Property Law Developments—Joseph William Singer

The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that a potential buyer who had an oral contract to buy real estate did not have a right to just compensation when the property was condemned by public authorities. American Central City, Inc. v. Joint Antelope Valley Auth., 2011 WL 2420787 (Neb. 2011). Although oral agreements to buy property are enforceable despite the statute of frauds in cases of part performance, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the potential buyer’s sole remedy was against the seller of the property rather than the public authorities that took the property by eminent domain.

The Religious Land Use-Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc, prohibits enforcing local zoning laws against religious institutions if those laws impose a “substantial burden” on the free exercise of religion and not justified by a compelling government interest that cannot be achieved in a less burdensome manner. The Ninth Circuit applied this statute to deny a city the power to exclude a church from moving to a larger building located in an area zoned for industrial use in the case of International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 2011 WL 1518980 (9th Cir. 2011). Read article. The church had become bigger over time and was looking for a new facility and hoped to move into an abandoned industrial building. The city hoped to attract a business to the site that would employ city residents and argued that its interest in promoting jobs was a compelling government interest justifying refusal to rezone the property for church uses even if this refusal imposed a substantial burden on religious freedom. The Ninth Circuit held both that job creation was not a compelling government interest that justified such a burden on religious freedom and that even if it was, there were less burdensome ways to achieve that result.

Many courts uphold acceleration clauses in commercial leases that require tenants to pay the rest of the rent due for the remainder of the lease term if the tenant breaches the lease. Such clauses are usually not enforced in the context of residential leases because they disclaim the duty to mitigate damages. The only issue for acceleration clauses in commercial leases is whether the amount exceeds a reasonable estimate of the likely damages from breach and thus constitute an invalid “penalty” rather than a valid liquidated damages clause. See, e.g., Cummings Properties, LLC v. National Communications Corp., 869 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. 2007). Many courts make this determination by assuming that the landlord still has a duty to mitigate damages by attempting to relet the premises and thus the remaining rent will be invalid if it far exceeds the damages that would be sustained if the landlord found a replacement tenant. See HealthSouth Rehabilitation Corp. v. Falcon Management Co., 799 So. 2d 177 (Ala. 2001). However, some courts hold that the duty to mitigate damages is irrelevant in this context. NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670 Mass. 2008). The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently explained that this means that it does not matter when the breach occurs during the course of the lease, i.e., at the beginning when many months or years of rent are left and the landlord might be able to obtain a replacement tenant and mitigate damages, or at the end of the lease when replacement of the tenant might be impossible within the remaining time. The only thing that matters is whether the figure chosen by the parties in the acceleration clause (the remaining rent for the lease term) is a reasonable estimate of the damages that might be sustained upon the tenant’s breach. Although this is a difficult determination to make, the court explained that acceleration clauses in commercial leases are presumptively enforceable and should be disregarded only if they are clearly unreasonable. Panagakos v. Collins, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 697, 2011 WL 5067707 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).