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	<title>Comments on: NSA Blog Stroll</title>
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	<description>Information, Law, and the Law of Information</description>
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		<title>By: Info/Law &#187; Some Objections to DOJ&#8217;s Data Retention Proposal</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/05/12/nsa-blog-stroll/comment-page-1/#comment-151</link>
		<dc:creator>Info/Law &#187; Some Objections to DOJ&#8217;s Data Retention Proposal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Jun 2006 16:25:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Yet placed against the backdrop of the NSA&#8217;s program to obtain comparable records about telephone calls, this assurance fades away. While details of the NSA program remain very sketchy (as I complained earlier), it seems clear that no search warrants were secured before the NSA obtained at least some data, and I am pretty confident that previously existing statutes required such warrants (as analyzed in the posts collected here). In the distinct category of recording telephone calls placed between the United States and other countries, the Administration has argued that warrants were not required because of a combination of the asserted Article II power to fight terrorism and a resolution Congress passed after the September 11th attacks authorizing the use of force against al Queda (fairly weak arguments in my view and the view of this memo by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service). [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Yet placed against the backdrop of the NSA&#8217;s program to obtain comparable records about telephone calls, this assurance fades away. While details of the NSA program remain very sketchy (as I complained earlier), it seems clear that no search warrants were secured before the NSA obtained at least some data, and I am pretty confident that previously existing statutes required such warrants (as analyzed in the posts collected here). In the distinct category of recording telephone calls placed between the United States and other countries, the Administration has argued that warrants were not required because of a combination of the asserted Article II power to fight terrorism and a resolution Congress passed after the September 11th attacks authorizing the use of force against al Queda (fairly weak arguments in my view and the view of this memo by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service). [...]</p>
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