Comments on: Panel 2: Dispute System Design on a Global Scale

By: Rosalie Braunstein

Rosalie Braunstein — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 19:40:58 +0000

On David Lee’s comment above regarding David Miller’s third culture: I think that there are other elements of being a civil servant that does work to neutralize cultural differences and bind together otherwise conflicting parties. For example, common goals, common interests, common desires, common fears; many of those who work at the UN have similar concerns for their own country that their colleagues have for another country. A well-designed dispute system should capitalize on these commonalities, and try to bring them out in discussion to better enhance this third culture and its viability.

By: Rosalie Braunstein

Rosalie Braunstein — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 19:31:25 +0000

In response to Bob’s comment on Rachel’s description of the WTO, i.e. does the most powerful player have to be willing to play: Creative thinking on the part of the small states is clearly key (i.e. her example with Antigua and intellectual property rights). I think it is sometimes overlooked how effective smaller states can be as players, even though they aren’t as powerful individually, when they work together with each other as against a more powerful dominating party. I’m not sure how one would design a dispute system that would take power into account, but one idea might be to examine partnerships and alliances among the parties and think about how that alters the power dynamic as well.

By: Rosalie Braunstein

Rosalie Braunstein — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 19:06:33 +0000

Bob’s point about changing time frames (i.e. short term versus long-term) or changing internal structure of governments, etc. as opposed to trying to change BATNAs or forcing parties to the table is interesting to me. To what extent can outside forces creating an ADR framework expect to control these factors? And, more importantly, how hard should they try to do so? At what point does this whole approach become too aggressive?

By: Rosalie Braunstein

Rosalie Braunstein — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 19:00:11 +0000

I think Andrea’s point about collective amnesty being a bottom up choice is such an underreported phenomenon. A dispute design really requires a deep understanding of what the individual requires for his or her own good, and what the society at large needs in order to recover. That tension obviously must be addressed. I wonder how much different cultural conceptions of ‘justice’ actually inform these decisions on a local level?

By: Rosalie Braunstein

Rosalie Braunstein — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 17:21:33 +0000

Amy’s point of thinking about the intersection of institutional design and actual individuals strikes me as particularly salient, especially when designing a dispute system for a foreign set of cultures and values, where the value of the individual versus the value of the community may differ from the conceptions and experiences of the designer. Pia’s point about creating outside incentive to induce powerful players to work to level the playing field is interesting when thinking about the intersection of institutional design and the individual in areas with different conceptions about individuality–perhaps these outside incentives can be broadened to take these values into consideration as well.

By: hnmcp

hnmcp — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 18:41:23 +0000

This is a source mentioned by one of the participants that represents a point of view not expressed in the conference – Abram Chayes and Antonia Hadler Chayes “New Sovereignty” Chapter 9. The chapter deals with dispute settlement mechanisms as an instrument of active management of treaty regimes.

By: Bob Bordone

Bob Bordone — Sat, 08 Mar 2008 15:35:29 +0000

It’s not clear that if you can’t persuade a party that it isin their interest to enter into a new disptue resolution process and you can’t change their BATNA to get them to the table and you can’t use moral or normative arguments, that you can be successful. But, one possible idea might be to think about how you can change the time frame that parties are considering (i.e. long term v. short term), or perhaps working for long-term internal structural change (i.e. changing leadership) which is different from actually changing the BATNA of the nation-state itself.

By: Pia Owens

Pia Owens — Sat, 08 Mar 2008 15:33:43 +0000

Andrea responded to the question about whether closure in Liberia isn’t justice enough by saying that in that country, it was a bottom-up process where people felt they need closure. She contrasted the situation in South America where the government imposed closure by granting amnesty from the top down. I wonder how you build the process so it is bottom-up versus top-down. Is it who decides to start the process — whether it’s the government deciding that it needs to deal with ongoing disputes, or people organizing? Or does it have something to do with the culture or power structure within the country? Not being familiar with the situation in South America, I don’t know how the process went but it’s surprising to me that the government would make a unilateral decision — they must have involved people involved in the disputes (?) but is it a question of how they made the decisions of who to involve?

By: Akilesh Ayyar

Akilesh Ayyar — Sat, 08 Mar 2008 15:28:36 +0000

Bob, that’s very interesting. I’m having trouble conceptualizing a force to bring people to the table not ultimately based on affecting BATNAs somehow. Could you please give an example?

By: Bob Bordone

Bob Bordone — Sat, 08 Mar 2008 15:19:58 +0000

Pia — Your point is really interesting to me. And figuring out what the right “balance” between ethnic and national identity is a question worthy of study — looking at places where it has worked, places where it hasn’t, and places where the question is still open.