Incentives for Political Office
Rational choice theory in political science has made much of the fact
that it is seemingly irrational to vote in a large-scale
election. This is because the probability that your single vote
will determine the outcome is generally very close to zero, while the
act of voting entails some small but real costs. Even in a close
election like Florida in 2000, an individual’s vote would really
“count” only if the margin of victory was exactly one vote.
I wonder if we couldn’t improve the political system by actually
associating individual votes with real value. One way to do this
would be to tie the financial compensation an elected official receives
with the number of votes received in the most recent election.
Another way would be to do the same with some element of political
authority. For example, the Congressional two-thirds majority
currently needed to override a Presidential veto could be increased or
decreased as a function of the percentage of the popular or electoral
college votes the President received. Using electoral college
votes as an example, George W. Bush won in 2000 with only about 50%,
whereas Ronald Reagan won in 1984 with nearly 98%. Using this
number in place of the standard two-thirds would give greater force to
what is usually called a “popular mandate.” The President who
wins with overwhelming popular support would actually be given greater
control over national policy, albeit within limits. Putting this
type of mechanism in place would benefit voters by giving political
officials an incentive to work for votes beyond the threshold (usually
50%) required to enter office.

