Property Law Developments—Joseph William Singer

While the US Constitution’s free speech provisions in the first amendment apply only to state action, both California and New Jersey have interpreted their state constitutions to grant individuals free speech rights in some cases in relation to private parties. In both states, citizens have the right to distribute leaflets in shopping centers. In Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue Owners, Inc., 2014 WL 6777311 (N.J. 2014), a resident wanted to run for a seat on the Board of Directors of the coop and sought to distribute materials relevant to his campaign and he was prevented from doing so by the coop board. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the coop rule banning soliciting and distributing written materials in the building was unreasonable and a violation of the resident’s state constitutional free speech rights. The ruling reaffirmed and expanded on the rulings in earlier cases that protected free speech rights of owners in common-interest communities when those owners wanted to post signs. See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507 (N.J. 2012); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).

The Texas Supreme Court affirmed its ruling that the border between state-owned submerged lands and private lands along the coast is the “mean higher high tide line” or the mean location of the high tide line over the regular tidal cycle of 18.6 years. Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 2014 WL 2994436 (Tex. 2014). In various ways, agents of the state of Texas has acted so as to claim public rights in property that is on the “private” or landward side of the line. The Texas General Land Office (GLO) claimed that it owns lands that the Texas Supreme Court says are privately owned; that office also requested that tax records be changed to indicate state ownership of those lands. These statements have made it harder for private owners to sell those lands. However, since the GLO ended its bid to change the tax rolls to claim public ownership of those lands and, “even though the [GLO] lawyers’  statements injured the [landlowners]”, the state did not actually dispossess the owners and therefore did not “take” their property without just compensation in violation of the takings clause.

The court also held that the line separating public and private ownership does not change because of state renourishment of beaches. “The State does not gain the dry beach by dumping sand on it,, nor does it lose what was before the wet beach, even if the renourishment pushes the MHHT [mean higher high tide] line farther seaward, which is usually the purpose of renourishment.”

The Massachusetts Land Court has held that no prescriptive easement can arise no matter how long a sewer pipe has traversed a neighbor’s property because the non permissive use was not “open and notorious” and there were no other indications that the pipe was there. 143-145 Nahant Rd, LLC v. Mastoras, (Mass. Land Ct. 2014), 2014 WL 2548094, 42 Mass. Lawyers Weekly 1879 (July 7, 2014). With no easement, the use was likely a trespass although that was a question on remand.

A patron who knew he could not enter a diner because the diner did not have wheelchair access could sue the diner and its landlord for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act even though he never went to the diner and tried to get in. Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 2013 WL 5340465 (2d Cir. 2013). The mere fact that he was deterred from going to the diner is enough to give him standing to bring a claim for violating the public accommodation provisions of the ADA. Moreover, once he had standing to sue for one violation, he could sue the diner for other violations of the statute that relate to his particular disability even if he has never been inside.

The New York Court of Appeals relaxed a traditional rule of property law by holding that a commercial landlord’s interference with possession of 12 square feet of space out of a total of 15,000 square feet does not constitute a partial actual eviction entitling the tenant to a full rent abatement. Eastside Exhibition Corp. v. 210 East 86th Street Corp., 965 N.E.2d 246 (N.Y. 2012). The court noted that withholding of the entire amount of rent is the proper remedy when there has been a partial eviction by a landlord but a partial eviction will not be found if the landlord’s intrusion is trivial and has no effect on the tenant’s use or enjoyment of the property. In this case, the landlord merely placed cross-bracing between two steel support columns on both of tenant’s floors in a manner that did not affect the tenant’s use or enjoyment of the leased premises. The only effects of the cross-bracing were minimal effect on the flow of foot traffic and the fact that the bracing was unattractive, insufficient to constitute partial eviction.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that pesticide drift from one property to another is governed by nuisance law and not trespass law even though it constitutes a physical invasion of particles. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 2012). The court held that trespass law protects only the interest in possession while nuisance law protects use and enjoyment, making nuisance the appropriate standard to regulate the problem. Trespass law does not require any proof of harm and the court felt that applying it in this context would require a narrowing principle it was not willing to create.

The Ninth Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act grants a woman the right to use a Segway in Walt Disney World unless the park owners can show that its use is dangerous. Baughman v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 685 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). The court found that allowing Segway use might constitute a reasonable modification of the park’s policies that were “necessary” to allow her to enjoy the facilities on an equal basis with others. Such modifications are not required if they cannot be consistent with safety requirements.

The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has reaffirmed the old rule that property rights can be expanded by slow accretion or diminished through slow erosion when property is located on a stream or the ocean. In White v. Hartigan, 982 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 2013), beachfront owners claimed a right to use the beach behind their neighbors house because their deed had given them rights to the beach in 1841. The court disagreed, noting that changing boundaries had placed the plaintiffs’ beach under water and that they had no right to “moveable” boundaries ensuring access to the beach behind their neighbor’s house.

The Rhode Island legislature passed a statute likely to be signed by the Governor called the “Homeless Bill of Rights.” The act amends Rhode Island’s fair housing law by adding “housing status” to the list of prohibited kinds of discrimination and defines housing status to mean “the status of having or not having a fixed or regular residence, including the status of living on the streets or in a homeless shelter or similar temporary residence.” It guarantees access to public spaces (including sidewalks and public buildings) on the same terms as others and grants a certain amount of protection for the personal property of the homeless. The law also ensures that public services are available to homeless persons. The bill is S 2052 Substitute B (2012) and it will amend R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 34 by adding §§34-37.1-1 to 34-37.1-5 and amending §§34-37-1 and 34-37-3.

On May 8, 2012, the U.S. Attorney’s office in Manhattan announced a $2 million settlement by a landlord, his building superintendent and the superintendent’s son to pay fines to tenants who were sexually harassed by the superintendent. The building superintendent was a convicted sex offender who served 14 years in prison for molesting or raping 3 girls and a woman before being hired by the landlord to run three buildings. The superintendent would enter women’s apartments while drunk and demand sex, retaliating when he did not get his way. Both the landlord and the superintendent are also barred by the agreement from owning or managing occupied properties. read article

Defendants unknowingly built their house on land that belonged to the plaintiff who also did not know that the land belonged to him. The mistake was discovered after the house was built and plaintiff sued to eject the trespassers from his land. The Washington Supreme Court denied injunctive relief, adopting the relative hardship doctrine. The court granted plaintiff damages for the value of the land encroached on by his neighbor’s structure but denied plaintiff an injunction ordering the structure removed. Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117 (Wash. 2010).

In Young v. Ledford, 37 So. 3d 832 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2009), an Alabama court held that an owner could not remove the half of a tree that sat on his property without killing it and that the owner could not destroy the entire tree without the neighbor’s consent. The landowner claimed that the tree was dangerous and might fall on the owner’s house and the court noted that it is possible an exception might be granted in such cases of boundary trees when they constitute a nuisance.

A couple complained about the intrusion on their private road by a Google vehicle that photographed their home for Google Streetview. All claims for invasion of privacy and mental distress were dismissed but the trespass claim remained. The Third Circuit held, in Boring v. Google Inc., 362 Fed. Appx. 273 (3d Cir. 2010), that the owners were entitle to nominal damages but not punitive damages, creating a contrast with the well-known case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), which awarded $100,000 in damages for a willful trespass. On remand from the Third Circuit, the trial court signed off on a settlement giving the Borings $1 in damages for trespass. read article

The Third Circuit allowed Pittsburgh couple Aaron and Christine Boring to proceed with their trespass suit against Google brought after a Google employee entered their land despite a “No Trespassing” sign to take pictures of their house and pool for use on Google Maps street view. Boring v. Google Inc., 2010 WL 318281 (3d Cir. 2010). The trial court had thrown out the trespass claim because the Borings had not alleged any damage from the trespass but the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania law (like the law elsewhere) does not require proof of damage to find a trespass. Any unauthorized entry onto another’s land constitutes a trespass unless privileged. See article. On remand, if the trespass is proved factually, the land owners would be entitled at least to nominal damages, perhaps of $1. This would obviously not deter any business from trespassing unless it would be hurt by adverse publicity from such trespasses. The court refused to allow damages for harm caused by posting the photos on Google’s website because the court found that such postings would not be “highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities” and thus would not be protected by the tort of invasion of privacy. Moreover, any such damages would be caused by publication of the photos, not by the trespass itself, and thus would not be appropriate as trespass damages.

It is unclear why the courts have not developed a rule that allows compensation for the indignity of an unauthorized entry in appropriate cases either to more fully compensate the owner for the invasion of property rights or to deter such activity by an actor likely to repeat the conduct. Compare the fair housing laws which give a right to compensatory damages for persons denied housing because of race even if they find substitute housing immediately afterwards and no economic injury can be shown. It is an interesting question whether juries should be allowed to give the equivalent of civil rights damages for trespasses in particular kinds of cases. Recall the famous case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), in which the court got around this problem by awarding punitive damages of $100,000 against a mobile home company that dragged a mobile home across the Jacque’s property against their express wishes. Query whether the Boring case would an appropriate one for punitive damages; is the “No Trespassing” sign equivalent to an order to stay off after requesting permission to enter?

We generally take for granted that owners have the power to exclude non-owners from their land. But at one time in the United States,unenclosed and undeveloped land was open to the public for the purpose of hunting, gathering kindling and berries, and walking. Eric Freyfogle, The Lost Right to Roam, in On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land 29 (2007). Today, about half the states still allow hunting on private land unless the owner has posted “no trespassing” signs. Mark R.Sigmon, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 Duke L.J. 549(2004). Moreover, owners who wanted to protect their fields from wandering cattle originally had to fence them out; they had no right to complain that a trespass had occurred when cattle wandered onto their property. Nor could railroads insist that cattle owners prevent them from intruding on train tracks. See, e.g., Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Co. v. Peacock, 25 Ala.229 (1854); Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911 (1860). Over time, the rules changed to place liability on cattle owners for damage to crops on the neighbors’ property and denied cattle owners remedies if their cattle wandered onto railroad tracks, effectively changing to a fencing-in system by which owners had the duty to keep their cattle from invading neighboring property.

The right to roam has long been recognized in Finland, Norway, and Sweden where anyone is entitled to hike across or camp in the countryside on the property of another as long as one does not disturb the owner. For information on Sweden, see link.  In 2000, the United Kingdom adopted the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, Acts of 2000, ch. 37, guaranteeing public rights of access for recreational purposes (mainly walking) to certain categories of uncultivated countryside in England and Wales, see link. The Ramblers Association “campaigns to increase and protect public access to the countryside,” see link. Scotland adopted a similar act in 2003, see link. See also Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19 Georgetown Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 375 (2007).