Home Is Where The Heart Dwells

June 29, 2011

Mark Roe: How Capitalist is America?

Filed under: In English,reading — Rui Guo @ 11:27 pm

How Capitalist is America?

2011-06-20

How Capitalist is America?

CAMBRIDGE – If capitalism’s border is with socialism, we know why the world properly sees the United States as strongly capitalist. State ownership is low, and is viewed as aberrational when it occurs (such as the government takeovers of General Motors and Chrysler in recent years, from which officials are rushing to exit). The government intervenes in the economy less than in most advanced nations, and major social programs like universal health care are not as deeply embedded in the US as elsewhere.

But these are not the only dimensions to consider in judging how capitalist the US really is. Consider the extent to which capital – that is, shareholders – rules in large businesses: if a conflict arises between capital’s goals and those of managers, who wins?

Looked at in this way, America’s capitalism becomes more ambiguous. American law gives more authority to managers and corporate directors than to shareholders. If shareholders want to tell directors what to do – say, borrow more money and expand the business, or close off the money-losing factory – well, they just can’t. The law is clear: the corporation’s board of directors, not its shareholders, runs the business.

Someone naïve in the ways of US corporations might say that these rules are paper-thin, because shareholders can just elect new directors if the incumbents are recalcitrant. As long as they can elect the directors, one might think, shareholders rule the firm. That would be plausible if American corporate ownership were concentrated and powerful, with major shareholders owning, say, 25% of a company’s stock – a structure common in most other advanced countries, where families, foundations, or financial institutions more often have that kind of authority inside large firms.

But that is neither how US firms are owned, nor how US corporate elections work. Ownership in large American firms is diffuse, with block-holding shareholders scarce, even today. Hedge funds with big blocks of stock are news, not the norm.

Corporate elections for the directors who run American firms are expensive. Incumbent directors typically nominate themselves, and the company pays their election expenses (for soliciting votes from distant and dispersed shareholders, producing voting materials, submitting legal filings, and, when an election is contested, paying for high-priced US litigation). If a shareholder dislikes, say, how GM’s directors are running the company (and, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, they were running it into the ground), she is free to nominate new directors, but she must pay their hefty elections costs, and should expect that no one, particularly not GM, will ever reimburse her. If she owns 100 shares, or 1,000, or even 100,000, challenging the incumbents is just not worthwhile.

Hence, contested elections are few, incumbents win the few that occur, and they remain in control. Firms and their managers are subject to competitive markets and other constraints, but not to shareholder authority.

In lieu of an election that could remove recalcitrant directors, an outside company might try to buy the firm and all of its stock. But the rules of the US corporate game – heavily influenced by directors and their lobbying organizations – usually allow directors to spurn outside offers, and even to block shareholders from selling to the outsider. Directors lacked that power in the early 1980’s, when a wave of such hostile takeovers took place; but by the end of the decade, directors had the rules changed in their favor, to allow them to reject offers for nearly any reason. It is now enough to reject the outsider’s price offer (even if no one else would pay more).

American corporate-law reformers have long had their eyes on corporate elections. About a decade ago, after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, America’s stock-market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), considered requiring that companies allow qualified shareholders to put their director nominees on the company-paid election ballot. The actual proposal was anodyne, as it would allow only a few directors – not enough to change a board’s majority – to be nominated, and voted on, at the company’s expense.

Nevertheless, the directors’ lobbying organizations – such as the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce (and their lawyers) – attacked the SEC’s initiative. Lobbying was fierce, and is said to have reached into the White House. Business interests sought to replace SEC commissioners who wanted the rule, and their lawyers threatened to sue the SEC if it moved forward. It worked: America’s corporate insiders repeatedly pushed the proposal off of the SEC agenda in the ensuing decade.

Then, in the summer of 2010, after a relevant election and a financial crisis that weakened incumbents’ credibility, the SEC promulgated election rules that would give qualified shareholders free access to company-paid election ballots. As soon as it did, the US managerial establishment sued the SEC, and government officials felt compelled to suspend the new rules before they ever took effect. The litigation is now in America’s courts.

The lesson is that the US is less capitalist than it is “managerialist.” Managers, not owners, get the final say in corporate decisions.

Perhaps this is good. Even some capital-oriented thinking says that shareholders are better off if managers make all major decisions. And often the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned.

But there is considerable evidence that when managers are at odds with shareholders, managerial discretion in American firms is excessive and weakens companies. Managers of established firms continue money-losing ventures for too long, pay themselves too much relative to their and the company’s performance, and too often fail to act aggressively enough to enter new but risky markets.

When it comes to capitalism vs. socialism, we know which side the US is on. But when it’s managers vs. capital-owners, the US is managerialist, not capitalist.

Mark Roe is a Professor of law at Harvard Law School.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
 http://media.blubrry.com/ps/media.libsyn.com/media/ps/roe4.mp3

May 8, 2011

The rise and rise of the princelings, the country’s revolutionary aristocracy

Filed under: Uncategorized — Rui Guo @ 11:51 pm

Economist: The rise and rise of the princelings, the country’s revolutionary aristocracy

 

“THERE are some sour and smelly literati these days who are utterly abominable,” a retired military officer reportedly told a recent gathering in Beijing. “They attack Chairman Mao and practise de-Maoification. We must fight to repel this reactionary counter-current.” At the time, two months ago, the colonel’s crusty words might have had the whiff of a bygone era. Today, amid a heavy crackdown on dissent, they sound cruelly prescient.

One of the most prominent literati, Ai Weiwei, is among dozens of activists the security forces have rounded up recently. Mr Ai, an artist who is famous abroad, was detained in Beijing as he attempted to board a flight to Hong Kong on April 3rd. There has been no official confirmation since of his whereabouts. Officials say that he is being investigated for unspecified economic crimes, but the Global Times, a Beijing newspaper, warned that Mr Ai had been skirting close to the “red line” of the law with his “maverick” behaviour. In other words, he had apparently provoked the Communist Party once too often.

Since the late 1970s, when China began to turn its back on Maoist totalitarianism, the country has gone through several cycles of relative tolerance of dissent, followed by periods of repression. But the latest backlash, which was first felt late last year and intensified in late February, has raised eyebrows. It has involved more systematic police harassment of foreign journalists than at any time since the early 1990s. More ominously, activists such as Mr Ai have often simply disappeared rather than being formally arrested.

It is an abnormally heavy-handed approach, one unprompted by any mass disturbances (recent anonymous calls on the internet for a Chinese “jasmine revolution” hardly count). This suggests that shifting forces within the Chinese leadership could well be playing a part. China is entering a period of heightened political uncertainty as it prepares for changes in many top positions in the Communist Party, government and army, beginning late next year. This is the first transfer of power after a decade of rapid social change. Within the state, new interest groups have emerged. These are now struggling to set the agenda for China’s new rulers.Particularly conspicuous are the “princelings”. The term refers to the offspring of China’s revolutionary founders and other high-ranking officials. Vice-President Xi Jinping, who looks set to take over as party chief next year and president in 2013, is one of them. Little is known about his policy preferences. Some princelings have been big beneficiaries of China’s economic reforms, using their political connections and Western education to build lucrative business careers. Other princelings are critical of China’s Dickensian capitalism and call for a return to socialist rectitude. Some straddle both camps. Prominent princelings in business include President Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng, who headed a big provider of airport scanners; and Wen Yunsong, a financier who is the son of Wen Jiabao, the prime minister.

Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, argues that a shared need to protect their interests binds these princelings together, especially at a time of growing public resentment against nepotism. Since a Politburo reshuffle in 2007, princelings have occupied seven out of 25 seats, up from three in 2002.

The Mao-loving ex-colonel was talking to a group called the Beijing Friendship Association of the Sons and Daughters of Yan’an (where Mao Zedong was based before his takeover of China in 1949). No prizes for guessing that the group favours socialist rectitude. Its president is Hu Muying, a daughter of Mao’s secretary, Hu Qiaomu. Mr Hu was a Politburo hardliner in the 1980s who died in 1992. Other princelings are association members, though it is unclear how many are current or expected holders of high office. In her speech to the gathering Ms Hu said she rejected the word “princelings”, but declared: “We are the red descendants, the descendants of the revolution. So we have no choice but to be concerned about the fate of our party, state and people. We cannot turn our backs on the crisis the party faces.”

The crisis, as her sort see it, is rampant corruption, a widening gap between rich and poor, and a collapse of faith in communist ideology. Details of Ms Hu’s speech and the former colonel’s were posted on several websites controlled by China’s remaining Maoist hardliners. Journals put out by the hardliners were forced to close a decade ago because they were too blunt in their criticism of China’s economic reforms. Yet the websites have kept up their tirades, including fierce denunciations of Ai Weiwei and other liberal intellectuals long before the recent arrests.

The Maoists’ lingering influence has been evident for the past couple of years in the south-western (and Scotland-sized) municipality of Chongqing. There, one of the country’s most powerful princelings, Bo Xilai, Chongqing’s party secretary, has been waging a remarkable campaign to revive Maoist culture. It includes getting people to sing Mao-era “red songs” and sending text messages with reams of Mao quotations. A local television channel has even started airing “revolutionary programming” at prime time. Last year Chongqing’s fawning media ascribed a woman’s recovery from severe depression to her singing Mao-vintage songs.

The campaign has drawn plenty of attention. Mr Bo is a Politburo member who is thought to be a strong contender for elevation next year to its standing committee, the party’s supreme body. He has become a darling of the Maoists (their websites say that the same colonel singled out Mr Bo for praise, to applause from the audience). For a long time it had been thought that Mr Bo and Mr Xi did not get on. But in December Mr Xi visited Chongqing and said its red revival had “deeply entered people’s hearts”. It deserved all its praise.

Few people—certainly not Mr Bo or other contenders for power—are calling for a return to Maoist despotism and an end to market economics. What worries many liberals, however, is that they share Mao’s high-handed approach to the law. In Chongqing a sweeping campaign against the city’s mafia-like gangs and their official protectors has won Mr Bo many plaudits in the state-controlled press. But the jailing of a defence lawyer for one of the mobsters, for allegedly trying to persuade the accused to give false testimony, has led many to worry that Chongqing’s courts will do anything to prevent lawyers from challenging the prosecution. He Weifang, a prominent legal expert at Peking University, wrote this week that recent events in Chongqing “threatened the basic principles of a society under the rule of law”.

The manner of the recent crackdown could be a sign that Mr Bo’s approach (which includes dollops of spending on housing for the poor) is gaining favour in Beijing. It is also a sign of the increased influence of the domestic security apparatus since 2008, when China pulled out all the stops to stop unrest marring the Olympic games in Beijing. The power of Zhou Yongkang, the member of the Politburo’s standing committee in charge of security, is widely thought to have grown along with a rapid increase in government spending on his portfolio.

More liberal thinking has not been entirely suppressed. The party chief of Guangdong province in the south, Wang Yang, who is another (non-princeling) contender for the Politburo’s standing committee, is widely seen as a bit more open-minded. Shenzhen, a special economic zone in Guangdong, has been experimenting in giving a freer rein to NGOs. The province’s newspapers are among the country’s most spirited (for which they are bitterly attacked by leftist websites). But Mr Wang has a cautious streak, too. The official media reported this week that 80,000 “potentially unstable people” had been evicted from Shenzhen in preparation for a sporting event this summer.

One of the most powerful criticisms of the clampdown came on April 8th from Mao Yushi, a notable economist. In a blog posting at Caixin Media, an outspoken publishing group, Mr Mao accused leaders of making a mistake by neglecting political reform in their plans for China’s development in the next five years. Spending ever greater sums on maintaining stability, he said, just made citizens more hostile. Determined not to allow any disruption to next year’s high politics, Chinese leaders are willing to take that risk.

译者:tony

校对:南山

据报道,一名退休军官最近在北京的一次集会上这样说道:“有些酸臭的知识分子非常可恶。他们攻击毛主席,提倡‘去毛化’,我们必须努力击退这种反动逆 流。”在两个月以前,这位退役上校的强硬言辞兴许带着一些逝去时代的味道。而在今天,一场针对异议人士的沉重打压,让他说的话听起来带着残酷的预见性。

艾 未未是最近被国家安全机构逮捕的数十人中最著名的知识分子。艾先生是一位蜚声国际的艺术家,4月3号在北京机场准备登上前往香港的航班时被捕。现在还没有 关于他下落的官方确认。官员声称,他是因为涉嫌“不明的经济犯罪”被逮捕调查,但是《环球时报》(一份北京的报纸)警告说,艾未未先生常常用他桀骜不驯的 行为挑战法律的“红线”,换句话说,很明显的,他过于频繁地挑衅共产党。

自从20世纪70年代末开始,中国从毛泽东极权主义扭转过来之 后,中国经历了数个从对异议的相对宽容时期到随之而来一段压制言论自由时期的周期。但是最新的这次反弹,始于去年年底并且在今年二月末期加剧,势头更加猛 烈。它包括了警察对国外记者的系统性的骚扰,其频率超过了自1990年代初以来的任何时候。更加不祥的是,像艾未未这样的异议活动人士更经常的是突然地消 失而不是正式地逮捕。

这是一次异常严厉的行动,并非针对任何具体的群体性事件(最近在互联网上发出匿名号召的中国“茉莉花”革命不能算 数)。这表明了中国领导层的内部权力转移很可能在此事中扮演了一定角色。因为中国准备明年年末的大规模党,政,军高层的换届(译者注:十二大),正在进入 一个政治不确定性加剧的时期。这是十年的剧烈社会变化以来的第一次权力转移。而在国家内部,新的利益集团已经出现。他们正在竭尽全力地为中国的新统治者设 立新的待办事项。

其中尤为突出的是“太子党“。这个词指的是中国的革命创始人和一些高级官员的后代。现任国家副主席、被安排在明年将成为 党和国家领导人的习近平就是其中一员。而对于他的政策偏好外界知之甚少。一些“太子党”成为中国经济改革的最大受益者,他们利用自己的政治影响力和西方教 育背景经营着利益丰厚的商业生涯。其他的“太子党”对中国“狄更斯式的资本主义”(译者注:“狄更斯式的资本主义”常常用来形容中国三十年来的污染严重, 贫富分化剧烈的发展过程,如同狄更斯描写当时英国的资本主义)持批判态度并且呼吁回到传统的社会主义公平与正义。也有一些太子党成功的横跨这两个阵营。 “太子党”在商业领域中的佼佼者包括国家主席胡锦涛之子胡海峰,他掌管着生产机场扫描仪的一家大型供应商。还有国家总理温家宝之子温云松,他是一位金融 家。

华盛顿特区布鲁金斯研究所的Cheng Li认为,保障自身利益的共同需求将这些“太子党”绑在了一起,尤其在当前公众对裙带关系的愤恨程度在不断增长的背景之下。2007年的政治局换届,太子党占据了25席中的7席,而在2003年,他们只占据了3席。

那 位喜爱毛泽东思想的前上校,是对一个名叫“延安子女北京联谊会”的组织讲出那番话的(延安是毛泽东在1949年夺得全国政权之前的根据地)。不难猜出,这 个组织热衷于社会主义的正义。其主席叫胡木英,是毛泽东的秘书胡乔木之女。胡乔木曾是1980年代政治局的强硬派,死于1992年。其他的“太子党”也是 协会成员,但是现在还不清楚有多少现任或未来的高层领导人。在她的集会演讲中,胡女士拒绝承认“太子党”这个词,反而宣称:“我们是红色后代,革命后代。 因此,我们除了关注我们党,国家,人民的命运以外别无选择。我们不能在党面临危机的时候置之不理。”

在她看来,腐败的猖獗,贫富差距的日 益扩大,以及共产主义理念的崩溃构成了一场危机。胡女士和那位退役上校的演讲的详细内容,发布在由中国残存的毛泽东思想强硬派所控制的一些网站上。而这些 人创办的杂志在十年前被当局强制关闭,原因是他们对中国经济改革的犀利批评。然而,早在逮捕开始很久以前,这些网站就持续以长篇大论激烈地谴责、攻击艾未 未和其他的自由主义知识分子。

毛泽东主义者挥之不去的影响,近几年在中国西南部的重庆市(面积和苏格兰相近)表现得最为明显。在这里,中 国最有实力的太子党之一、重庆市党委书记薄熙来发动了影响巨大的运动,以恢复毛泽东时代的文化。它包括了让公众“唱红歌”,发送毛泽东语录的短信。一个当 地电视台更是开始在黄金时间播放“革命节目”。去年,重庆市可怜的媒体把一名女士从严重抑郁症中康复归结于她的唱红歌行为。

这些活动引起 了广泛的重视。薄先生是政治局委员并且被认为在明年的换届中是晋升为政治局常委的强力竞争者,政治局常委会是党的最高机构。他成为了毛派最喜爱的人(他们 的网站说,那位上校对薄熙来提出点名表扬,听众们也鼓掌赞同)。在很长的时间里,薄熙来和习近平被认为不合。然而在12月,习先生视察了重庆并说红色文化 复苏已经“深入人心”。它获得的赞誉名副其实。

几乎没人——包括薄熙来先生和其他的权力竞争者——呼吁回归毛时代的独裁,并且结束市场经 济。但让很多自由主义者担心的是,这些人认同毛泽东对法律的高压干涉。在重庆对其黑手党似的黑帮以及他们的官方保护势力进行的清扫活动中,薄熙来赢得了来 自国家控制的新闻媒体的很多喝彩。但一名黑帮成员的辩护律师因涉嫌试图说服被告提供伪证而被逮捕,让很多人们担忧引重庆的法庭会不惜一切措施来防止律师对 公诉人提出质疑。北京大学著名法律专家贺卫方,本周撰文说最近在重庆发生的事情“威胁到一个法制社会的基本原则”

近期对于异议者的打压方 式可能是一个迹象,说明薄熙来的手段(包括大量的投资改善穷人的居住条件)得到了北京的青睐。这也是国内安全机构自2008以来影响力与日俱增的一个表现 ——当时中国尽全力防止任何影响到北京奥运会的社会动荡。很多人认为,随着他所掌管的部门得到了政府大幅度的投入,负责安全方面的政治局常委周永康的权力 也在逐渐增加。

更加自由的思考却没有被完全抑制。中国南部的广东省党委书记汪洋,是政治局常委(非太子党)的另一位有力竞争者,被广泛认 为是有着更加开放的态度。深圳是广东的一个特别经济区,它已经试着给予非政府组织更加自由的发挥空间。广东省的报纸媒体是这个国家里最有良知的媒体(这也 是他们被左派网站激烈攻击的原因)。但汪洋也在谨慎地处事。官方媒体本周报道,八万名“潜在的不稳定的人“已被逐出深圳,为这里在今年夏天的体育赛事做准 备。

对这种趋势最有力的批评来自茅于轼,一位著名的经济学家。他在四月八号在财新网站(一家直言不讳的出版集团)上发表了一篇博客。茅于 轼先生指责中国领导人在下一个五年计划中错误的忽略了政治改革。他说,花费更巨大的预算在维稳上,只会让公众对政府更加敌视。然而,由于决心不允许任何因 素干扰明年的高层政治会议,中国领导人愿意为此承担这份风险。

 

何清涟:中国的反精英情绪从何而来?

Filed under: Uncategorized — Rui Guo @ 11:39 pm

 何清涟

好几年以前,曾看到过有文章提到中国的中低层人士已经产生了反精英情绪,一看到精英阶层有人倒霉,网上一片叫好声音。我记住了这一观察,但反精英情绪强烈到什么程度,对此却并无切身感受。上个月末在推特上有关“精英”一词的争论,却让我深深感受到了这种情绪。

此次争论的缘起很简单。4月下旬,我在“面对中国未来前景的惶恐”一文中使用了一个分标题,“中国精英阶层的惶恐”。对精英这个词的使用,一些推友有意见,大致可归纳如下:
一、中国没有所谓“精英”,就像它也没有贵族。
二、“精英”这词本身不妥,暗含只有这些人是社会精华的意思,宣传一种傲慢和不平等。
三、中国的精英没有道德,所以不能算是精英。更有比较极端的意见,认为拥护共产党就不能算是精英。
四、彻底颠覆“精英、草根”及原有的社会分层话语系统。一位推友干脆就说:“什么精英草根的,那是你们闭门造车自作聪明,匪区分五等,大土匪,中土匪,小土匪,屁民和冤民 ”。

尽管我向这些推友解释:任何研究都需要一套话语系统,研究者发表自己的观点与意见时必须借用这套话语体系。“精英”其实只是与“草根”相对应的一个词汇,其定义很简单:受过良好教育,占有政治、经济及文化资源,并无道德含义。更何况,为“精英”一词赋予道德含义,会让人们在使用这词汇时产生困扰,比如一些上层精英一旦有了道德缺陷,比如包养多个情妇、贪污腐败等,难道就能因此将他们贬入“草根”阶层?如果弃用精英、草根、上层、中层这一社会分层的话语系统,研究写作“中国社会各阶层分析”,就会变成这种范式:“开篇:界定中国各等土匪之内涵外延;第一章:中国大土匪的属性,第二章……”,这在学术研究上是不可行的。

讨论者也意识到这种颠覆话语系统的事情说说也就罢了,真要行之于世也太困难。但是好几位推友仍然认为用“精英”一词是抬举了中国的政治经济文化上层,于是以张艺谋为例,认为他只能算“精”(精于算计),但未必是“英”(即“人之英华”之意)。

但是我对推友们否定中国精英存在的倾向很感兴趣,因为这是转型期社会情绪的一种折射。在我看来,这种情绪至少反映了几个方面的问题:

一是中国的精英阶层未能肩负他们本应承担的责任。任何社会都有本社会的精英阶层,但毛泽东统治下的中国是个异数。首先这是缘于毛泽东本人有严重的反精英情结与反智倾向,即使在他成了事实上的皇帝之后,终其一生也未能完成从革命者到执政者的心理转变,那句“文革每隔七八年要来上一次”的名言就是这种反精英情结的反映。其次,毛领导的革命本身就是消灭社会精英的革命。直到中国改革开放以后,毛泽东那套“工人阶级是领导阶级”、“高贵者最愚蠢、卑贱者最聪明”的圣谕才被国家建设需要人才的现实完全推翻,“精英”一词也就慢慢地出现在中国的学术研究及各种评论文章里了。

可以说,80年代直至90年代前期,中国社会由草根上升为精英的通道是畅通的(许多省部级、厅局级贪官,包括学者型大法官黄松有都出身于农家或平民家庭是证明)。“精英”一词也被赋予中国式内涵:被衍伸为“在某个方面对社会、国家有突出贡献甚至能够影响政府决策和国家前进方向的人士”,民间的俚俗解释就是“有本事、能耐大的人”。此时无论是精英还是非精英,都一致认定精英阶层理所当然地承担着一定的社会责任,精英一词的使用是正面的。

但随着90年代的改革堕入权力市场化这条不归路之后,中国的精英阶层就逐渐痞子化,精英阶层利用权力瓜分掠夺公共资源且越来越肆无忌惮。无数事例表明,政治精英与腐败密不可分;经济精英与权力勾结瓜分资源且毫无社会责任感;知识精英为政治经济精英代言而毫不知廉耻。精英阶层获得了太多的利益而拒绝承担责任,底层民众毫无权利还要被精英阶层掠夺轻视。其结果造成精英阶层公信力下降,草根在道德层面上对精英阶层持否定态度并产生反精英情结的主要原因。

二是精英产生的机制有严重问题。买官卖官成了官场升迁的不二法门(女干部则被讥为从床上培养)。随着就业机会日益稀缺,大学生毕业即失业这一现象使得中国的大学丧失了“培养中产阶级的摇篮”功能。就业的竞争成了就业者家世背景的竞争。80年代至90年代前期曾经畅通的社会上升管道已经变得非常狭窄。从精英产生的机制来看,中国正在向身份型社会复归(即精英选拔是以血缘为标准)。

很早以前,我就注意到两种阶级观念。一种是马克思主义的阶级观念,无产阶级对有产阶级(精英阶层)抱持否定态度,并崇尚以暴力为手段推翻有产阶级然后取而代之。在社会上升管道梗阻的社会,社会中低层上升无望,则容易产生对精英阶层的怀疑与仇视,这种极度的社会紧张状态就是马克思阶级斗争理论产生的温床。另一种是凡勃仑的观念,他反对马克思的阶级斗争观念,认为底层对上层的羡慕,通常表现为希望自己通过努力也成为上层阶级的一员。在社会阶层流动管道畅通,底层通过努力能够获得上升机会的社会,社会低阶成员可以实践凡勃仑的阶级上升意愿。

综合以上所述,我认为中国的问题不在于应不应该使用“精英”“草根”这类名词,而是要改变精英阶层有特权无责任、平民草根无权利有义务的不平等状态,打通社会上升管道,消除社会紧张与阶层对立。

□ 美国之音

December 11, 2010

Why theology is more necessary in modern society

Filed under: In English,reading — Rui Guo @ 2:17 am

Modernity progressively undermines the social environments which support taken-for-grantedness, in religion as in everything else that people believe. This is not the place to elaborate on this important phenomenon, but the basic reason for it can be stated quite simply: People take their beliefs for granted to the extent that everyone around them does the same. Put differently, beliefs appear to be self-evident if there is a more or less unified social consensus about them. Modernity, through some of its most basic processes (such as mass migration, mass communication, urbanization), undermines this sort of consensus. The individual is increasingly confronted with many different beliefs, values, and lifestyles, and is therefore forced to choose between them. Choice requires at least rudimentary reflection. Religious choice, then, requires at least rudimentary theologizing.

Peter Berger

December 1, 2010

Talking to Main Street, China by Yasheng Huang

Filed under: China,Comments,In English — Rui Guo @ 2:06 pm

From Foreign Policy
 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/20…

Looking at the seemingly inscrutable actions of the men who rule Beijing, Washington often assumes many in the Chinese government to be anti-American, whereas the Chinese public is pro-American. The reality is almost exactly the opposite. Among the Chinese general public, there has always been a strong suspicion that the United States has a well-crafted, carefully thought-out, and coherent strategy to contain China. In the most extreme version of this conspiracy theory, everything is a part of the plot. Criticism of China’s record on human rights? A bid to undermine the government in Beijing. Pressure on the central bank to revalue the yuan? Obviously part of an attempt to inflict a “Japan malaise” on China. Even private actors such as Goldman Sachs and Google are sometimes portrayed in popular books and publications as America’s foot soldiers and loyal pawns in this grand strategy.

U.S. President Barack Obama’s current trip to Asia — to India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan, conspicuously skipping and encircling “one big red dot,” as one reporter recently put it — is likely to fan this conspiracy theory even further. One can blame China’s official propaganda organs and tight information controls for fostering these outlandish views of the United States. No doubt there is some truth to that, but the United States has consistently failed to communicate its intentions and its actions to the broader Chinese public, which, despite the infamous Great Firewall, is enjoying newfound media freedom thanks to the Internet.

The health of the relationship between China and the United States no longer depends simply on handshakes and backroom deals between officials in the White House and in Zhongnanhai. Just look at the recent midterm elections in the United States: 29 candidates, either directly or indirectly used political ads that bashed political opponents over their positions on China, according to the New York Times. When it comes to China policy, increasingly, Main Street matters. Chinese public opinion is also beginning to loom large in a range of issues critical to Sino-U.S. relations, such as the exchange rate, the role of domestic consumption in Chinese growth, and private-sector development. Yet the foreign-policy establishment in Washington has behaved as if Sino-U.S. relations were still the exclusive province of Nixon and Kissinger and of Mao and Zhou. The United States has not seriously tried to make its case and communicate its views directly to the Chinese public.

Of course, this isn’t easy in a country that heavily restricts press freedom. But technology is beginning to crack a few holes in Beijing’s system of media control. There are now more than 300 million Internet users in China, about the same size as the entire population of the United States. On top of that, China has 700 million mobile-phone subscribers — and both categories are expanding by tens of millions of people each year.

Yet for some inexplicable reason, U.S. administrations have always chosen the most censored, tightly controlled medium to communicate with the Chinese public. In 2009 Obama’s town-hall meeting in front of a live TV audience completely failed to resonate with most Chinese because the censors made sure that only the most banal questions were posed for discussion. (Sample: “Shanghai will hold the World Exposition next year. Will you bring your family to visit the Expo?”) Contrary to how it was interpreted in the Western media, the Chinese censors also limited those questions critical of the United States. They did not want to embarrass Obama.

The U.S. administration has also made its case in ways that can alienate the Chinese public. On human rights, the United States has always voiced strong criticisms of China on Tibet and on its treatment of dissidents. These criticisms typically backfire with ordinary Chinese because they are viewed as challenging Chinese cultural values and political norms. They also ignore issues that have far greater resonance in Chinese society at large, particularly in the area of property rights. When elderly widows are forcibly evicted from their homes or entrepreneurs suddenly lose the assets they have toiled for years to build, these are the “teachable moments” about why human rights and due process matter.

On the currency issue, for example, the United States consistently picks arguments that do not resonate with ordinary or even educated Chinese. The weakest of the arguments is that China has a responsibility to strive for balance in trade between the two countries. But exactly why should China bear any more responsibility for the imbalances than the United States, with its high consumption and low savings rate? The truth is that both countries are responsible — the United States through its macroeconomic excesses and China through its currency policies. To place all the onus on Beijing legitimately strikes many Chinese as extremely unfair.

There is another problem with this argument: It amounts to asking the Chinese to sacrifice jobs in the export sector to create the impression that the United States is doing something for its unemployed. This is hardly a winning argument on the streets of Chongqing and Guangzhou. The Chinese, the vastly poorer of the two countries, are being asked to reduce their living standards so that American politicians can feel good about doing something for their voters. The insult to injury goes even deeper than that — those Chinese who stand to lose most from a currency revaluation hail from the poorest, most vulnerable segment of the  population: rural migrant laborers.

To be sure, the vast majority of serious economists are absolutely right that in the long run, a currency revaluation is in the interest of the Chinese. But this is politics, where the issue is not about the technocratic intricacies of who is right and who is wrong. The Obama administration has chosen to frame the discussion in ways that are offensive to Chinese while shunning arguments that have a better chance of resonating. For example, one could argue that a currency revaluation may aid China in its aspirations of becoming a producer not just of cheap and labor-intensive products, but also a center of innovation and technology. This argument would go down better in China both because it is based on a rationale that emphasizes serving and enhancing Chinese interests and because it fits with the technological ambitions of many Chinese.

For too long, the United States has not paid attention to an important force in the Chinese economy: the rise of indigenous entrepreneurs. This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. approach in India. During his India trip, Obama met with 25 Indian entrepreneurs, soliciting their views on job creation and business expansion. Chinese private entrepreneurs have never received similar treatment from a U.S. president. Soon after Google decided to terminate its search-engine business in China, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the United States deplored restrictions on the Internet and called for web freedom in China. This was a laudable speech, but it may have had the unintended effect of conveying the sense that only foreign firms, such as Google, stand for Internet freedom, whereas Chinese Internet companies do not. The simple fact is that even before Google’s exit, the vast majority of Internet activities were provided by entrepreneurial Chinese companies, such as Baidu.comSina.com, and Sohu.com. Google’s exit simply provided more space for their growth. Many of these Internet companies are run by ambitious, U.S.-educated Chinese entrepreneurs. The Internet revolution in China — which has vastly expanded the free exchange of ideas and goods — is a cumulative result of the vision, successes, and technological savvy of both foreign and Chinese entrepreneurs. The administration should be careful, both in words and in deeds, not to pit the interests of Chinese and foreign businesses against each other.

In the next two years, both China and the United States will have some monumental political and policy issues to grapple with. China faces a leadership transition in 2012, and Obama will also be judged in 2012 on whether he has delivered growth and prosperity. China will figure prominently in how Obama tackles this challenge, and engagement is the only viable option. But to engage only with official Beijing is no longer enough. It is vital that American leaders learn to communicate more effectively with the Chinese people — lest the conspiracy theorists do the communicating for them.

查建英:国家公仆――中国最著名的作家是一名改革派还是一位护教者?

Filed under: in Chinese,reading,中文 — Rui Guo @ 11:33 am

查建英

2009年10月18日下午,作家王蒙在法兰克福国际书展发表演讲,是 时座无虚席。这是书展的最后一天,而中国作为此次盛会的年度荣誉嘉宾,正努力展示其文化吸引力。中国共产党的部长与德国总理一起为中国主题馆开幕。钢琴家 郎朗在古老的法兰克福歌剧院与德国艺术家们同台演出。还举办了京剧表演、中国民间艺术的展示以及关于中国日益增长的经济和政治实力的论坛。

76 岁的王蒙可能是中国仍健在的最著名的作家。他个子不高,戴着黑框眼镜,仪表整洁,满头黑白相间的头发,他著述广泛,作品几乎涵括每种体裁。作为曾经的中国 文化部部长,他对典礼应付自如。在法兰克福,王蒙被问及如何描述他的国家的文学现状。“中国文学发展非常快,读者的品味也是,”他用平淡的外交口吻说, “中国文学处在它最好的时候……中国现在有上百种文学刊物,诸多作家在从事纯文学创作,全国每年发表的长篇小说有上千部之多,中国可算是全世界的文学大国。”

他的评论在中国的互联网上受到了嘲笑。一个博客作者拿中国当代文学和中国制造的产品来比较:低价,大量,低附加值,没有品牌。很受 欢迎的年轻博客作者李承鹏把王蒙称为谎言家和马屁精,他说:中国大部分文学刊物“都是假话加变态刊物,有诸多作家从事纯文学创作,也就是拿国家的钱从事废 话加鬼话创作……王蒙的这个思路和各行各业的泰斗是一样的,只要够大够多够滥,中国的一切……都处于最好的时期。”几天之内,这篇博客文章点击次数超过 15万,收到数千条读者评论。对于年轻的中国博客主们,王蒙就像是又一个老化的处理品,一个僵化的体制的代言人。
(more…)

October 23, 2010

袁剑:房地产崩溃进入倒计时

Filed under: China,Comments,in Chinese,中文 — Rui Guo @ 10:13 am
[力量对比描述不错,但结论恐怕有误。房地产一时不会崩溃,但处置不当,恐怕会绑架中国政府进入万劫不复的轨道。]
作者:袁剑  原文地址:http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2010/10/20/193026.html

对于资产泡沫的预测没有特别好的方法,现有的方法对于预测泡沫破裂的时间更是完全无能。所以这篇文章试图用一种特别的方法来较为精确的预测中国房地产泡沫的破裂时间。虽然我相信房地产政策还会有反复,但是熊市已成定局,每一次波动都只能是反弹。

房地产崩溃进入倒计时

任何一位期望房地产价格下跌的人,只要愿意了解一下中国房地产市场中的力量对比,那他一定会感到沮丧甚至绝望。

在中国房地产巨大的泡沫游戏中,处于多头一方的,都是当今中国最为显赫的力量。在这些力量中,位列首位的是各级地方政府。无论是出于官员政绩,还是地 方财政及gdp的考量,中国各级地方政府都有最大的激励推动中国房地产泡沫的不断膨胀。可谓中国房地产的死多头。其中理由无非利益二字。这也是为什么金融 危机之后,中央政府稍有政策松动,各级地方政府便雷厉风行,密集出台各种房地产刺激政策的原因。出于同样的理由,在2010年中央政府开始抑制房地产泡沫 的时候,各个地方政府则是虚与委蛇,能拖则拖。今年以来,处于某种特殊的政治需要。虽然也有个别地方大员祭出住房消费税之类的把戏,颇有一点对房地产泡沫 大开杀戒的势头,但地方财政对土地泡沫的巨大需求使然,个别地方官员对房地产泡沫的特殊态度,至多能起到某种政治宣誓的作用。可以判断,地方政府对土地财 政的依赖一天不结束,地方政府就始终是推动中国房地产泡沫的死多头。特别需要指出的是,在现行的政治架构中,地方政府只享受房地产泡沫所带来的利益,却丝 毫不承担泡沫破裂的责任,是中国各级地方政府在推动房地产泡沫过程中毫无顾忌的重要原因。

在中国房地产的泡沫游戏中,与地方政府利 益高度一致并结成稳固同盟的另外一只多头力量,是形形色色、大大小小的房地产商。在这些房地产商中,虽然各有 各的算盘,但几乎没有人不喜欢价格泡沫,泡沫越大,他们赚得越多,即便冷静如王石者,恐怕也不会与泡沫过不去。说归说,长远利益归长远利益,短期暴利毕竟 不是坏事。至于泡沫破裂谁来兜底,地方政府尚且不顾,唯利是图的房地产商们又何须替古人担忧呢?所以,只要可能,他们就会采取诸如信息欺诈,游说政府等一 切可能的手段,为房地产泡沫火上浇油。尤其值得一提的是,在中国一直以私营企业为主的房地产商队伍中,近年来杀出了一路黑马:央企。由于在资金成本及实力 上的特点,以及在人事上与中国现行政治架构上的特殊勾连,央企的加入,为中国的房地产行业带来了重要的变数,其中最为重要的一条,就是中国房地产行业空前 的软约束化。与一般的地产商不同,央企的管理者们,完全不需要为房地产泡沫的崩溃承担任何个人损失,短期的泡沫越大,对他们越有利。在所有的房地产公司 中,央企最有动力推动房地产泡沫的膨胀。不止于此,今日央企的软约束已经远不止事后的免责,而更在于他们在事前对政策的游说,而这种政策的游说也绝非局限 在传统的部门范围,而是直及货币政策。任何资产泡沫,追根究底都是货币问题。影响货币政策,实际上也就影响了资产泡沫的最源头。去岁以来,中国一反其他新 兴经济体逐渐紧缩之势,货币政策欲紧还松,态度暧昧,虽不能完全归于央企之功,但与他们对政策钳制显然也有莫大关联。放眼经济领域,最大的软约束,莫过于 货币政策之软约束。其结果自然是货币充斥,价格腾踊,全民买单收场。在一年多来的中国房地产市场中,央企房地产异军突起,在泡沫面前全无惧色,频频刷新地 王记录,实在是其来有自。而这也正是中国房地产市场的重要特色之一。对于这些后起之秀,老牌民营房地产商们可谓亦喜亦忧。忧的是,他们可能挤占自己的市场 机会,喜的则是,这些不要命的官商毕竟在市场摇摇欲坠之际,延长了泡沫周期,为他们壮了胆撑了腰。

不过,如果仅仅只有地方政府,房地产商的做多热情,没有银行一边倒的信贷支持,中国的房地产泡沫恐怕也不会像现在这样烈火喷油,日剧一日。在上个世 纪90 年代之后,中国银行业在靡费数万亿公帑救助之后,得以幸存。以迄于今,不仅市值独步全球,而且在风险管控,经营管理方面据说也已脱胎换骨。而最近几年我们 看到的事实则让人忧从中来:中国耗资巨大的银行改革成果,很有可能是一个假象。中国银行业不仅业务高度的同质化,其最终的责任约束,似乎仍然无从谈起。短 期利益依然是那些调动频繁的行长们的最高利益。在利差收入还是中国银行业绝大部分利润来源的情况下,多放贷则都获利,于是,各大银行蜂拥放贷,一举而促成 中国历史上最为壮观的信贷狂潮。但一旦周期翻转(现在看来,这种概率正在变得越来越大),中国银行业无疑又是坏账如山。这种悲剧在金融史中俯拾皆是,在中 国更是十年前刚刚发生的故事。但短期利益所系,似乎没有人相信悲剧会重演,他们宁愿相信,中国的经济以及房地产将是历史上的特例。中国金融业乃是技术精英 云集之地,本应在市场狂热之时表现得更为理性,但他们在近几年的表现,让人有一次看到了,泡沫的狂热会在何种程度上摧毁一个民族的理智。不过,我不太相信 中国金融业全是这般见识浅陋之人,我以为他们更加隐蔽的算盘是:反正银行也不是我的,最终大不了中央银行或者中央财政再次兜底(实际上是全民买单)。要烂 大家一起烂,银行家个人的责任都可以归咎为所谓系统风险而消失得无影无踪。所以,只要宏观形势暂时不翻转,房地产短期内不崩盘,争先恐后放贷争取短期利润 就成为唯一理性的行为,而那些审慎经营的银行看上去就更像是一群自以为是的书呆子。如此博傻,夫复何言。要而言之,无论从短期还是长期来看,竞相向房地产 业放贷,推动房地产泡沫的不断腾升,都符合银行家们的利益。如此制度约束,中国银行业不成为房地产的多头反倒可能是咄咄怪事。

在中国房地产格局中角色最为微妙的是中央政府。由于中央政府对中国经济、社会负有广泛和最终的责任,他们对房地产的考量变得空前复杂,其处境也变得相 当痛苦。一方面,他们需要房地产拉动经济——这是中国政治合法性的主要来源(如果不是唯一的话),另一方面,不断腾升的房地产价格所引起的广泛民怨却在不 断吞噬着这种合法性,更为要命的是,随时可能破灭的房地产泡沫将彻底毁掉中国的金融系统并引发经济休克。这两种主要的厉害计算左右着中央政府对房地产的态 度。其最终决策取决于他们这种计算结果。毫无疑问,在过去的很多年中,虽然房地产已经逐渐导致了系统性的民生问题,但其对中央政府的正面价值显然大于其负 面价值。这也是中央政府尽管不断出台各种抑制泡沫的政策,但却始终不敢下重手的原因所在。及至金融危机,出于反危机之需,房地产更是万千宠爱积于一身,中 央政府不得不食言自肥,重新出台刺激房地产的各种政策。直到目前,中央政府的官方态度仍然是“保持房地产的健康、稳定”。在这一点上,素以坦率鲁莽著称的 任志强先生的看法,的确相当精准。他几乎不放过任何机会纠正媒体对中央政府态度的错误解读:政府从来没说要打压房地产,只是希望房地产价格稳定。任志强先 生的话翻译一下实际上是说:别看中央政府叫唤的厉害,他们仍然是我们的潜在的多头同盟军。纵观近十年来中央政府在房地产上的作为,虽然表现摇摆,态度暧 昧,但如果将其归于多头一方,虽不中亦不远也。有趣的是,中央政府这种反反复复、投鼠忌器的政策表现,不仅没有抑制住房价,反而造成了广泛的错觉。在这种 错觉中,中央政府的政策是唯一能够左右房地产价格的唯一因素,所有的下跌都是中央政府的打压政策而不是市场本身的力量所导致的。于是,房地产投机者与市场 的博弈变成了他们与中央政府的博弈。不幸的是,中国房地产的投机者们早就看透了中央政府的底牌:出于gdp的需要,中央政府即便暂时抑制房地产投机,也不 会将房地产往死里整。所以,一旦中央政府出台抑制房地产泡沫的政策,投机者们则祭出托字诀,坐等中央政府的下一次妥协。在这样一种意志的较量中,过往十年 的记录表明,形形色色的市场投机者们几乎完胜。在这个意义上,中央政府屡次房地产调控实际上起到了某种相反的助涨作用并延长了泡沫的时间。

在过去十余年中国房地产市场中,地方政府、开发商、银行以及那些拥有大量低成本住房的各类、各级官员,结成了一个相当稳定的多头利益集团。而唯一能够与 之 抗衡的中央政府,实际上也一直受制于经济增长之紧箍咒,而屡屡诚服于这个集团。而反观空头一方,仅仅只剩下那些尚未首次置业的年轻人以及进城的农民工了。 这个阶层在中国目前的政治格局中,几乎可归为最弱势之列,其政策影响几乎可以忽略不计。以这种力量与强悍无比的房地产多头相搏,无异于以卵击石。而即便是 这些人,一旦他们买房之后,他们就会立即转变为多头一方。毕竟,又有谁愿意自己的资产缩水,甚至变成负资产一族呢?如此看来,除了那些在现行房价下已经彻 底沦为看客的潜在购房者之外(颇有创意的中国房地产商们为他们发明了一个颇具羞辱性的别名:刚需),中国的房地产市场已经出现了净多头格局。所有的利益主 体都坐等某种神秘力量推动房地产价格的不断泡沫化,从而从中渔利。以这样的力量对比,不少人可能真的相信:中国的房地产真的会涨到天上去。然而,有经验的 投资者都知道,当一个市场全部都转变为多头的时候,市场实际上已经处于高度危险之中,换言之,市场反转的时候可能越来越近。其中道理非常朴素:所有的多头 力量都已经满仓入货,再也没有新的资金可以推动价格继续上涨。当那些刚需们被迫追涨蜂拥入市的时候,中国房地产的多头力量正在逐渐被耗竭。在这方面,迹象 已经变得越来越明确。有数据显示:中国的首次购房者的年龄正在快速降低。在北京,首次购房者的平均年龄已经下降到27岁。这个远远低于其他国家水平的数据 表明的是,中国房地产市场的购买力正在被迅速耗尽。当很多被认为不该买房的人都在买房的时候,难道不是一个牛市接近终点的有力证据吗?这就正如当不该买股 票的卖菜老太太都在买股票一样,将被熟练的投资者视为市场噩耗。顺便要提到的一个信号是,作为中国房地产市场的一个最为决绝的空头——一位叫“牛刀”的先 生,最近也已经向多头投降。开个玩笑,在这个时候,我们应该将牛刀先生视为市场一个灵敏的反向指标。多年之前,我的一位朋友在谈到股票市场的时候曾经有过 一个相当有趣的比喻:市场必须有摩擦力,如果失去摩擦力,市场就会飞出去。而飞出去的结果就是重重的跌落。从这个视角观察中国房地产市场,中央政府,地方 政府、银行、房地产商以及形形色色的投机者们万众一心、合力做多的2009年,与之何其相似乃尔?2009年的中国房地产难道不是真的飞出去了吗?一种看 上去不可一世的力量,毁灭他们的往往是他们自己,世事如此,言之可叹。

凭借逻辑上的证据,(包括中国房地产的空置率、自有住房率、租售比、房价收入比、尤其是中国未来经济的增长前景),以及市场经验,我们有充分的理由 相信, 中国房地产在2009年的放量暴涨,已经耗尽了这个市场绝大部分多头力量。这一年将是中国房地产市场长达十二年牛市的一个终结之年。而当下中国房地产市场 的种种表现,不过是其在顶部的最后挣扎。接下来的将是一次漫长的,惊心动魄的下跌。如果你想知道那会是什么景象,2008年中国股票市场就是一个标准的蓝 本。鉴于中国房地产价格对中国经济增长的严重透支程度,在我看来,中国房地产几无软着陆的可能,而很有可能是一场雪崩。

在论述人类 的农业及畜牧业革命时,汤因比认为,这不仅是技术的革命,更是人类由此获得了一种美德,人们已然认识到:“他们无论怎么饥饿,也绝不能吃光 种子或杀掉为他们提供奶水和补充畜群的母牛,母羊和母山羊。”而中国今天的房地产市场似乎已经根本背离了这一文明得以延续的美德。

在牧场被啃光、只剩下那些凶猛的动物的时候,猛兽之间的相互撕咬就可能成为他们生存下去的唯一办法。这大概就是所谓市场的力量。目下的中国房地产市场正处于这样一场战争的边缘。

2005年的时候,我曾经写过一篇《房地产套牢中国》,意思是说,房地产作为一个奇特的行业,已经将中国的强势利益集团紧紧捆绑在一起进而也将中国经 济的命运捆绑在一起。5年多过去之后, 这种捆绑不仅不见放松,反而更加紧密(我相信已经有人透不过气来)。如果说那个时候这还仅仅是一种趋势,那么现在房地产可能已经真正套牢了中国。房地产, 已经成为中国的一个死结。不过,西谚云:没有永远的朋友,只有永远的利益。中国房地产的死结也会因为利益的分野而被打开。

如前所 述,中央政府对房地产的态度取决于房地产泡沫给他们带来的价值。不用我算,在前面十余年,房地产给中央政府带来的正面价值远远大于负面价值。但 此一时彼一时,眼见得泡沫愈大,金融愈危,民怨愈盛,中央政府的算盘就可能打得不一样了。对于中央政府而言,房地产拉动经济的作用虽然仍不可小觑,但也不 是完全无法替代,比如多建廉租房,也同样可收拉动经济之功,况且在经历十数年的高速增长,自有住房率已经到接近90%左右的情况下,房地产究竟还有多少拉 动经济的潜力实在令人存疑。更为重要的是,房地产所引发的政治信任以及所带来的政治损失,正在变得越来越难以承受。显然,利弊权衡之后,天枰正在向另外一 面倾斜。我的判断是,中央政府对房地产的态度正在从最初的积极鼓励到前几年的被动支持,开始转变为今天的中性。用官方语言表述就是,“保持房地产的健康、 稳定”。在2010年,中央政府在年初及9月31日连出重手抑制房地产价格,即是这种态度转变的明确信号。虽然我也相信中央政府态度仍然可能出现反复,但 随着房地产泡沫日长夜大,这种概率会越来越小。与此相反,坚决抑制的概率的却变得越来越大。投资之大势者,此之谓也。时移世易,房地产曾经稳如磐石的多头 利益联盟显然已经出现裂缝。不过,在我看来,中央政府的态度并不是决定房地产走势的唯一因素,甚至不是最重要的因素。任何资产泡沫说到底都是货币现象。也 正是由于这个原因,我们相当有把握的判断,中国房地产泡沫已经走到尽头,处于盛极而衰的转折点上。

2008年金融危机以来,中国出于反危机之需,敞开货币闸门,货币供应达到有史以来的最高峰。一个被广泛引用的数据是:中国M2与GDP之比已经达到 180%远远超过美国的60%,广义货币的总量M2在2010年8月份达到68.7万亿,竟然超过美国10万亿左右。如此洪水猛兽般的货币态势,难道我们 还能指望货币政策继续扩张吗?虽然,疯狂的货币扩张在美国似乎没有引起通货膨胀,但不管美国、日本如何,也不管货币供应与通货膨胀之间的关系出现了哪些我 们不知道的变化,但作为一动而关乎天下社稷的政治家,货币供应与通胀之间关系的传统训诫,恐怕也不能完全掉以轻心。显见的事实是,中国的CPI正在以超过 所有预测者的速度逐月攀升。温JIA宝总理十月初在接受cnn采访时,明确将腐败及通胀列为威胁政权的两大因素,实际上已经明确了今后一段时间货币政策的 趋 势。另外一个更加重要的迹象是,中国领导人似乎已经准备接受更低的gdp增长速度。这显然意味着更加稳健和更加审慎的货币政策。当然,我们也不能排除中国 货币当局出于某种短期的政治利益而变成亡命之徒,更加疯狂的开动印钞机。但果真出现那种情况,讨论房地产恐怕已经没有必要了。明乎此,我们就能明白,从今 往后,中国的货币政策将逐渐趋紧,甚至在某些时候会骤然收紧。渐紧是大趋势,剩下的只在于程度及速度。于此,中国房地产市场的大趋势已经基本抵定。在这 里,那个一直沉默和隐身着的空头就要出场了。在整个房地产的泡沫游戏中,似乎从来就没有明显的受损者,只要房地产上涨,所有房地产的参与者几乎都能获利, 所谓多赢格局,莫过于此。如此好事,何乐而不为?或许正是由于这种考量,一位著名经济学家曾放言:房地产下跌对谁都没有好处。(顺便说一句,这是我听到的 关于房地产最无知的判断之一)然而,事实果真如此吗?天下从来就没有免费的晚餐,事实上,房地产泡沫在相当程度上是由全民货币购买力的损失来支付的。为了 人为延续泡沫而放任货币滥发的今日中国,情况则尤其如此。以全民货币贬值为代价向某些特定市场主体无偿支付暴利,这种游戏无论如何是难以长期持续的。货币 当局的这种貌似中性的欺骗真相一旦曝光,这个游戏就会嘎然而止。

当市场投机者们察觉并确认,市场最为重要的多头开始转向以及货币政 策将真的开始从紧的时候,市场的螺旋式下跌就开始了。房地产市场的各类投机者们,一 直被媒体妖魔化为一种可憎的形象,但实际上他们是一种中性的力量,涨是助涨,跌时助跌。他们从来不站在任何人一边,也从来没有所谓长远利益。人们或许很快 就会看见,他们是如何怀着惊恐的心情摧残他们昔日的多头同伴的。一场相互践踏的熊市大幕,正在拉开。中国房地产——这个曾经催生过无数富豪,吸引了无数聚 光灯的销金之窟,很快就会上演一幕剧情完全相反的戏剧。与这个剧情对应并作为背景的,是中国经济和政治的又一次艰难转型。

October 14, 2010

潘基文就2010年诺贝尔和平奖的颁发发表声明

Filed under: in Chinese,news,中文 — Rui Guo @ 4:06 am

潘基文就2010年诺贝尔和平奖的颁发发表声明

2010年10月8日 潘基文秘书长10月8日通过发言人发表声明表示,将2010年诺贝尔和平奖颁发给中国的刘晓波,是对国际社会在改善世界各地的人权做法与文化方面越来越多共识的一种认可。

潘基文在就刘晓波获得今年诺贝尔和平奖发表的声明中说,他一贯强调,人权、发展、和平与安全共同作为联合国工作的三个主要支柱的重要性。

声明说,过去数年中,中国取得了令人瞩目的经济进展,使千百万人脱离了贫困,扩大了政治参与,在遵循公认的人权文书与做法方面稳步加入了国际主流。

声明说,秘书长真诚地希望,任何有关颁奖决定的分歧将不会减损全球人权议程的推进或是这一奖项的崇高威望和鼓舞力量。

联 合国人权事务高级专员皮莱当天也对刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖表示欢迎。她表示,刘晓波无疑是一位著名的人权维护者,授予刘晓波诺贝尔和平奖是对人权维护者在 中国及许多其他国家发挥的重要作用、他们面临的挑战以及敢于表达自己信念的勇气的一种认可。她认为刘晓波等人权倡导者能够为中国的发展作出重要贡献。

皮莱在2009年曾就刘晓波被判入狱11年表示关切。

THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE PRIZE by Jerome A. Cohen

Filed under: In English — Rui Guo @ 3:42 am

THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE PRIZE

Oct 12th, 2010 | By USAsialawNYU | Category: Jerome A. Cohen’s Blog

This article was published in the South China Morning Post on October 12, 2010 under the title, “Nobel Ripples.” It was published in Chinese in the China Times on October 13, 2010. The Illustration is from South China Morning Post. (繁体中文)(简体中文

by Jerome A. Cohen

When evaluating the impact of Friday’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, there are at least six audiences to consider, in addition to the Laureate himself: China’s Communist Party leaders, who stifle dissent to maintain their power; legal elites caught between Party policies and rule of law requirements; a congeries of dissidents and “rights activists” for whom Liu has now become the foremost symbol; the far larger and even more diverse community of intellectuals struggling to reconcile China’s traditions, “Westernization”, nationalism and universal values; the broad masses who had never before heard of Liu or the Charter ’08 democracy manifesto that he helped draft and that was ultimately signed by roughly 10,000 people; and the outside world that has once again been stimulated to focus on the nature of China’s political system.

Although Party leaders have imposed an increasingly repressive regime upon the country during the past three years since the 17th Party Congress, they cannot remain insensitive to munitions-maker Alfred Nobel’s latest bombshell. Their immediate reaction was abysmal. The leadership remained silent but the Foreign Ministry declared the Nobel committee’s decision a “desecration” of the donor’s intent, and the police suppressed all signs of domestic celebration. After a brief meeting with her imprisoned husband, Liu Xiaobo’s wife was placed under de facto house arrest, and any overt supporters were detained, beaten or threatened. Even Premier Wen Jiabao, who for weeks has stirred speculation by hinting that he favors universal values and political reforms, kept silent when asked for his view of the award.

Yet Politburo members are too intelligent to think that their silence plus suppression can defuse the current challenge. That tactic worked well in riding out the storms created by the Dalai Lama’s 1989 Peace Prize and by less famous but important awards such as the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for fellow dissident Hu Jia and the Philippines’ Magsaysay award for blind “barefoot lawyer” Chen Guangcheng. The present situation, however, is potentially incendiary.

Of course, its impact will be veiled in many respects. It is unlikely to gain Liu Xiaobo immediate relief. After all, Hu Jia remains behind bars, and Chen Guangcheng, despite the end of his prison term, suffers enforced isolation at home. But Liu’s Nobel may ignite concerns that even influence the jockeying for seats on the new Politburo Standing Committee to be installed in 2012. Many restless Party cadres will want some leaders who can positively respond to domestic and international human rights pressures.

Certainly many among China’s burgeoning legal elites would welcome such a change. Hundreds of thousands of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, administrative officials and law professors — most of them Party members — have been struggling with the implications for their daily work of the reactionary Party line on law emanating from the 17th Party Congress, and the appointments of politically reliable but professionally unqualified high legal officials. The Prize reminds them of the universal values on which China’s post-’79 law reforms have been based and of the outside world that rejects the Party’s intensifying insistence on distorted applications of the very norms it has imported. The Prize has undoubtedly added to long-simmering “red versus expert” tensions that pit more regressive Party groups against relatively more liberal legal elites.

A more obvious audience is the country’s embattled dissidents and rights activists, who have received a substantial morale booster, as have the courageous lawyers who try to represent them. These lonely proponents of free speech and the rule of law hunger for international recognition of their sacrifices, even at the cost of further repression.

Unlike dissidents and rights activists, most Chinese intellectuals avoid confrontation. They differ among themselves about the nation’s circumstances, goals and policies. Yet, whatever their prescriptions for reform, they believe that progress can only be made through patient, long-term efforts that do not provoke Party crackdowns. Some do not wish to lose the considerable benefits brought to them by China’s socio-economic progress. Others understandably fear martyrdom. Yet the Prize has plainly stoked the fires of their ongoing debates over China’s heritage, its contemporary dilemmas and its future.

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the Prize on the hundreds of millions of Chinese who, because of Party-government controls over the media and internet, never before heard of Liu and Charter ’08. Due to this week’s massive campaign to conceal news of the award from the public, probably most still remain uninformed. Moreover, the regime seems poised to turn a vice into a virtue by gradually releasing the news only after imposing its own interpretation, as much as possible, upon it. The Prize has already been called an “insult” that is the latest imperialist scheme to humiliate the Chinese people by repudiating their values and achievements.

It is easiest, to be sure, to see the impact of the Prize on the outside world. Political leaders and public opinion in all democratic countries  overwhelmingly endorse the choice. Even Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, who has been pursuing an historic reconciliation between Taiwan and the People’s Republic, nevertheless requested Liu’s immediate release. An impressive international consensus supports the principle expressed by the Nobel committee’s chairman: “We have a responsibility to speak when others are unable to speak”.

Not since the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen tragedy have China’s leaders been so out of step with humanity.

Professor Jerome A. Cohen is co-director of NYU School of Law’s US-Asia Law Institute and adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. He serves without compensation on a Freedom Now legal team assisting Liu Xia, wife of Liu Xiaobo. See also www.usasialaw.org

孔杰荣(柯恩):《人道第一,抢救刘晓波》

Filed under: in Chinese,中文 — Rui Guo @ 3:39 am

人道第一 抢救刘晓波

Posted By USAsialawNYU On 2010/10/13 @ 6:04 PM In Publications,柯恩专栏 | No Comments

出处:2010年10月14日 中国时报

作者:孔杰荣(柯恩)

衡量刘晓波在上周五获得诺贝尔和平奖所产生的影响,除获奖者本人外,至少有六个群体应纳入考量。一是通过扼杀异见维护统治的中国共产党领导人;二是 夹在党的政策与法治要求中间,左右为难的法律精英;三是目前以刘为重要象征的一群异议人士及“维权人士”;四是人数甚众,也更加多元化的一批努力想要调和 中国传统、“西方化”、民族主义和普世价值的知识分子;五则是在此之前对刘一无所知的普罗大众,他们对刘与他人共同起草的民主宣言《零八宪章》也闻所未 闻,尽管该宪章迄今已有约一万人签署;最后则是国际社会,因刘晓波获奖再度燃起对中国政治体制性质的关注。

中共领导人,即便自三年前召开的共产党第十七次代表大会起,就以日愈严苛的镇压式手法统治这个国家,但对于阿尔弗雷德·诺贝尔这个军火制造者最近一 次抛出的重磅炸弹,也无法置之若罔。他们旋即作出了极为糟糕的回应。领导人依旧“失声”,外交部却宣称,诺贝尔委员会的决定,是对该奖项宗旨的“亵渎”。 与此同时,警方也将一切国内的庆祝活动扼杀在襁褓之中。刘晓波的妻子刘霞,仅仅见了狱中的丈夫短暂一面,就被软禁起来。公开的支持者们,不是被拘禁,就是 遭到殴打或威胁。即便是国务院总理温家宝,虽近几周频频示意赞成普世价值与政治改革,以致引发人们各种猜测,但被问及对获奖事宜的看法时,却选择保持沉 默。

然而,政治局委员何其聪明,他们知道以保持沉默和镇压的手段,无法化解眼下的挑战。不可否认,当一九八九年达赖喇嘛获得诺贝尔和平奖,以及另外一些 虽不那么有名,却同样重要的奖项颁布之际──如异议人士胡佳获得欧洲议会颁发的萨哈罗夫奖,以及盲人“赤脚律师”陈光诚获得菲律宾的麦格赛赛奖──这一招 曾非常奏效,帮助中共平安渡过由此引发的风波。但眼下的情况,却颇有愈演愈烈之势。

当然,刘获奖带来的影响在许多方面还不甚明朗。刘晓波不太可能立即获释。毕竟,胡佳也还身陷囹圄,而陈光诚,即便在服刑期满后,也仍然被软禁在家。 但是,鉴于二零一二年将产生新一届政治局常委,刘的获奖,或许会引发对此间席位角逐的关注,甚至于产生影响。许多坐卧不宁的中共干部,在未来领导人的选择 上,会倾向于那些能够积极应对来自国内外人权压力的人选。

诚然,中国迅速成长起来的法律精英群体中,有许多人都会乐于见到这样的改变。自党的十七次代表大会以来,中共发布的法律政策频频倒退,其任命的高层 法律官员,虽政治性强,专业方面却不合格。这一系列问题,都对中国数十万的法官、检察官、律师、行政官员以及法学教授的日常工作产生了影响;尽管他们中多 数都是中共党员,却也在不断与这种现象搏斗。刘的获奖,唤起他们对普世价值的记忆──这个中国自七九年起的法律改革所一贯秉承的价值观;同时也让他们想起 了,中共一意孤行,对其自身引入的准则阳奉阴违,其不断加剧的态势,已经遭受到外界的抵制。原本,在比较保守倒退的中共组织,和比较自由化的法律精英之 间,“红”与“专”的紧张关系就酝酿已久,蓄势待发,刘此番获奖,无疑更热化了这一冲突。

一个更明显的群体,则是在这个国家中,受到四面楚歌的异议人士及“维权人士”,以及勇于为这些人辩护的律师,刘获奖的消息对他们来说如同注入一剂强 心针。这些言论自由和法治的支持者,一直以来孤军奋战,非常渴望得到国际社会对于他们所作出的牺牲的认同,哪怕这种认同令他们遭受到更惨重的镇压。

与异议人士和“维权人士”不同,大部分中国知识分子选择避免正面冲突。他们对于这个国家的国情、目标和政策,有着各自不同的理解。不过,不论他们给 改革开出怎样的“处方”,他们都相信,为了避免引起中共的镇压,这只能是一个耐心的、长期不懈努力的过程。他们中的一些人,不愿因此丧失中国社会经济进步 带给其的可观利益。其他人,则当然是害怕需要他们以身殉道。不过,刘的获奖,对他们正在进行的关于中国传统、当前面临的窘境,和未来方向的争论,无疑是火 上浇油。

由于党政府对媒体和网路的控制,中国好几亿人此前对刘晓波和《零八宪章》闻所未闻,因此要衡量该奖项带给他们的影响,就比较困难。拜这一周来大规模 的封锁消息运动所赐,他们中大多数人恐怕仍然对刘晓波获奖一无所知。此外,中国政府似乎摆出想要“借力打力”的架势,在尽可能地强加其单方面解释之后,逐 步开放了消息。然而,此番获奖已被称作是一种“侮辱”,是帝国主义的最新阴谋,通过否定中国的价值体系和丰功伟绩,来羞辱中国人民。

该奖项对于外界的影响,无疑是最显而易见的。所有民主国家的政治领袖,以及民意,绝大多数都为这一选择欢欣鼓舞。甚至是致力于台湾和中华人民共和国 之间达成历史性和解的台湾总统马英九,也建议立即释放刘。国际社会达成鲜明共识,一致支持诺贝尔委员会主席所表述的原则:“当其他人无法站出来维护自己的 时候,我们有责任为他们发声”。

继一九八九年六月四日之天安门惨案后,这是中国领导人作出的最有违人道之举。

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(作者孔杰荣 Jerome A. Cohen, 纽约大学法学院亚美法研究所共同主任,纽约外交关系协会兼任资深研究员。作者义务担任刘晓波之妻刘霞的法律顾问小组“现在自由”(Freedom Now)之成员。英文原文请参www.usasialaw.org。亚美法研究所研究员韩羽译。)


Article printed from U.S. – Asia Law Institute: http://www.usasialaw.org

URL to article: http://www.usasialaw.org/?p=4444

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