Home Is Where The Heart Dwells

March 5, 2009

美国的董事责任保险

Filed under: Uncategorized — Rui Guo @ 12:16 am

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance

By David Gische of Ross, Dixon & Bell, LLP

I.  Introduction

In recent years, directors and officers liability insurance has become a core component of corporate insurance. As many as 95% of Fortune 500 companies maintain directors and officers (“D&O”) liability insurance today. Furthermore, it has become a commonplace of the financial world that disappointed investors will charge corporations and their officers and directors with securities fraud whenever a company’s stock drops significantly in price. Studies indicate that the average settlement of securities fraud litigation in 1999 was greater than $8 million, with average defense costs exceeding $1 million. In light of these numbers, it should not be surprising that such litigation has become almost routine, and D&O liability insurance plays a large role in handling it. At the same time, the D&O insurance industry has become highly specialized and new products are constantly emerging to meet the needs of specific markets. This article will discuss the historic and current trends in the industry. In addition, this article will address some of the primary legal and coverage concerns that must be considered by underwriters, claims handlers, corporations and their executives, and the attorneys who represent them.

A.   History of D&O Insurance

In the 1930s, in the wake of the depression, Lloyd’s of London introduced coverage for corporate directors and officers. At the time, corporations were not permitted to indemnify their directors and officers. Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. Law 573, 574 (1996). However, directors and officers did not perceive a great risk, and the insurance did not sell. Well into the 1960s, the market for D&O coverage was negligible. In the 1940s and 1950s, courts, corporations and directors and officers began to see benefits to corporate indemnification and prompted state legislatures to enact laws permitting it. Then, during the 1960s changes in the interpretation of the securities laws created the realistic possibility that directors and officers themselves, and not only corporations, could face significant liability. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 21 & nn. 74-77 (1989). Insurers responded to these changes by reviving specialty coverage for the “personal financial protection” of directors and officers.

The historic focus on “personal financial protection” distinguished D&O insurance from other kinds of commercial insurance that cover identified areas of corporate risk. Insurers had defined corporate risks they would insure. General liability insurance provided corporate insurance for bodily injury or property damage claims; fidelity bonds afforded specified first-party coverage for losses corporations incur due to certain acts of their officers, directors, or employees. D&O coverage, on the other hand, was not intended to be corporate insurance, much less an attempt at general corporate insurance for liability caused the corporation by virtue of the acts of its directors and officers. In recent years, however, D&O coverage has undergone a number of changes. (more…)

Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Filed under: Chinese Corporations, In English, reading — Rui Guo @ 12:01 am

Lessons from the Financial Crisis

(Editor’s Note: This post comes from Mats Isaksson of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.)

The OECD Steering group has recently issued a report entitled “Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis.”

This Report concludes that the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements. When they were put to a test, corporate governance routines did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of financial services companies. A number of weaknesses have been apparent. The risk management systems have failed in many cases due to corporate governance procedures rather than the inadequacy of computer models alone: information about exposures in a number of cases did not reach the board and even senior levels of management, while risk management was often activity rather than enterprise-based. These are board responsibilities. In other cases, boards had approved strategy but then did not establish suitable metrics to monitor its implementation. Company disclosures about foreseeable risk factors and about the systems in place for monitoring and managing risk have also left a lot to be desired even though this is a key element of the Principles. Accounting standards and regulatory requirements have also proved insufficient in some areas leading the relevant standard setters to undertake a review. Last but not least, remuneration systems have in a number of cases not been closely related to the strategy and risk appetite of the company and its longer term interests.

The Report also suggests that the importance of qualified board oversight, and robust risk management including reference to widely accepted standards is not limited to financial institutions. It is also an essential, but often neglected, governance aspect in large, complex non-financial companies. Potential weaknesses in board composition and competence have been apparent for some time and widely debated. The remuneration of boards and senior management also remains a highly controversial issue in many OECD countries.

The current turmoil suggests a need for the OECD, through the Steering Group on Corporate Governance, to re-examine the adequacy of its corporate governance principles in these key areas in order to judge whether additional guidance and/or clarification is needed. In some cases, implementation might be lacking and documentation about the existing situation and the likely causes would be important. There might also be a need to revise some advice and examples contained in the OECD Methodology for Assessing the Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.

The full report can be found here.

March 2, 2009

Quote of the day: Qin Hui on 08 Charter

Filed under: in Chinese, news, 中文 — Rui Guo @ 3:04 pm

“一些所谓左派的朋友不同意零八宪章的观点,我完全可以理解,因为我本人也并不完全同意这个文本。但是像“乌有之乡”网站那样呼籲镇压宪章参与者,我觉得简直不可理喻:这些以文革派自诩的朋友难道不知道自己的主张也不符合“主旋律”吗?他们号召起来“造反”,号召打倒“党内走资本主义道路的当权派”,难道他们认为刘晓波就是这样的“当权派”?今天假如真有所谓毛派,他们如果不想搞“武装斗争”,不也只有寄希望於言论自由吗?这大概也是“马列主义毛思想 ”承认的大道理吧?”

–秦晖:谈《零八宪章》

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