client that includes specific charges for in-house costs and services, we want to emphasize that determining reasonableness starts with looking at “the nature and extent of the disclosure made to the client about the costs.” Therefore, the revised Comment to the Florida rule stresses (1) general overhead should be accounted for in the lawyer’s fee, and (2) “The lawyer should sufficiently communicate with the client regarding the costs charged to the client so that the client understands the amount of costs being charged or the method for calculation of those costs.“
- The lawyer should not take advantage of the “captive” nature of the client as a customer of in-house services and costs. Using an analogy to candy: the price should be similar to that found at your local drug store and supermarket (including mulit-packs and bulk discounts), and not like the cost at the counter of a movie theater.