With a petulant cry of “cronyism/schmonyism”, GW Bush has shown
the world that he will to appoint old friends and cronies if he wants to —
even to the most important and consequential positions. (see CNN.com,
“Bush picks White House counsel for Supreme Court”) President Bush’s
second choice for a Supreme Court justice looks from here to be a bad
case of Terrible Two’s — the need to prove just how independent and in
charge he is, while still needing the reassurance of unqualified love and
Of course, I’m willing to be persuaded otherwise, but my initial
cronyism, which along with prideful arrogance seems to be the besetting
sin of the Bush presidency.” And, Steve asks a great question: “Why is
the leader of a party that [is] supposedly about merit and against affirmative
action making an appointment that can only be explained as an affirmative
action choice?” [can you say “spousal suasion“?]
Naturally, unlike Prof. B, it’s not Miers’ lack of a “public track record of
proven conservative judicial values” that concerns me. It’s the scarcity of
information for evaluating her likely judicial temperament (especially open-
minded fairness) or the excellence of her mind. Her blind devotion to the
policies of George W. Bush, obviously worries me. Making it all much
worse is the fear that neither party is likely to give us a confirmation process
that will enlighten or edify the public.
I’ve often opined that I will gladly choose a person
with an excellent and open mind, with whom I often disagree,
over a person who always agrees with me but has either an
agenda or a mediocre mind. I can’t expect Pres. Bush to
name someone with whom I am likely to always agree, but
I do expect a nominee of high intelligence with no secret
agendas.
Gimme that moon!
cries the crying
child
You will, as expected, find much more on this topic
Plus, more from Steve Bainbridge here and there.
telling her its time
for a diaper change:
“I did not”
update (Oct. 4, 2005): Receiving a tip from Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum
Federalist No. 76
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that
the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general,
a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism
in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it would be an
efficacious source of stability in the administration.
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole disposition
of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations and interests,
than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion
and determination of a different and independent body, and that body an entier
branch of the legislature. The possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to
care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective
magistrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an
unbecoming pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would
have great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to operate as a barrier
to the one and to the other. He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward,
for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit
than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of
being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
orig.
