Globalization, competition among communities of globalizing states, China, the US, and the gap states they are competing to link up with.
Dec 29th, 2004 by jimmoore
Here’s one for Tom Barnett, who as we speak is going through a “big think” (his words) about his next book:
The current situation in Sudan illustrates key aspects of the struggle
among great powers to integrate gap states into the global
economy.
I. The fact that the struggle to integrate these gap states into
the global system is not clearly-enough recognized in the United States
by policy makers does not mean that the competition among super powers
has not been joined. All superpowers, implicitly by way of the
interests of the businesses that make up their economies, and
explicitly as an element of foreign policy, are continually engaged in
a competition to link up and develop gap states. And in doing so,
they also compete in terms of the “value regime” that they promote
across the world. Gap-integration-initiatives are not value
neutral. The US-centered integration initiative has values–some
I support and some I frankly abhor. So does the Chinese integration
initiative. Globalization is not a single process, it is a
competition among “paradigms of globalization” and among networks of
states joined together to make up a particular economic and value
community, and a competition among nations that have the power to drive
such communities. The US and China are the central, but by no
means the only, drivers of communities of globalizers.
China, as it reaches out for natural resources, is naturally attracted
to certain gap states as sources of raw material for its booming
economy. Gap states ranging from Burma to Sudan are good sources
of some materials. The prices are often quite cheap, reflecting
low labor and other costs. And often there is less competition,
or none, from other super powers in gap states that have been declared
world pariahs. So China, whether consciously or not, has an
aggressive gap-development policy working its way in Burma, Sudan, Iran.
In addition, China is keen to develop the Asian nations into a regional
economy that it can dominate. In doing so it will integrate
certain developed economies, such as Singapore, with many less
developed states–some of which qualify as gap states, and some of
which, like Indonesia, have gap regions within their borders.
II. Moreover, once a superpower takes action, other players are
incented to join. Like tenants in a new shopping mall, they are
reassured by the presence of an “anchor tenant” such as China, knowing
that trade traffic will abound, national security in the gap state will
be supported, and that in helping a gap state connect to the global
economy there will be many opportunities to establish new elements of
the local economic system, and to prosper. Note two announcements in the
past two days: 1. The World Bank and the IMF are stepping in to shore up the Sudanese banking system
and national accounts system–providing essential training, systems
and certification for a banking system preparing for membership in the
global economy. 2. The
United Arab Emirates announces an agreement with the Sudanese
government to set up an international-level “Emirates and Sudan Bank”
that is Sharia-law compliant, will have bank branches all over Sudan.
added: ‘The creation of the new bank draws tighter the historically
close ties between Sudan and the UAE, a great supporter of economic and
trade cooperation between Arab countries. He added: ‘UAE investors
reacted enthusiastically to the opportunity to set up the bank.
‘Sudan’s economic indicators are generally positive and forecasts
for gross domestic product, balance of payment, balance of trade,
exchange rates, and foreign investments suggest that the country is
poised for an economic upswing, particularly after the latest
developments to do with the peace treaty.
‘It is crucial to the country’s further progress that it has solidly
established banks and financial institutions with the resources and
facilities to offer a service that can facilitate international
transactions.’
Post-script: in the time period Barnett is hoping to
address-say, 20 years into the future–could another sort of
globalizing/global competition emerge? Could the power of the
globalized countries expand to the point that they become their own
drivers? Or might some sort of NGO/UN/WTO/Social Investment third
way of organizing gap-development and globalization be established?
Here’s one for Tom Barnett, who as we speak is going through a “big think” (his words) about his next book:
The current situation in Sudan illustrates key aspects of the struggle
among great powers to integrate gap states into the global
economy.
I. The fact that the struggle to integrate these gap states into
the global system is not clearly-enough recognized in the United States
by policy makers does not mean that the competition among super powers
has not been joined. All superpowers, implicitly by way of the
interests of the businesses that make up their economies, and
explicitly as an element of foreign policy, are continually engaged in
a competition to link up and develop gap states. And in doing so,
they also compete in terms of the “value regime” that they promote
across the world. Gap-integration-initiatives are not value
neutral. The US-centered integration initiative has values–some
I support and some I frankly abhor. So does the Chinese integration
initiative. Globalization is not a single process, it is a
competition among “paradigms of globalization” and among networks of
states joined together to make up a particular economic and value
community, and a competition among nations that have the power to drive
such communities. The US and China are the central, but by no
means the only, drivers of communities of globalizers.
China, as it reaches out for natural resources, is naturally attracted
to certain gap states as sources of raw material for its booming
economy. Gap states ranging from Burma to Sudan are good sources
of some materials. The prices are often quite cheap, reflecting
low labor and other costs. And often there is less competition,
or none, from other super powers in gap states that have been declared
world pariahs. So China, whether consciously or not, has an
aggressive gap-development policy working its way in Burma, Sudan, Iran.
In addition, China is keen to develop the Asian nations into a regional
economy that it can dominate. In doing so it will integrate
certain developed economies, such as Singapore, with many less
developed states–some of which qualify as gap states, and some of
which, like Indonesia, have gap regions within their borders.
II. Moreover, once a superpower takes action, other players are
incented to join. Like tenants in a new shopping mall, they are
reassured by the presence of an “anchor tenant” such as China, knowing
that trade traffic will abound, national security in the gap state will
be supported, and that in helping a gap state connect to the global
economy there will be many opportunities to establish new elements of
the local economic system, and to prosper. Note two announcements in the
past two days: 1. The World Bank and the IMF are stepping in to shore up the Sudanese banking system
and national accounts system–providing essential training, systems
and certification for a banking system preparing for membership in the
global economy. 2. The
United Arab Emirates announces an agreement with the Sudanese
government to set up an international-level “Emirates and Sudan Bank”
that is Sharia-law compliant, will have bank branches all over Sudan.
added: ‘The creation of the new bank draws tighter the historically
close ties between Sudan and the UAE, a great supporter of economic and
trade cooperation between Arab countries. He added: ‘UAE investors
reacted enthusiastically to the opportunity to set up the bank.
‘Sudan’s economic indicators are generally positive and forecasts
for gross domestic product, balance of payment, balance of trade,
exchange rates, and foreign investments suggest that the country is
poised for an economic upswing, particularly after the latest
developments to do with the peace treaty.
‘It is crucial to the country’s further progress that it has solidly
established banks and financial institutions with the resources and
facilities to offer a service that can facilitate international
transactions.’
Post-script: in the time period Barnett is hoping to
address-say, 20 years into the future–could another sort of
globalizing/global competition emerge? Could the power of the
globalized countries expand to the point that they become their own
drivers? Or might some sort of NGO/UN/WTO/Social Investment third
way of organizing gap-development and globalization be established?