Another emerging form of domestic communication is Tencent’s Instant Messaging (IM) on QQ.com. No site in China enables greater horizontal web communication than QQ.com, now the 9th largest web property in the world. Founded by Pony Ma in 1998, Tencent –a Chinese-listed company earning $1.2 billion annually in revenue, 88 percent via the sale of “virtual goods” rather than online advertising– has over 570 million registered users of its IM service. In January Tencent launched an English version of the IM platform at IMQQ.com, and a 3G version that offers QQ chat, real-time news, and search engine accessible over mobile phone.

Many users in Western China, and across rural China, do not have email accounts. And many rural Chinese view and understand the Internet as Tencent, the platform on which they’ve grown up. In fact, as of March 2009 China had as many active Tencent QQ users as it officially had people online. Despite focus on access to Google and Twitter –observations of Tweet trends, and Google search engine query data patterns– undoubtedly most relevant in China is continued access to those domestic services of communication most widely used by Chinese citizens.

As advised last week by a Chinese colleague –“mail me at my university account. The government might shut down Google, but they never mess with my college email”– the CCP is selectively choosing what to patrol, because it can’t do it all. While the Western media predominately pay attention to the CCP denying access to Western sites and services, domestic entrepreneurship and a swelling offering of overlapping tools of communication are mitigating the effectiveness of the Internet muzzle. In line with Ethan Zuckerman’s Cute Cate Theory, Web 2.0 may have been created to share photos of adorable creatures, but new platforms for user-generated content are empowering digital activism in profound ways. For the CCP, perhaps it’s the “cute cat,” that is now out of the bag.

The LA Times and other media outlets are reporting that a resilient group of Iranians has defied the government by publicly protesting the nearly month old election results. The opposition chose today to commemorate the 10th anniversary of student-led protests against the closing of reformists newspapers by conservatives during the Khatami presidency. Andrew Sullivan and others are back to relying on Twitter for updates. According to the LA Times, over a thousand protesters turned out in Tehran, and they have been met with violence by the Basij and regular security forces. In an attempt to thwart protest organizers, the government has cut off cell phone access for the last few days, although they apparently released 2,000 who had been arrested after earlier protests. On Tuesday, Ahmadinejad called the election, the “freest ever,” which alone was probably enough to push the opposition back into the streets.

While US media outlets have led daily news coverage with President Obama’s visit to Russia, including several days of special reports by the NewsHour and front page, above the fold articles in the New York Times, Russian media, and especially Russian TV, have almost completely ignored Obama’s visit. For example, Obama’s speech to the graduating class at the New Economic School was not covered at all on Russian TV, while President (oops, Prime Minister) Putin’s motorcycle antics received roughly the same amount of airtime as the US President’s visit.

Photo: REUTERS/РИА-Новости, Алексей Дружинин

This is not completely surprising, since the Kremlin has long viewed national TV outlets as critical to its efforts to influence public opinion, in particular about Putin, while ignoring thorny topics like the war in Chechnya. The high point of the independence of the Russian media may have been the critical coverage of the first Chechen war, which many argue forced President Yeltsin to end the war in order to have a chance to win re-election against a resurgent Communist Party. Putin quickly moved to reverse privatization of national media outlets after entering the national political stage in 1999, though, starting with Boris Berezovskii’s ORT and then Vladimir Gusinskii’s NTV. The state used charges of tax evasion to force both oligarchs into exile and placed their television stations under state control.

Today, all Russian television stations are under direct control of the Kremlin or state-controlled enterprises, such as Gazprom. Television is the only mass media that has nationwide reach and is an important tool used to maintain the popularity of the administration. In a paper in the British Journal of Political Science, Steven White, Sarah Oates and Ian McAllister also showed that the 1999 parliamentary elections, and the 2000 presidential election in which Putin became president, were won in large part through the partisan use of state television. This helps explain why the Kremlin has taken control over national television stations through direct and indirect means. This control includes, according to Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, weekly meetings between Kremlin officials and television producers from major networks where pro-government talking points are distributed, expected news topics discussed and approaches to news stories suggested. One can guess how that meeting went this week.

While one could argue that coverage of Obama’s visit could have benefited the Kremlin, by showing them as an equal player with the US, others argue that it was more important for Russia to maintain the illusion that the US is a threat. As Mark Ournov told the Telegraph, “Anti-Americanism is the basis of a system that has been created to justify a return to authoritarianism.”

Internet social platforms and chat programs appeared to have unified Uighurs in anger over the way Chinese officials had handled the earlier brawl, which took place in late June thousands of miles away…photographs that appeared online after the battle showed people standing around a pile of corpses, leading many Uighurs to believe that the government was playing down the number of dead Uighurs. One Uighur student said the photographs began showing up on many Web sites about one week ago. Government censors repeatedly tried to delete them, but to no avail, he said.

‘Uighurs posted it again and again in order to let more people know the truth, because how painful is it that the government does bald-faced injustice to Uighur people?’ said the student, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution from the government.

A call for protests spread on Web sites and QQ, the most popular instant-messaging program in China, despite government efforts to block online discussion of the feud.

If history is any guide, the Chinese will likely ease their online restrictions when the riots end, but the cat and mouse game will continue. As Michael Wines argues:

Chinese experts clearly have studied the so-called color revolutions — in Georgia and Ukraine, and last month’s protests in Iran — for the ways that the Internet and mobile communication devices helped protesters organize and reach the outside world, and for ways that governments sought to counter them…As the Internet and other media raise new challenges to China’s version of the truth, China is finding new ways not just to suppress bad news at the source, but also to spin whatever unflattering tidbits escape its control.

In regards to the resources at China’s disposal, Jonathan Zittrain may have said it best, “Given that it’s a game of cat and mouse they could bring to bear a lot of cats if they had to.”

Well, Americans will never be able to understand us, because you are stuck in the cocoon of your mass media, which always depicts Russians as the enemies of America.

Also according to the Times, Russian TV outlets, whose content is heavily influenced by the Kremlin, have backed off criticism of the US during the summit, partly by keeping anti-US agitators like Mikhail Leontyev off the airwaves. Still, according to Levada Center polling data, only 36 percent of Russians view the United States positively, while 50 percent view it negatively, a reversal from opinion of the US in the 1990s after the break up of the Soviet Union.

While this meeting is largely about restarting nuclear disarmament talks, it is clearly also meant to move forward Hillary Clinton’s initially bumbled ‘reset’ of the US- Russian relationship, which many argue is at its worst since the Cold War thanks to lingering tensions over last summer’s conflict between Russia and Georgia. Although Obama has been generally quiet about democracy and human rights issues in Russia, he does plan to meet with human rights and civil society representatives during his trip, as well as opposition politician and former chess champion Gary Kasparov. Obama also granted an interview to the often Kremlin-critical Novaya Gazeta, which has had four of its journalists assassinated in roughly as many years, including Anna Politovskaya. While most of the questions posed by Novaya Gazeta dealt mostly with the economic crisis and whether the US was to blame (a common claim by Putin), here is part of what President Obama said about whether the ‘reset’ in US-Russian relations would also include issues of human rights and freedom, in particular resolving the Politovskaya murder:

I also think that Americans and Russians share an interest in strengthening the rule of law, democracy and human rights. To quote my inaugural speech: ‘To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.’ Later, speaking in Cairo, I said: ‘I have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights.’ These ideas are shared by your President and your people. I agree with President Medvedev when he says that ’some freedom is better than no freedom.’ I therefore see no reason why the ‘reset’ in relations cannot include the common desire to strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Sunday’s elections are pivotal in the ability to provide majority. While no Senate seats are up for grabs, should PRI or PAN secure sufficient seats in the lower Chamber of Deputies –350 of whom are elected, 150 appointed– the President’s ability to push reformist policies will alter. With the onset of Swine Flu, the disengagement of tourists, rising unemployment, and destabilizing macroeconomic climate, the mid-term election offers potential for facilitated policy change, not to mention a tacit referendum on Calderon half way through his six-year term.

Today, Mexico has roughly 27M people, or 25 percent of its population, online. Although looking at Internet data in  low-connectivity nations can be problematic –as many online in Mexico are “Panista,” meaning they support the Calderon’s PAN party– such data can still be illustrative if used to describe proper demographics.  Before Sunday’s elections, online trends point to pockets of support across demographics and regions. It can point to issues of regional importance. Relevant to Mexico’s youth demographic, Facebook’s Lexicon displays prevalence of terms on Facebook Wall posts. When comparing “PRI” with “PAN,” the margin of difference for Calderon’s PAN has increased since March 2009. In fact, Facebook Wall reference volume on PAN is triple PRI, and peaking around June 15. As yet, there is still no means of parsing Facebook Lexicon data by geography.

Facebook Lexicon PRI vs PAN Wall Posting Data

Regarding use of Google, 30-day moving averages of relative search data indicated that Calderon’s PAN was leading in regional online interest, with strongholds in states of Sonora, Jalisco, Distrito Federal (Mexico City), Nueva León, and Baja California.

Geographic Distibution of Relative Google Search on "PAN"

The 30-day domestic Mexican Internet search volume puts PAN at roughly 40 percent greater volume than PRI, however recent spikes in traffic and initial post-election results are putting PRI roughly ten points up on PAN. Internationally, the importance of the mid-term election as partial referendum is indicated by high volume on President Calderon. Outside Mexico, greatest interest in Calderon –as a proportion of domestic search– comes from Puerto Rico and Costa Rica. Outside of Mexico, the issue remains important across much of Latin America, in Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and even Spain.

Global Geographic Overview of Google Search on "Calderon"

Initial post-election results show Calderon’s PAN trailing the PRI in new Lower House seats won. Diminished PAN influence in the Chamber of Deputies will hamper Calderon’s reform movement, and strike an initial blow to the Mexican economy, with lack of Congressional majority undercutting likelihood of decisive leadership. As of 9:40AM, stocks and the Mexican Peso had fallen by half of a percent against the Dollar. Initial results indicated that in Mexico online interest in party and candidate terms by connected voters did not translate into a reflection of ballots cast. But the Internet demonstrated that such electoral events matter not only in Mexico, but also indicated a leading interest in Mexican politics across Latin America and across much of the globe.

Lumeta also has a map of the Internet in the Middle East.

Which you can compare to our map and study of the Arabic blogosphere.

Hat Tip: Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH)

On July 8, Demokrat party incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will face off against the incumbent Vice President Jusuf Kalla, now the Golkar party presidential nominee, and against 2001-2004 Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, also daughter of Indonesia’s first President Sukarno. Megawati is the leader of the opposition party known as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, or PDI-P. Her controversial career soldier running mate, Prabowo Subianto, is the son-in-law of Suharto and the well-heeled founder and former Presidential nominee of the Gerinda party.

30-day domestic relative data on most popular candidate terms

While the perennial elite continues to vie for Indonesia’s top office, political engagement is moving from the streets to the information superhighway. Despite religious differences, the most salient non-domestic interest in the Iranian elections came from Jakarta, where –according to Google Insights for Search– Indonesian (Bahasa) trailed only Persian as the language of choice for entering Google search queries on Iranian presidential candidates. Outside of Iran and its diaspora, Indonesian interest in Iranian politics underscores religious trans-national solidarity, and an increasingly politically active youth demographic.

Within Indonesia, primary interest during the Iranian elections of early June stemmed from Internet users in the Javanese cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya, and in the Sumatran capital of Medan. Prior to the July 8 Indonesian elections, increased online circumspection in these cities could impact domestic voting patterns. Though Internet penetration in Indonesia is low, limited to 13M –or 5.4 percent of its 240M people– its use is strong in young demographics, evidenced not least by the fact that seven of the 90-day Indonesian top-ten growth Google search terms relate to Facebook or Friendster.

Indonesia is an immensely diverse and complex country comprised of a rich history, and 922 inhabited islands, each multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious. Internet penetration is not ubiquitous, its use is not widespread across demographics, and Internet Service Providers are centralized predominately in hub cities.

Even accounting for such gaps, understanding the use of new online media such as search, social networks, and micro-blogging adds a necessary –if not sufficient– layer of analytical firepower for deciphering trends. One week before Indonesian presidential elections, search volume data yields interesting information. While incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono leads by 10 points according to a June 11 poll, aggregated search on iterations of his name –“sby,” “boediono,” “budiono,” “pd” (after his party)– show him leading by 6:1 over Megawati, and by even wider margins over former Vice Presidential incumbent Jusuf Kalla. Putative opinion in Indonesia is that “Mega” –as she is known– is out of the running. In certain regions such as Jawa Timur (East Java) “SBY” leads both in search and in political stronghold. Online “Mega” appears competitive until one realizes that predominate queries are, by “Breakout” proportions, “say no Megawati.”

Top Megawati search terms in Indonesia over last 90 days

But illustrative online activity must be conjoined with offline knowledge. Coupled with an understanding of demography, geography, language, religion, and domestic influence, the political application of this data can be at a minimum indicative of desultory intrigue, but potentially a leading indicator of alteration in public opinion. It must be understood in the context of its influence on domestic social and political institutions. Only if being informed translates to being influential, and only if political will moves from router box to ballot box, will those observations made online be indicative of likely political change. With the most recent polls indicating a spread in public opinion of no more than 10 points, should relative online search volume be correlated with votes cast, Presidential incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will be re-elected, and the Indonesia of next Wednesday won’t look all that different from the Indonesia of today.

The Public Opinion Foundation (or Фонд Общественное Мнение in Russian) recently released a new report from their quarterly series Internet in Russia (started in 2002) which places discussions of the booming Russian language internet in context and allows for both domestic and international comparisons. A few key themes emerge from the report. One is the significant disparity between Moscow and the rest of Russia. Another is the impact of socio-economic factors – age, education and income – on internet use in Russia and around the world.

The report (PDF in Russian), co-sponsored with the Russian search engine giant Yandex, is based on a massive nationwide survey of 42,000 respondents and 8000 face to face interviews, conducted in the first quarter of 2009. The report provides data and charts on internet penetration in Russia nationwide, as well as breakdowns by region, places of access and various socio- economic factors. The data is presented in numerous charts and graphs, including growth and changes since the reports began in 2002.

Russia Compared to the Rest of the World
Russia’s current internet penetration of 33% can be compared to Brazil’s (which is at around 29%), most of Europe (around 60%) and the US (70%). At the same time, internet penetration in Moscow is currently at European levels. As a comparison, in the US, internet penetration was at 35% in 1998 (remember the internet euphoria of 1998?) and reached 60% in 2004.

From another angle – Russia’s 33% internet penetration adds up to almost 38 million internet users – more than all of England’s internet users, yet far less than the US’s 200 million internet users (which is more than the entire population of Russia) and China’s 298 million. Moscow alone has 5.4 million internet users.

Another issue to consider is what constitutes a “user”. According to this report, anyone who has used the internet in the last six months qualifies. How would you define an internet “user” – at least once a week? Once a day? Weekly users in Russia number around 30 million or 27%, and daily users shrink to 20 million, or 18%. Again, in Moscow the figure is drastically different – 92% of Moscow’s users go online at least once a week, and 80% - over 4 million people – are online every day.

Moscow vs. the Regions
The disparity between Moscow and the “rest of Russia” becomes clearer when one looks at the regional data. Moscow has 8% of the country’s population, 14% of its average internet users and 25% of Russia’s daily internet users! The Central region, which includes Moscow, has 28% of the population and 32% of the internet users - almost 12 million people in all. The Northwest region, which includes St. Petersburg, has 10% of the population and 13% of the internet users- almost 5 million people in all (while an impressive 50% of those in St. Petersburg are online, demonstrating the importance of the urban-rural divide when looking at the regional data.) In the remaining 5 regions, the percent of internet users is generally slightly less than the percentage of the total population. The Volga region, for example, has 22% of the national population, but only 19% of its internet users – which is still over 7 million people.

Internet Users by Russian Region (Source: FOM Report)

These numbers highlight the danger of extrapolating from Moscow to “all of Russia.” Moscow holds a central position as the nucleus of political and economic power in Russia, but it certainly does not represent the country as a whole.

Internet Growth Impressive
While a national internet penetration of about one third may not seem very impressive – the rate of growth has been steady and exponential, especially in the areas outside Moscow. So, for example, during the seven years between 2002 and 2009, the percentage of internet users in Moscow more than doubled from 27% to 60%. During that same period, in most of the rest of the country, the pace of growth was even faster, with the percentage of internet users increasing almost six fold– from around 5% to around 30%. As a comparison, in the US during that same time period – 2002 to 2009, internet penetration increased only 10%. The US was experiencing Russian type growth during the heady 1990’s. In addition, the place of internet access has shifted dramatically, with far more people (almost 80%) going online at home, rather than at work or other locations (friend’s, internet cafes, school etc - the categories, are, of course, not mutually exclusive). In 2002, only 32% went online at home, while the number of people going online at work dropped from 41% in 2002 to 34% in 2009. This could be attributed to improvements to the quality of internet connections at home, and the increase in personal land lines, or other forms of access.

Who’s Online (and Who’s Not)
Socio-economic demographics – gender, age, education and income – contribute to the sense of an “internet boom.” In Russia, as elsewhere in the world, the higher the income and education, the higher the rate of internet access & use. The percentage of internet users with advanced degrees (about 17% of the total population) is significantly above average – about 65%. For roughly 70% of the population, those with a secondary education and a high school diploma, internet penetration is at or below the national average – from 33% to 24%. And of the remaining 12%, only 5% are internet users. In other words, for the relatively elite, it may seem that virtually everyone they know is online. For others, the internet may appear as a “luxury item” or even something that has no significant relevance to daily life.

In terms of internet use, Russia has achieved the gender equality much touted in Soviet times – the split between male and female users is roughly at 50%. This is especially interesting compared to users globally, where men are usually a significantly higher number of users, especially in the Middle East. In some areas, there are more male users than females, in others, the females outnumber the men. The average Russian blogger for instance, is female. This may be connected to the fact that women slightly outnumber men in Russia.

“Working woman are actively involved in all aspects of working and social life of the country!”

The breakdown of internet users by age reflects the usual assumptions – the younger age group (18-24) which accounts for only 14% of the population, has the highest internet penetration at 67%. In Moscow, as elsewhere, internet penetration decreases with age, but to a much lesser degree than in other parts of Russia. It is also interesting that while in the early part of this decade most users gained access to the Internet at work, now the vast majority (almost 80%) prefer to access the Internet at home.

Finally, as a sobering counterbalance to all this, it seems, from the report, that most of the people who are offline do not have any plans to change their status in the near future - in other words, less than 3% of those who are not online plan to start using the internet anytime soon. Maybe they have something else – like an economic crisis - on their minds?

(Hat Tip: Veronica Khokhlova, Global Voices Russia Editor)

While Twitter is getting a lot of attention in the current Iranian crisis, it’s good to know that the robust Iranian blogosphere also remains active in the face of the government’s interference with the Internet. The figure below shows new blog posts on blogfa.com, the dominant Iranian blogging platform, over the past three weeks. While some Blogfa users are outside Iran, the vast majority are inside. We can see significant, through sporadic, disruption of Iranian blogging for a period of about two and a half days beginning a day after the disputed election. After that, posting returns to roughly pre-election levels.

What are bloggers talking about? A scan of text reveals high levels of discussion about politics. Many bloggers continue to link to websites supporting Mousavi (such as mirhussein.com), whereas linking to the main site supporting Ahmadinejad  emtedadmehr.com) has nearly stopped, including among conservative political bloggers.

One harrowing story lately has been how the Revolutionary Guards have been posting pictures of protesters and asking readers to identify them. Perhaps hearteningly, the Guards’ site for this, gerdab.ir, is being linked to by a relative handful of bloggers [gerdab.ir map below], even among the conservative bloggers who mainly support Ahmadinejad. In fact, the site is being linked to by reformist bloggers, presumably calling out the practice, at nearly the same rate as the conservatives.

As for Twitter, we see a dramatic rise in the number of Iranian bloggers linking to Twitter in the first 15 days after the election [first map below], as compared to the same period a month earlier [second map below]. Interestingly, this linking is localized to a cluster of the map featuring longstanding opposition (as opposed to merely “reformist”) and expatriate bloggers. As we showed in our paper last year, this is also the portion of the map that is most frequently filtered by the Iranian government.