from Daniel A. Bell: Beyond Liberal Democracy

(Description of Dworkin’s trip to China)

Those expressing “enthusiasm for liberal values,” Dworkin noted, did
voice their views: “all the scholars and almost all the students who spoke
about the issue on various occasions insisted that there was no impor­
tant difference between Western values or conceptions of human rights
and their own.” One member of the audience “said of course the funda­
mental situation of human beings is the same everywhere, that there
should be no more talk of distinctive Chinese values, that China must
begin what he called a ‘renaissance’ of liberal individualistic values.
When he finished, the large audience clapped loudly.” Nevertheless,
Dworkin found it peculiar that members of the audience did not seem to
share his desire to discuss specific cases of human rights violations, lead­
ing him to conclude that Chinese academic discourse remains “eerily ab­
stract in a country whose government treats itself as above the law.”
What Dworkin seems to have learned from his trip, in short, is that Chi­
nese academics cannot mount a successful defense of an Asian philoso­
phy even when given the opportunity to do so. The only question that
remains is how to implement liberal individualism in China, which ap­
parently requires greater moral courage and concrete thinking on the
part of Chinese academics.

Not surprisingly, Dworkin’s visit generated less-than-friendly responses.
Professor Liufang Fang, who teaches law at the Chinese University of
Political Science and Law, opens his critique with a sarcastic account of
the college students who attended Dworkin’s lectures because they “did
not want to miss the festival-like event.” They could hardly hear any­
thing, but “being squeezed in the crowd itself was a joy to many of the
students.” Professor Dworkin, meanwhile, “unilaterally believed that
his China tour was a valuable opportunity for China to be privy to his
ideas of liberty.” Ironically, he was taken for a ride by the Chinese gov­
ernment. His visit had been organized to showcase China’s new free­
doms, and the government knew full well that Chinese academics would
not argue publicly about the details of particularly sensitive cases.
Dworkin seemed unaware of the risks that China-based academics would
incur by publicly endorsing his condemnation of the Chinese govern­
ment’s handling of such cases. As Professor Fang puts it, “the truth is
that the degree of freedom of speech is negatively correlated with the
risks borne by the speaker.” Moreover, Dworkin seemed unaware of the
extent to which “general discussions” of legal issues by China-based ac­
ademics have led to substantial improvements of legal practice. Had
Dworkin been better informed, he would not have made facile comments
regarding the “eerily abstract” Chinese discourse. Professor Fang con­
cludes his essay by suggesting that Chinese professors should spend
more time reading, thinking, and writing instead of wasting time on “hot
events.” (more…)

《南方周末》未刊稿流出（欢迎转帖）
宋石男 @ 2008-5-8 16:28:00 阅读(25496) 评论(92) 引用通告 分类: 彭州乙烯
作者授权我转帖，也授权所有人转帖。

化工：成都的危险拐点？

“漂亮小姐，你还是稍微往前头扭（成都方言，意为走动）一下嘛”。5月4日下午，成都，望江楼地带府南河边人行道上，一名警察站在几个面容娇好的姑娘面前，彬彬有礼，略显尴尬，试图劝说她们离开。

在他们周围，一个由两三百市民和几十名警察组成的庞大队伍正沿着府南河边缓缓移动。人群中有人停下来，就会有警察上前礼貌的催促前行。

队伍没有标语，不喊口号，部分人戴着口罩，所有人都对集体散步的所指心照不宣。在成都市区30公里外的彭/州，一个初期规划1000万吨/年炼油和80万吨/年乙烯化工基地正在建设。这项从开始酝酿至今已历20年，并于去年3月举行了工程奠基仪式的大型化工项目，如今刚刚被部分成都市民所得知。重化工项目将给人口稠密的天府之国带来怎样的环境影响，更多的人不得而知。
(more…)

三聚氰胺食品大会师：鸡蛋
来源：新华网

10月25日这个周末，香港、台湾和日本又爆出多种食品含三聚氰胺的消息。10月25日，香港食物安全中心证实，他们在香港百佳超级市场一批进口自辽宁大连的鸡蛋中，检出浓度为每公斤4.7毫克(即4.7ppm)的三聚氰胺，比当地法定上限每公斤2.5毫克超标88%。根据美国食物及药物管理局的参考标准计算，一名年约三岁的小童每天进食12只上述有问题鸡蛋，或者一名成年人每天使用144只，就会超出安全水平。 (more…)

Body blow for the judiciary

Jerome Cohen

（related blog post：He Weifang: Which one of the “Three Supremes” is truly supreme?）

During the first term of the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao , many legal specialists inside and outside China were disappointed by its tepid support for proposed reforms that would make the country’s courts more professional and independent.
Noting China’s ever greater need for a fair and competent judiciary, optimistic observers turned their hopes to the Hu-Wen second term. They reasoned that the more powerful and confident leadership would feel secure enough to establish overdue judicial reforms.

However, those hopes appear to be dashed. It is clear that a new, more authoritarian party line on the courts has been promulgated. The “Three Supremes”, as it is known, was first espoused by Mr Hu last December.

During the National Conference on Political-Legal Work, convened by the party’s central Political-Legal Committee that presides over the legal system, Mr Hu told the assembled judges, procurators and officials: “In their work, the grand judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme the party’s cause, the people’s interest and the constitution and laws.” Like many previous communist doctrines, this “theory” is proving to be profoundly important.

In March, just after the National People’s Congress confirmed the appointments of the heads of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuracy for the next five years, the Political-Legal Committee, now led by the former minister of public security, issued a major notice. It required all legal personnel to seriously study and discuss Mr Hu’s December speech and related documents. Since then, the new SPC president, Wang Shengjun, has launched a campaign within the court system to promote the “Three Supremes”. His speeches leave no doubt that there has been a significant change in the tone and content of judicial leadership.

Gone is the emphasis that his predecessor, Xiao Yang , placed on bolstering professional competence, and individual and collective judicial autonomy. In a series of mind-numbing ideological cliches, Mr Wang emphasises upholding party leadership and focusing the courts on economic development and social stability. For Mr Wang, who has had no formal legal training, concerns for judicial fairness and justice must be interpreted in light of minyi, or “public opinion”.

Understandably, many judges are reportedly confused and unhappy about this apparent return to the past, to the use of law as an instrument of “proletarian dictatorship” implemented through the “mass line” in the guise of “democratisation”. How to reconcile the newly propagated “mass line” with legal norms and procedures must be a particular challenge for SPC vice-presidents and provincial high court chiefs. Now, under intense political pressure, they must put flesh on the doctrine’s bare bones by formulating specific policies for the increasingly broad range of challenging cases.

Already their speeches suggest some diversity of views and nuances. Many administrators, legislative aides and especially lawyers are undoubtedly troubled by the new line, which downgrades the importance of their work. Some scholars and academic activists continue to advocate Xiao-Yang-type reforms, which paid lip service to party controls but gradually sought to introduce greater judicial independence and professionalism, reforms now condemned as “westernisation”. A few prominent law professors, such as He Weifang of Peking University, dare to openly criticise the Hu doctrine, while others try to interpret it to minimise new obstacles. Some, however, praise it as “democratic”.

China’s continuing struggle over the death penalty makes clear that much is immediately at stake in the ideological realm. Although Beijing is too ashamed to reveal its appalling statistics on capital punishment, there are reliable reports that, thanks to substantial improvements in procedures at the high court and SPC levels, the number of executions may have dropped by as much as one-third.

Senior appellate judges intimate that, despite the new line, they continue to carefully scrutinise all death sentences. Yet there are indications that some trial courts, and even some reviewing judges, may now be more willing to approve capital punishment.

After all, the first public signal of Mr Wang’s leadership was his announcement last April that, in handling death cases, the courts had to consider not only the law and social conditions but also “the feelings of the masses”. Although the relationship among the courts, the media and the people is complex, no one was left in doubt that the party would serve as the authoritative voice of the masses.
——————————————————————————
Jerome A. Cohen is co-director of NYU’s US-Asia Law Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York

“三个至上”谁至上

贺卫方

(相关讨论：科恩教授论三个至上 Jerome Cohen on the “Three Supremes” )

如果我们仔细观察不同文化下的话语风格，是否讲求逻辑也许是其中值得关注的一个分别。唐德刚先生曾经分析我们的思想史，其中不讲逻辑的特征被他归因于“东西两方对‘法’的观念不同的滋长有以致之”。他说：

“法律”是最讲逻辑的。因而个个律师都是逻辑专家；而律师在西方社会里的地位——从古希腊罗马到今日的英美法苏——那还了得！可是我们传统中国人（古印度人也是一样）最瞧不起所谓“写蓝格子”的“绍兴师爷”和“狗头讼师”。我们的“仲尼之徒”一向是注重“为政以德”的。毫无法理常识的“青天大老爷”动不动就来他个“五经断狱”，断得好的，则天理、国法、人情、良心俱在其中；断得不好的，则来他个“和尚打伞”，无法（发）无天，满口的革命大道理，事实上则连最起码的逻辑也没有了。西方就适得其反了。西方的律师，诉讼起来，管他娘天理、人情、良心，只要逻辑不差，在国法上自有“胜诉”。因而他们的逻辑，也就愈发展愈细密了。（《胡适口述自传》第五章注释23）

唐先生的说法也许多少忽略了一国政治形态对于逻辑学发育的影响，例如雅典式的民主政体对于演说、辩论的讲求，就在很大程度上推进了逻辑学的发展。不过，说法庭之上是否讲求法律至上、遵循逻辑规范是其中重要的因素却毫无疑问。

眼下全国司法界正在“大学习、大讨论”，其中的核心内容就是贯彻“三个至上”学说：始终坚持党的事业至上、人民利益至上、宪法法律至上。报章连篇累牍，会议连绵不绝，最高法院甚至还组成宣讲团在全国巡回宣讲。我对此感到很困惑，因为这“三个至上”在逻辑上存在着值得商讨的地方，尤其是把它运用到司法领域时，这样的逻辑困难会给司法界带来某些混乱。

很明显，所谓“至上”，便是最高的准则。至上有其惟一性，不可以有多个准则一块儿至高无上。好比在一个家庭里，假如有一个人说话具有最终极的权威，那么就不可能是公公的意志至上，婆婆的意志同样至上，媳妇的意志还是至上。又好比奥运会比赛，冠军只能有一个。一下子出现三个冠军就摆不好——领奖台齐平，同时奏三个不同国家的国歌，岂不是乱了套，或者用时髦的说法，就要“俯卧撑”，或者如正龙拍虎一般扑朔迷离！因此，如果党的事业、人民利益以及宪法法律是具有不同内容、相互区别的三个事物，那么我们必须给出一个顺序，按照法律界熟悉的说法，要对于三者的效力位阶作出安排。例如，或许可以如此表达：当法官处理案件时，需要对于上述三者进行考察，当三者统一时，应依据宪法和法律作出判决；当三者有矛盾时，应将人民利益置于宪法法律之上，将党的事业置于人民利益和宪法法律之上。也就是说，在效力位阶上，党的事业最高，人民利益次之，宪法法律再次之。

这样的说法在逻辑上没有问题了，但是在我们的政治语境下却是不成立的。因为按照官方一贯的话语模式，在我国，这三者是一而三、三而一的。十七大修改通过的《党章》在总纲里明确地说：“党除了工人阶级和最广大人民群众的利益，没有自己特殊的利益。”在一次领导人的讲话中，我们读到这样的说法：“我们党领导人民制定了宪法和法律，也要领导人民遵守宪法和法律。宪法和法律体现了党的主张和人民意志的统一。党员遵守宪法和法律就是遵从人民的意志，服从党的领导。所有的党组织、党员尤其是负责干部的言行，都不得同宪法、法律相抵触。加强党的领导同充分发扬民主和坚持依法办事是一致的。”（《十三大以来重要文件汇编》中册页943-4）既然三者之间毫无区别，那么不厌其烦地把三者并举，而且要“三个至上”，岂非修辞上的同语反复？

问题的困难还在于，如果用“三个至上”作为指导司法的准则，那么司法官员就必须在每一个案件里对于三者作出辨析，要时时分析，怎样的判决不损害党的事业，怎样的判决符合人民利益，当然还需要符合宪法和法律。对于我们的数量在20万以上的法官来说，这似乎是一个大难题。对于什么是党的事业，什么是人民利益，不同的法官也许在理解上会有很大差异。张志新对于“文革”提出异议，她的观点尽管与当时的党中央决策完全矛盾，但是后来的历史证明，如果她的主张得到采纳，党的事业就会得到维护。当时的司法机关判处张志新死刑，这种表面看来符合中央要求的做法，最终证明给党的事业造成了巨大的损失。再说人民利益，所有的诉讼都存在着对立的利益诉求，农民状告县政府违反土地承包合同，“最牛钉子户” 因补偿不合理拒绝拆迁，提款机出问题许霆飙取17万先被判刑无期后来又改为5年徒刑，刘燕文诉北京大学要求颁发毕业证先胜而后输……究竟谁是人民，谁是敌人？判谁胜诉算是“人民利益至上”？如果放开手让不同的法院、每一个法官都按照各自对于党的事业、人民利益的理解而不是严格地依照宪法和法律的规则去办案，这个国家的司法岂不是要各吹各的号，各唱各的调，燕瘦环肥，五花八门？

自己越想越不解，“一事不知，士之耻也。”遵循进一步解放思想的教导，提出上述疑问，尚祈高人为我释疑解惑，则幸甚。

2008-8-21

低油价是好消息

《金融时报》１６日刊登新闻《低油价才是问题》，说全球股市在油面上打滑了——石油也许是本周三股市恢复慢镜头崩盘的关键催化剂。国内新闻也跟风，例如《中国经济网》刊登评论《油价持续跌也会出问题》，不加分析地附和《金融时报》，显示出某些中国新闻媒体素质的低下。

低油价对英美金融机构是问题，对中国是好消息。油价下跌使得英美金融业失去稳定的获利途径，对英美金融业而言是问题。对中国而言，油价下跌使国内制造业成本降低，从而有利于开拓欧美之外的国际市场；低油价有利于增加国内市场需求；更重要的是，低油价还使困扰中国的通货膨胀消弭于无形。对中国而言，何来油价下跌”有问题“之说？

《金融时报》没有提到的是，低油价（以及原料价格降低）不仅是金融机构的问题，而且是美国经济面对的大问题：因为低油价，美国现在再也无法通过美元贬值的方式脱身了。

相关：

Can the US inflate out of crisis this time?（危机可否通过美元贬值解决？）

Scores of young protesters, led by 39 year-old city councilor Wang Dingyu, surrounded the 62 year-old professor Zhang Mingqing from Xiamen University, also the vice-president of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, and pushed him to the ground when he was visiting the Tainan Confucius Temple–a place where people remember Confucius whose teachings value the respect of the senior.
The government of Taiwan openly criticized the city councilor and the protesters, and promised to provide more police force for Professor Zhang’s security in the coming days.

[貉子食用含三聚氰胺饲料大批死亡事件提醒三聚氰胺毒性可能被低估。]

辽宁发现数百结石貉子：它们死于三聚氰胺

FDIC Chief Raps Rescue For Skewed Priorities

2008年10月16日15:19

【《财经网》专稿/记者 叶逗逗】近 年来，因被非法劳教而申请国家赔偿的案件日渐增多。其中，关于国家赔偿的标准是争议的焦点。《财经》记者了解到，对此问题，即将在10月底提交全国人大常 委会审议的《国家赔偿法（修订案草案）》将有明确的规定。而现行法律规定的国家赔偿标准过低、不赔偿精神损失等问题有望修改。
据新华网报道， 重庆开县三名农民工在上海被劳教后，经重庆市第二中级法院二审终审，上海市劳动教养管理委员会的劳动教养决定被撤销。此后，这三个农民工向上海方面提起国 家赔偿。近日该案经重庆开县法院一审，上海劳动教养管理委员会被判支付三个农民工赔偿共5万余元，相关赔偿金目前已经兑现。
2007年9月 13日，上海某派出所民警在调查一起治安事件时，曾询问在上海打工的重庆农民工雷华灯等人。雷华灯、肖家品和肖鹏飞等三人因不配合调查，与上述民警发生拉 扯、扭打。后经上海市公安局浦东分局验伤，民警胡某、金某被致轻微伤。2007年10月8日，上海市劳动教养管理委员会决定，这三名农民工因妨碍公务被劳 教一年。
随后，雷某等三名民工就上述劳动教养决定向重庆开县法院提起行政诉讼。重庆开县法院一审判决撤销了上海市劳动教养管理委员会对雷华灯三人的劳动教养决定。上海劳动教养管理委员会不服，提出上诉。重庆市第二中级法院则维持了一审判决。
重庆第二中级法院认为，雷华灯、肖家品、肖鹏飞抗拒执法，并与执法人员发生推搡、厮打，其行为确已妨碍公务，但雷华灯等人并非蓄意抗拒调查，其行为系妨 碍公务行为的一般表现。该行为除了造成民警轻微伤害，并未带来其他严重后果。法院认为雷华灯、肖家品、肖鹏飞的行为，可适用《治安管理处罚法》相关规定， 但不符合劳动教养的对象和条件。
重庆市第二中级法院的终审判决生效后，雷华灯、肖家品和肖鹏飞三人才被释放，但三人已分别被劳教180天、 180天和202天。为此，三人诉请上海市劳动教养管理委员会给予国家赔偿。重庆开县法院认为，由于劳动教养决定已被法院撤销，被告违法行使职权侵犯了公 民的人身自由，因此判决被告支付三名农民工共计5.4万元的赔偿金。
相对于治安管理行政拘留最长不超过20天的规定，劳动教养是严重限制人身 自由的处罚。1982年，国务院出台的《劳动教养试行办法》（下称“办法”）是该制度的法律依据。该“办法”规定劳动教养的期限为一到三年。中国的劳动教 养制度设立于1957年，当时的目的在于把游手好闲、违反法纪、不务正业而有劳动能力的人，改造成为自食其力的人。
中国现行《国家赔偿法》规定，行政机关及其工作人员在行使行政职权时，违法拘留或者违法采取限制公民人身自由的行政强制措施的，受害人有取得赔偿的权利。由于上海劳动教养委员会对普通治安事件错误适用劳动教养处罚，侵犯了三个农民工的人身自由，应该支付国家赔偿。
目前的国家赔偿标准是根据上一年度职工日平均工资计算。由于国家统计局确定的2007年职工日平均工资为99.31元，雷某等人最终按照此标准获得了国 家赔偿。在当前的国家赔偿体制下，雷某等人无疑属幸运。但与他们三人长达半年之久失去人身自由相比，仅仅依照日平均工资赔偿，显得只是“适当补偿”而非真 正的赔偿。因为关押一天，实际上是24小时，但目前只按每天8小时工作日的平均工资赔偿。
同时，现行法律规定，国家赔偿不赔精神损失。以往的 类似案例显示，这存在诸多问题，实际上无法覆盖赔偿对象的实际经济和精神损失。数年前，陕西发生的“处女嫖娼案”，受害者最终仅得到74.66元的赔偿， 因为她被羁押的时间只有两天。而黑龙江铁路工人史延生一家七口蒙冤被关押5101天，仅获赔偿6000元。
赔偿标准偏低是现有《国家赔偿法》 的立法缺陷。近年来，法学界人士和多位全国人大代表，都曾建言修改《国家赔偿法》，提高国家赔偿标准，并将精神赔偿纳入赔偿范围。在10月底举行的十一届 全国人大常委会第五次会议上，《国家赔偿法（修订案草案）》将接受审议，上述问题当有明确的答案。■