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	<title>Comments on: poorly framed in Schenectady</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/</link>
	<description>breathless punditry and one-breath poetry with David Giacalone</description>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175570</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2008 12:27:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175570</guid>
		<description>Thanks for more discussion, Gideon.  It seems that you&#039;ve set up a strawman-like dichotomy.  I&#039;m certainly not saying that a lawyer should act merely on a hunch. Nor, that the defense attorney &quot;question (almost) everything that a client ever says.&quot;  However, when there are obvious red flags screaming &quot;this evidence/alibi is bogus,&quot; doing a little cross-examination of your client to put the proffer to a test is not asking a lot of the lawyer, if there truly is an obligation to prevent false evidence from tainting the trial.  That need does not arise with almost everything a client tells you (or, if it does, it is because clients have learned to expect their criminal lawyer to act deaf-dumb-blind) -- and will come up even less if criminal clients know their lawyer is not simply a mouthpiece or cipher. 

Every other kind of (responsible) lawyer asks his or her client questions to help confirm or just better-understand the client&#039;s story.  For example (using two areas in which I practiced for long periods), the ethical divorce lawyer has a duty to ask a few questions when a client starts throwing around accusations about the other spouse (who, e.g., often suddenly becomes a danger to their children or an incompetent babysitter).  And, antitrust lawyers don&#039;t take conspiracy or boycott allegations on their face and just start drafting their pleadings. 

Every lawyer in litigation has to &quot;fight the system.&quot;  Criminal defense lawyers -- unlike everyone else -- only have to deal with an evidentiary standard of &quot;beyond a reasonable doubt&quot; in order to win their case.  The rest of the profession can lose despite almost convincing the trier of fact that their story is more likely to be true.  It seems to me, therefore, that the criminal lawyer should have an even stronger obligation than other lawyers to make sure evidence creating doubt is not false.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for more discussion, Gideon.  It seems that you&#8217;ve set up a strawman-like dichotomy.  I&#8217;m certainly not saying that a lawyer should act merely on a hunch. Nor, that the defense attorney &#8220;question (almost) everything that a client ever says.&#8221;  However, when there are obvious red flags screaming &#8220;this evidence/alibi is bogus,&#8221; doing a little cross-examination of your client to put the proffer to a test is not asking a lot of the lawyer, if there truly is an obligation to prevent false evidence from tainting the trial.  That need does not arise with almost everything a client tells you (or, if it does, it is because clients have learned to expect their criminal lawyer to act deaf-dumb-blind) &#8212; and will come up even less if criminal clients know their lawyer is not simply a mouthpiece or cipher. </p>
<p>Every other kind of (responsible) lawyer asks his or her client questions to help confirm or just better-understand the client&#8217;s story.  For example (using two areas in which I practiced for long periods), the ethical divorce lawyer has a duty to ask a few questions when a client starts throwing around accusations about the other spouse (who, e.g., often suddenly becomes a danger to their children or an incompetent babysitter).  And, antitrust lawyers don&#8217;t take conspiracy or boycott allegations on their face and just start drafting their pleadings. </p>
<p>Every lawyer in litigation has to &#8220;fight the system.&#8221;  Criminal defense lawyers &#8212; unlike everyone else &#8212; only have to deal with an evidentiary standard of &#8220;beyond a reasonable doubt&#8221; in order to win their case.  The rest of the profession can lose despite almost convincing the trier of fact that their story is more likely to be true.  It seems to me, therefore, that the criminal lawyer should have an even stronger obligation than other lawyers to make sure evidence creating doubt is not false.</p>
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		<title>By: Gideon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175568</link>
		<dc:creator>Gideon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2008 11:45:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175568</guid>
		<description>David, it sure looks like that doesn&#039;t it? But if it were anything else - say the requirement was &quot;reasonably believe&quot;, then it puts defense attorneys in the untenable position of having to question (almost) everything that a client ever says and then we&#039;re fighting them while fighting the system at the same time.

So given the alternative, I&#039;d rather have the requirement of actual knowledge as opposed to just a hunch.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David, it sure looks like that doesn&#8217;t it? But if it were anything else &#8211; say the requirement was &#8220;reasonably believe&#8221;, then it puts defense attorneys in the untenable position of having to question (almost) everything that a client ever says and then we&#8217;re fighting them while fighting the system at the same time.</p>
<p>So given the alternative, I&#8217;d rather have the requirement of actual knowledge as opposed to just a hunch.</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175330</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 01:22:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175330</guid>
		<description>Gideon, thank you for &quot;the really long comment.&quot; It&#039;s useful. Got to tell you, it sounds like lawyers (a committee of &#039;em) wrote that commentary -- and that&#039;s not a compliment.  On the one hand, blah, blah; on the other hand, blah, blah.  Client&#039;s rights, blah blah blah.

If the lawyer does not have an obligation to try to learn whether shaky-looking evidence is or isn&#039;t false, the rules are protecting lawyers, not the justice system.

Thanks for pointing to this posting from your weblog. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gideon, thank you for &#8220;the really long comment.&#8221; It&#8217;s useful. Got to tell you, it sounds like lawyers (a committee of &#8216;em) wrote that commentary &#8212; and that&#8217;s not a compliment.  On the one hand, blah, blah; on the other hand, blah, blah.  Client&#8217;s rights, blah blah blah.</p>
<p>If the lawyer does not have an obligation to try to learn whether shaky-looking evidence is or isn&#8217;t false, the rules are protecting lawyers, not the justice system.</p>
<p>Thanks for pointing to this posting from your weblog.</p>
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		<title>By: Gideon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175324</link>
		<dc:creator>Gideon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 00:52:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175324</guid>
		<description>David, for further reflection, I turned to the Rules of Professional Conduct here in CT. Rule 3.3 states that a lawyer shall not knowingly:

(3) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

The commentary provides:

If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence.

The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious
falsehood.

Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the
testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client’s decision to testify.

So, did this lawyer &quot;know&quot; that the evidence was false? Probably, but the rule does complicate matters a bit.

(Sorry for the really long comment)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David, for further reflection, I turned to the Rules of Professional Conduct here in CT. Rule 3.3 states that a lawyer shall not knowingly:</p>
<p>(3) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.</p>
<p>The commentary provides:</p>
<p>If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence.</p>
<p>The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious<br />
falsehood.</p>
<p>Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the<br />
testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client’s decision to testify.</p>
<p>So, did this lawyer &#8220;know&#8221; that the evidence was false? Probably, but the rule does complicate matters a bit.</p>
<p>(Sorry for the really long comment)</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175118</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 03:56:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175118</guid>
		<description>Thanks for continuing the discussion, Gideon.  Just to be clear: the picture used in evidence was not the entire insert from the picture frame; the photo was cut from the insert -- leaving the strange shape and image that is shown above and &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/files/2008/04/framedwayneheittleman.jpg&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for continuing the discussion, Gideon.  Just to be clear: the picture used in evidence was not the entire insert from the picture frame; the photo was cut from the insert &#8212; leaving the strange shape and image that is shown above and <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/files/2008/04/framedwayneheittleman.jpg" rel="nofollow">here</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Gideon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175116</link>
		<dc:creator>Gideon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 03:44:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175116</guid>
		<description>I can&#039;t disagree with your first statement. 

I would like to think that I, too, would not have let the client present that alibi and if the picture is indeed the one you linked to, then I would have to agree that the decision should not have been a difficult one.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I can&#8217;t disagree with your first statement. </p>
<p>I would like to think that I, too, would not have let the client present that alibi and if the picture is indeed the one you linked to, then I would have to agree that the decision should not have been a difficult one.</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175113</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 03:33:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175113</guid>
		<description>When there&#039;s a fine line to an ethical issue, it is rare that the appropriate action is the easy one. Usually, the right thing to do takes some courage on the lawyer&#039;s part. 

A veteran (head) public defender who I respect a lot had this to say about this case: &quot;You&#039;re being too hard on Gebert. . .. I would have never let the client present that alibi.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When there&#8217;s a fine line to an ethical issue, it is rare that the appropriate action is the easy one. Usually, the right thing to do takes some courage on the lawyer&#8217;s part. </p>
<p>A veteran (head) public defender who I respect a lot had this to say about this case: &#8220;You&#8217;re being too hard on Gebert. . .. I would have never let the client present that alibi.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Gideon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175101</link>
		<dc:creator>Gideon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 03:18:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175101</guid>
		<description>David - you&#039;re right, it&#039;s a very fine line. I find myself struggling a bit to make this argument plausible.

I still think there&#039;s a difference between &quot;That picture looks like it is from a catalog&quot; and &quot;I know that picture is from a catalog&quot;.

As to the picture, I didn&#039;t realize that the image you posted was exactly how it appeared in this frame. If that is the case, then I think the case for knowing admission of false evidence becomes stronger.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David &#8211; you&#8217;re right, it&#8217;s a very fine line. I find myself struggling a bit to make this argument plausible.</p>
<p>I still think there&#8217;s a difference between &#8220;That picture looks like it is from a catalog&#8221; and &#8220;I know that picture is from a catalog&#8221;.</p>
<p>As to the picture, I didn&#8217;t realize that the image you posted was exactly how it appeared in this frame. If that is the case, then I think the case for knowing admission of false evidence becomes stronger.</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175089</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 02:36:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175089</guid>
		<description>Thanks for leaving such a substantive Comment, Gideon.  It bothers me to think that counsel could decide that there was &quot;no concrete proof&quot; here -- that oddly-shaped, professional-model photo printed on a piece of cardboard seems like rather probative evidence and should have prompted a little digging.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for leaving such a substantive Comment, Gideon.  It bothers me to think that counsel could decide that there was &#8220;no concrete proof&#8221; here &#8212; that oddly-shaped, professional-model photo printed on a piece of cardboard seems like rather probative evidence and should have prompted a little digging.</p>
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		<title>By: Gideon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-175085</link>
		<dc:creator>Gideon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 02:16:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-175085</guid>
		<description>Unfortunately, I think Scott&#039;s hit it right on the head. There are times in the representation of a criminal defendant when the lawyer has a very strong inkling that the &quot;story&quot; is absolutely false. However, the ethical rules call for more than an &quot;inkling&quot;.

I think it is pretty obvious that the lawyer was not &quot;oblivious&quot; to this, at best, shaky alibi. The question is what he could have done about it.

He almost certainly would not have been permitted to withdraw based on a lack of definite information, regardless of how obvious the sham was. Stuck with a pushy client, an almost certainly fake alibi and no real concrete proof of the former, he probably had no choice but to proceed to trial. 

I will say that his comments post-trial seem a bit unnecessary. It would have been more appropriate to decline comment and go about his business.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately, I think Scott&#8217;s hit it right on the head. There are times in the representation of a criminal defendant when the lawyer has a very strong inkling that the &#8220;story&#8221; is absolutely false. However, the ethical rules call for more than an &#8220;inkling&#8221;.</p>
<p>I think it is pretty obvious that the lawyer was not &#8220;oblivious&#8221; to this, at best, shaky alibi. The question is what he could have done about it.</p>
<p>He almost certainly would not have been permitted to withdraw based on a lack of definite information, regardless of how obvious the sham was. Stuck with a pushy client, an almost certainly fake alibi and no real concrete proof of the former, he probably had no choice but to proceed to trial. </p>
<p>I will say that his comments post-trial seem a bit unnecessary. It would have been more appropriate to decline comment and go about his business.</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-172904</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 01:44:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-172904</guid>
		<description>Thanks for framing the issues for us, Scott. Quite helpful (even if a punt).  Of course, when the lawyer &quot;lacks affirmative evidence to the contrary&quot; due to &quot;conscious avoidance&quot; he does not get to &quot;let the defendant sleep in the bed he made.&quot;  Obliviousness is no defense for the competent and ethical lawyer.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for framing the issues for us, Scott. Quite helpful (even if a punt).  Of course, when the lawyer &#8220;lacks affirmative evidence to the contrary&#8221; due to &#8220;conscious avoidance&#8221; he does not get to &#8220;let the defendant sleep in the bed he made.&#8221;  Obliviousness is no defense for the competent and ethical lawyer.</p>
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		<title>By: shg</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-172901</link>
		<dc:creator>shg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 01:29:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-172901</guid>
		<description>The lawyer&#039;s responsibility is clear; it&#039;s his vision, or lack thereof, or choice to close his eyes, that&#039;s in question.

The defendant&#039;s effort here was pathetic.  It&#039;s hard to imagine that the lawyer thought it possibly true, leaving two possibilities.

Was the lawyer complicit in the attempted false alibi, whether knowingly or by conscious avoidance.  Or did the lawyer decide that it was the defendant&#039;s life and, if he insisted on the truth of his alibi, despite how bad an alibi defense it was, decide to let the defendant sleep in whatever bed he made?

Sometimes, when the client absolutely insists, and the lawyer lacks affirmative evidence to the contrary, on pursuing a ridiculous strategy, he&#039;s caught between ethical duties.  Was this such a time?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The lawyer&#8217;s responsibility is clear; it&#8217;s his vision, or lack thereof, or choice to close his eyes, that&#8217;s in question.</p>
<p>The defendant&#8217;s effort here was pathetic.  It&#8217;s hard to imagine that the lawyer thought it possibly true, leaving two possibilities.</p>
<p>Was the lawyer complicit in the attempted false alibi, whether knowingly or by conscious avoidance.  Or did the lawyer decide that it was the defendant&#8217;s life and, if he insisted on the truth of his alibi, despite how bad an alibi defense it was, decide to let the defendant sleep in whatever bed he made?</p>
<p>Sometimes, when the client absolutely insists, and the lawyer lacks affirmative evidence to the contrary, on pursuing a ridiculous strategy, he&#8217;s caught between ethical duties.  Was this such a time?</p>
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		<title>By: David Giacalone</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-172882</link>
		<dc:creator>David Giacalone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 00:11:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-172882</guid>
		<description>Scott, I fail to see how the intelligence of the defendant bears on the responsibility of the lawyer not to present false evidence.  If anything, the stupid defendant&#039;s alibi is even easier to spot as false.  And, the stupid defendant deserves to be strongly counseled not to try a fake alibi -- not ill-served by a lawyer who &quot;sees no reason to doubt the evidence.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott, I fail to see how the intelligence of the defendant bears on the responsibility of the lawyer not to present false evidence.  If anything, the stupid defendant&#8217;s alibi is even easier to spot as false.  And, the stupid defendant deserves to be strongly counseled not to try a fake alibi &#8212; not ill-served by a lawyer who &#8220;sees no reason to doubt the evidence.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: shg</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/comment-page-1/#comment-172880</link>
		<dc:creator>shg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 00:02:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2008/04/12/poorly-framed-in-schenectady/#comment-172880</guid>
		<description>Always bear in mind that defendants are presumed innocent, not intelligent.  Some even less so than others.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Always bear in mind that defendants are presumed innocent, not intelligent.  Some even less so than others.</p>
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