Continuing on governance, Robert Rotberg has an article now on Find Articles that, while it over-simplies somewhat for the purposes of argument, makes a case for a “ranking” of governance, similar to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
While in theory it is a good idea, one has to be very careful. The article gives some regard to cultural differences but it notes the universality of certain factors of governance and thus offsets cultural relatavism arguments. One cannot so easily dismiss concerns when any ranking supposes itself to be independent or “objective.” Certain rankings widely used are biased in many ways, and few people, especially outside the process itself, actually look to see what comprises any “ranking” and what the measurements are. While certainly there is room to argue, and a ranking might help give a basis point, one has to be concerned with how the ranking is formed. Certain economic rankings, for instance, are based almost exclusively on the liberal economic model of what is good for an economy. Not to say that these cannot be useful, but rankings are inherently reductionist and, without serious input about how alternative strategies can get similar results, any ranking based solely on Western pre-fab notions will simply not comport to reality in many cases and risk being less useful when there really are governance problems that anyone would recognize.
With Rotberg’s all-too-simply citing to Weber’s statist concept of a monopoly of violence as the main basis of “security”, I wonder if his version of rankings would at least seriously consider non-Western conceptions of the “state” and what constitutes one’s government. The nation state is a largely Western concept, and perhaps focusing on increasing security of prefab notions of state boundaries, without considering how those were made (i.e. colonial carving up of Africa) is just a recipe for interstate conflict rather than peace. True, the abscence of a strong state is usually a disaster. But the presence of one that it is not welcome/does not comport to the desires of the people under it has not exaclty been beneficial either, and a focus on “security” of those states may in fact be just a support of oppression of minorities. As has often been said, the sovereign nation state was a concept imposed upon land, and just because it suits Westerners so well does not mean other concepts are inherently bad.
One should also look critically at his other ranking categories. Not that I necessarily disagree with Rotberg’s categories, but all too often categories are taken as given and then applied. Forming the categories, not just ranking countries based on pre-conceived categories, is the first step. Rotberg’s eight categories are a good place to start, but they should not be taken ”as is” — there is a lot of room within each category for interpretation and debate. Any output is only as good as the input, and as Rule of Law practitioners know, if the people affected have a role in how a measure is made, they are far more likely to take it seriously. Coming up with categories is hard work, and the categories can be changed based on the evidence that is found. Just looking for a few things one has in mind is likely to miss the big picture.
The article is right to mention that “measuring governmental performance requires measuring outcomes, and not inputs.” The inherent problem with rankings is that they tend to focus on a limited subset of inputs to judge by, rather than taking a look at the outcomes. They look at a few successful outcomes and assume what must be the “universal” inputs. But governance is not a hard science, and correllation does not imply causation. Ranking categories need to be made in an inclusive and discursive process taking, as he suggests, due regard for outcomes acheived through various means — while still upholding standards of course — or else the rankings will just be seen as another Western attempt to judge other places based on what works for us (a sometimes valid critique of the CPI — a lot of its validity depends on how one defines “corruption” — for example, should that include campaign contribution quid-pro-quos? Politically-motivated judicial appointments? Is it not corruption if it is technically legal, made that way by the people who stand to benefit the most? Is slipping a customs official a gift more “corrupt” than getting a political appointment for the head of your company? Etc.). To be seen as universal one has to prove the objectivity and validility of the categories, not just assume others will take them for granted. And that is a burden we all too often do not meet. If one is to go about ranking places, with potentially very negative implications for those places, one must be willing to submit one’s own categories to the test.
On a side note, the article is a good reminder to Rule of Law scholars that Rule of Law is not the #1 priority in a country. It is, especially in conflict/post-conflict societies, security, however that is acheived. What that means might be different to different people (a single state “monopoly of violence” may not be the only solution, especially in states with ethnic/cultural tensions), but without some sense of personal security, not much else gets accomplished no matter how many laws are made.
