Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Mark N. Katz

There has been much press coverage about how the Saleh regime in Yemen is facing important security challenges.

There is the Houthi rebellion in the north of the country which has been going on since 2004 (see a brief, excellent analysis by Gregory Johnsen). There is the growing movement to restore the independence of South Yemen (which April Longley Alley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani have written about). And there is an Al Qaeda presence in Yemen which has been widely reported on, though it appears (as Johnsen has pointed out) to be far less of a threat to the Saleh regime than either the Houthis or the southern secessionists.

A fourth threat is one that Alley pointed out in her 2008 Georgetown University Ph.D. dissertation, “Shifting Light in the Qamariyya: The Reinvention of Patronage Networks in Contemporary Yemen”: the fracturing of the alliance between the Saleh clan on the one hand and the Al Ahmar clan on the other. Abdallah Al Ahmar, chief sheikh of the Hashid, helped Saleh come to power in 1978, and strongly supported Saleh for almost three decades thereafter. With Saleh increasingly working to ensure that the presidency is transferred to his own son, Ahmad, President Saleh has, as Alley pointed out, increasingly marginalized Abdallah’s son, Hamid—who retaliated by actively supporting Saleh’s electoral rival in 2006 (see Chapter V of her dissertation). Sheikh Abdallah again sided with Saleh on this occasion, but his passing away at the end of 2007 means that he is no longer present to manage the rivalry between his sons and nephews on the one hand and Saleh and his kin on the other with regard to the succession or any other issue. Needless to say, a growing rift within the ranks of the regime’s top elite will not help it in dealing with security challenges from opposition forces.

There is also an international dimension to the crises in Yemen. As has been widely reported recently, Saudi forces have joined the fight against Houthi rebels near the Saudi-Yemeni border. Riyadh is helping Saleh in this instance, but it must not be forgotten that Saudi-Yemeni relations have often been tense. Under Saleh, tension arose between the two governments when Sanaa sided with Saddam Hussein during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and when Riyadh sided with the southern secessionists in the 1994 Yemeni civil war (which Saleh’s forces won). Saudi-Yemeni relations have improved greatly since the two governments signed a border agreement in 2000. If, however, Riyadh concludes that Yemen is fracturing, it will undoubtedly seek allies to support there—perhaps including the southern secessionists whom they backed over a decade ago.

Recent Yemeni government statements that Iran has been helping the Houthis have raised alarm in many quarters. The Houthis are indeed Shi’ites, but belong to the Zaidi sect and not the Twelver sect predominant in Iran (indeed, the two sects have historically been rivals). Many Western sources (including the Washington Post) have mistakenly portrayed the Houthi conflict as a Shi’ite rebellion against a Sunni government. But as Johnsen pointed out, “Saleh and numerous other leading figures of contemporary Yemen are of Zaidi origin.” Iran has denied that it is involved in this struggle, and the Houthis have declared that the Saleh government is falsely claiming that Tehran is supporting them in order to get support from America, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC countries for himself. As Johnsen further noted, the Yemeni government “has yet to provide any firm evidence of direct Iranian support.” Indeed, up until October 2009, Yemeni-Iranian relations appeared to be quite good. Even since then, Tehran has called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, warning outside powers to stay out.

The Saudis, though, insist that Iran is involved. It is not clear whether they really believe this or are simply going along with Yemeni government claims in order to obtain a larger role inside Yemen—something that Sanaa has traditionally resisted, but now appears to welcome. Interestingly, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Muhammad Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid also recently claimed (on Al Jazeera, November 10) that “Persian Iran” is supporting the Houthis (among others).

As with previous conflicts within and between the two Yemens before unification in 1990 and the 1994 civil war, the current conflicts inside Yemen have local causes. But as with previous conflicts, these Yemeni conflicts have international ramifications and could draw in other actors. Saudi Arabia is already involved. If Iran is not yet involved, it could be. The same is true, of course, for the United States.

So what are the goals of the various protagonists in Yemen?

The Houthis want to restore the Zaidi Imamate that ruled North Yemen between the departure of the Ottomans at the end of the First World War and the 1962 North Yemeni “revolution.” Presumably, they also want to rule over South Yemen—which, though ruled by the British until 1967, was claimed by the Imamate. The South, though, is overwhelmingly Sunni. If anything, the Southerners have even less desire to be ruled by a Shi’a Imamate in Sanaa than by the Saleh regime.

Al Qaeda does not appear strong enough to come to power in Yemen, but it may be satisfied with a chronic state of conflict there that provides it with maximum freedom to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia and other countries.

The Al Ahmars may see the growth of any or all of these opposition movements as further proof (as if they needed it) that the Saleh regime can no longer govern Yemen effectively, and to use their considerable resources to displace it. Saleh and his kin, of course, simply want to suppress all opposition and remain in power.

And what are the possible outcomes to the current conflicts?

One is that the Houthis take power in the North and the secessionists restore the independence of the South. This would lead to a situation somewhat similar to the 1967-90 period when there were two Yemeni states. As then, the two are likely to have hostile relations and to seek external assistance from rival great powers (or even not so great powers) against each other.

Another is that Yemen will descend into chaos, with none of the various actors strong enough to defeat all the others nor weak enough to be completely defeated either. In this scenario, all the various Yemeni protagonists are likely to seek external assistance. And to a greater or lesser degree, all might receive it.

A variation on this theme is that Yemen will come to resemble Somalia—another country which was previously divided, then united, but then became divided again. As in Somalia, the more populous region (the South in Somalia; the North in Yemen) could descend into a prolonged state of chaos while the formerly British-ruled portion (the North in Somalia; the South in Yemen) could emerge as a relatively coherent—albeit impoverished—state. Unlike Somaliland (North Somalia), which the West has largely shunned in deference to the African Union, Saudi Arabia and Oman might well recognize a re-emergent South Yemen (or South Arabia, as the British referred to it), thus easing the way for the West and other Arab states to do so.

Or, the Al Ahmars might overthrow the Salehs and establish a more effective regime that inspires popular support, peacefully resolves the conflict with the Houthis (who have a very personal grudge against Saleh), defuses the southern secessionist movement by fostering both autonomy and democracy, and cooperates with America, Saudi Arabia, and others against Al Qaeda. (The Al Ahmars, of course, could manage to oust the Salehs, but not succeed in some or all of these other tasks.)

Finally—and seemingly against all odds—Saleh might prevail over his adversaries. He has, after all, a track record of doing just this through a combination of co-opting many while at the same time playing them off against each other, and enlisting allies (both foreign and domestic) to isolate and defeat still others. Saleh has always played a poor hand well. The example of Syria also shows that it is possible for a father to successfully transfer power to a son in an Arab republic. But as the prospectuses of mutual funds warn: past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Whatever its future, the period ahead for Yemen is likely to be, to paraphrase Hobbes, “nasty and brutish.” This nasty and brutish period, though, is not likely to be short.

From Daniel Byman

Saudi Arabia is once again sailing in dangerous waters as it increases its military involvement in Yemen. The recent New York Times article on the subject is welcome, because the growing violence in Yemen is perhaps the most neglected news story in the Middle East.

Yemen is racked by no less than three distinct sources of violence, beyond the traditional tribal uprisings that have always wracked the country. The “Houthi” rebellion involves Zaydi Shi’a in the northwestern part of the country near the Saudi border. Also in revolt are some disgruntled southerners, bitter at their steady loss of power since north and south Yemen unified in 1990, and also at their loss in the 1994 civil war. Yemen is also home to many jihadists tied to Al Qaeda of the Arabian peninsula. They have shown up in Iraq and elsewhere, and are increasingly active in Yemen itself and in Saudi Arabia. Yemen was always loosely governed, but the levels of violence are high even by a historical standard. The various rebels do not work together, and their agendas are not harmonious. But together they weaken the state and stretch Yemen’s military forces.

Much of the attention is on the Iran-Saudi competition in Yemen, as the New York Times story notes, because the Houthi rebels are Shi’a. However, their Zaydi interpretation of Shiism is different than the Twelver Shiism of Iran, and the two communities historically have not been close. For now, Iran’s support seems limited at best. (Despite Yemeni government claims to the contrary, I have not seen a credible account of serious Iranian backing, though given the dearth of reporting on this topic that omission is less meaningful than it might otherwise be.)

Saudi Arabia, however, feels it has more at stake in Yemen than just Iran. Riyadh has always felt a proprietary interest in the tribes in the northwest, particularly as some of them straddle the Yemen-Saudi border. Drugs and weapons also come to the Kingdom from Yemen. The Saudis, moreover, have also always felt that they should be the dominant power in Yemen, and for decades have meddled extensively in the country’s domestic politics. (One policymaker I know compared the Saudis’ obsession with Yemen to the U.S. concern over Cuba.)

The danger, however, is that growing military involvement will create political problems for the Saudis and strengthen the insurgents. The Houthis are not likely to suffer more than a minor tactical setback from Saudi Arabia’s military effort (more threatening to the insurgents would be Saudi efforts to patrol the border and stop smuggling). Moreover, the violence seems to be creating some sympathy for the rebels in Iran. Perhaps most important, Yemenis agree on little in general, but there is a strong resentment of Saudi meddling. Saudi intervention delegitimizes the Yemeni government further and may create more support for the rebels.

From Matthew Levitt

Even as the West seeks to engage Iran in negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran continues to arm rogue regimes and terrorist groups in blatant violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1747. Such aggressive behavior on the part of Iran in support of terrorist groups and rogue regimes highlights a critical shortcoming of current international sanctions on Iran. In the latest case, last week, the Israeli Navy intercepted the Francop, a vessel carrying five hundred tons of weapons, including thousands of mortar shells and long range rockets believed to be bound for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israeli officials released photographs of Katyusha rockets seized last week by UNIFIL forces in Lebanon that are the same make as those seized on board the Francop. According to U.S. officials, the arms shipment was “clearly manifested from Iran to Syria” in violation of a March 2007 UN arms embargo and provides “unambiguous evidence of the destabilizing proliferation of arms in the region.”

It is high time to back up the tough talk with action. The good news is that there are ways to effectively disrupt Iran’s international weapons smuggling. The question is whether the Francop episode will provide the political impetus for the international community to take action. Previous cases of Iranian arms smuggling prompted no such action.

Indeed, the Francop is just the most recent Iranian violation of UNSCR 1747’s ban on Iranian weapons trafficking. In January, the U.S. Navy stopped another vessel, the Monchegorsk, while it was transiting the Red Sea en route to Syria with components for mortars and thousands of cases of powder, propellant, and shell casings for 125mm and 130mm guns. The Monchegorsk was chartered by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) which, just four months earlier, the Treasury Department blacklisted for its proliferation activities, noting that IRISL “facilitates the transport of cargo for UN designated proliferators” and also “falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce.”

In recent years, a number of similar incidents exposed Iranian efforts to transport military materiel and arms by sea, land, and air to allies and surrogates. During the second Palestinian Intifada, Iran helped facilitate arms shipments to Gaza through Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to Gaza (by means of floating waterproof containers) by using two civilian vessels, the Santorini, seized by Israel in May 2001, and the Calypso 2. In January 2002, Iran attempted to deliver fifty tons of weapons to the Palestinian Authority aboard the Karine A, whose shipment was seized by the Israeli Navy in the Red Sea.

During the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, Israeli intelligence charged that Iran was resupplying the Shiite movement via Turkey. Such claims gained credibility in May 2007, when a train derailed by PKK terrorists in southeastern Turkey was found to be carrying undeclared Iranian rockets and small arms destined for Syria—possibly for transshipment to Hezbollah.

Existing UN and EU legal guidelines provide the authority to take action against Iran weapons smuggling, but on their own are insufficient. In February and April 2007, the EU imposed a number of sanctions on Iran in order to implement UN Security Council decisions, including a ban on Iranian transfers of military materiel, arms, and missile technology. Similarly, Resolution 1747, adopted in March 2007, prohibited the transfer of “any arms or related materiel” by Iran, and urged UN member states not to facilitate such efforts. In addition, Resolution 1803, passed in March 2008, calls upon all states, “in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,” to inspect IRISL cargoes to and from Iran transiting their airports and seaports,” provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting [prohibited] goods.”

Getting countries to act on these authorities, however, has been sketchy at best. As these cases indicate, serious gaps exist in the available policy tools to deal with Iranian arms transfers to its allies and surrogates. To close these gaps, the United States should work with its allies on multiple levels.

For example, the EU could expand its current policy banning the sale or transfer of arms to Iran to include a ban on the purchase or transfer of arms from Iran. Indeed, only the latter actually address the export of arms. Individual countries and regional organizations both—especially in South America and South and East Asia—should adopt legislation pertaining to Iranian arms and technology transfers, to enable them to fulfill their UN and EU obligations.

Government engagement with the private sector, drawing attention to the risk of doing business with IRISL, its subsidiaries, and other banned entities, could also have a significant impact. As the U.S. Treasury noted when it designated IRISL: “Countries and firms, including customers, business partners, and maritime insurers doing business with IRISL, may be unwittingly helping the shipping line facilitate Iran’s proliferation activities.” Since then, Dutch Customs automatically label merchandise shipped by IRISL or Iran Air at the highest risk category and inspect the cargo. Last month, the United Kingdom also sanctioned IRISL, banning British firms from doing business with the Iranian shipping line.

Given Iran’s history of deceptive financial and trade activity, extra scrutiny should be given to any ship that has recently paid a call to an Iranian port. Countries should be encouraged to require ports and/or authorities to collect detailed, accurate, and complete data regarding all cargo being shipped to or through their countries (especially from risk-prone jurisdictions like Iran), to conduct rigorous risk assessments, and to proceed with actual inspections as necessary. According to press reports, the Francop docked in Egypt before it was boarded some 180 kilometers of the coast of Cyprus.

Recent events show that even as the Obama administration seeks to engage Tehran, the Islamic Republic has continued to work to undermine Western interests and to support anti-Western elements around the world, as demonstrated by its ongoing efforts to resupply Hamas and Hezbollah and assist insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Disrupting Iran’s ability to arm allies and surrogates hostile to the interests of the United States and its allies would enhance Washington’s leverage in possible negotiations with Tehran, contain Iran should such diplomatic efforts fail, and prevent Iran from contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and beyond.

From Stephen Peter Rosen and Martin Kramer

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From Gal Luft

The tragic killing of the 13 U.S. soldiers in Fort Hood by Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan is one is a string of events involving Muslim soldiers and veterans who have gone astray, raising delicate questions about the role and trustworthiness of the 3,000 Muslim soldiers in the U.S. military. The major incidents include the March 2003 attack in Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait by an American Muslim soldier, Asan Akbar, who rolled grenades into three tents where officers of the 101st Airborne’s 1st Brigade were sleeping, killing one serviceman and wounding 15; the six Islamic radicals who in May 2007 plotted to storm New Jersey’s Fort Dix Army Base with automatic weapons and execute as many soldiers as possible; and John Allen Muhammad, the Beltway Sniper, a Gulf War veteran and convert to Islam who was responsible for 16 shootings and 10 murders and who is scheduled to be executed today.

It would be inappropriate to malign or even question the loyalty of the hard-working Muslim men and women wearing the uniforms of the United States. But it would be equally irresponsible to ignore the amassing evidence that subversive and combustible elements with radical Islamic persuasion have infiltrated our military, often putting our personnel at bigger risk in their own bases than from their enemies on the battlefield.

While Muslim soldiers have served in uniforms loyally for decades, it is the rising number of Wahhabi-trained and converted Muslims that is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since Wahhabism is one of the most radical and puritan strands of Islam, the penetration of Wahhabi thinking into the ranks of the military must be treated with care.

The genesis of radical Islamic thinking within the military was in the 1990-91 Gulf War, when nearly half a million soldiers and marines were deployed in Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait and defend the oil kingdom from Saddam Hussein’s aggression. While the Saudis were adamantly opposed to any expression of religious practice by their guests, including a ban on Christmas carols, bible classes and Christian and Jewish prayers, they embarked on a well-orchestrated and generously funded effort sponsored by the Saudi government to convert as many American military members as possible to Islam.

According to General Norman Schwarzkopf’s aide Rick Francona,

Saudi officers appeared to have been directed by their senior military or religious leadership to spot and assess potential converts to Islam among American military members. Once a particular American was ‘targeted,’ […] a few Saudi military officers, including a military imam, would attempt to meet the American in either a purely social setting or at least outside of the work area. These approaches usually included fairly generous gifts and of course, literature about Islam. The gifts included expensive briefcases, pens, books and other personal items. Americans who decided to convert to Islam were rewarded handsomely […] including all expenses paid trips to Mecca, and payments as high as $30,000.

The commander of Saudi forces in the Gulf, Prince Khaled bin Sultan bragged in his memoir that more than 2,000 American troops converted to Islam through this campaign. “These Muslim troops are now the messengers of Islam in the U.S. forces,” said Dr. Abu Ameena Bilal Phillips, a Jamaican-born convert to Islam (1972) who worked during the Gulf war under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force while converting U.S. troops to Islam in his spare time. After the war, Phillips moved to the United States to “set up Islamic chapters in the U.S. Defense Department.”

Nearly two decades have passed since the Saudi conversion campaign, and most of the converts may no longer be in uniforms. But the seeds sown during the Gulf War have germinated, creating scores of radicalized Americans who are a threat to their comrades in uniforms as well as to their civilian communities.

Fort Hood’s Hasan yelled “Allahu Akbar“—Arabic for “God is Great”—just before the shooting. As Camp Pennsylvania’s killer Akbar was being led away after the incident, fellow soldiers heard him shout: “You guys are coming into our countries and you’re going to rape our women and kill our children.” Allahu Akbar, “you guys,” “our countries”—strong words which tell us that it is time to investigate what exactly happened back then in the desert and assess how serious and deep-rooted the damage is.

From Tamara Cofman Wittes

This will be my last post on MESH for the foreseeable future. On Monday I will take up new responsibilities that will take me away from the wonderful discussion that unfolds on this page. I’ll be serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, with specific policy responsibilities that include democracy and human rights (and, yes, the Middle East Partnership Initiative) along with public diplomacy.

MESH has done what some thought impossible: built a successful and well-read group blog on Middle East affairs, one that produces a sustained, relatively unpoliticized, thoughtful, and empirically grounded discussion among academics and policy analysts on the politics of the contemporary Middle East. I’ll admit that, at the start, I was skeptical about the project Stephen Peter Rosen and Martin Kramer proposed—but they convinced me to give it a try, and they, along with my excellent colleagues on this blog, have built a rich conversation that brings together multiple perspectives and disciplines in a way that is always fresh, and very often truly enlightening, even for experts in many regional policy topics. I have learned a lot here, and for that I am grateful to Stephen, Martin, and all my smart and dedicated fellow MESH members.

The associated paper series, conferences, and other activities have built on the value of this unique forum and demonstrated the payoff from continued dialogue between the ivory tower and those inside the Beltway over Middle East policy. That’s a lesson I’ll certainly bring with me into the State Department, and I look forward to reading and learning from my MESH colleagues in the months and years to come.

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From Philip Carl Salzman

“It is time for the Iranian government to decide whether it wants to focus on the past, or whether it will make the choices that will open the door to greater opportunity, prosperity, and justice for its people.”

—President Barack Obama, statement on the 30th anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, November 4, 2009

The assumption represented by the fresh statement by President Obama on Iran is that all people and peoples are the same: at heart, all people and peoples basically want the same things, basically understand the world in the same way, basically are prepared to come to terms in the same way as everyone else. This is particularly clear in the assertion that what the people of Iran seek is “universal rights.” Such a culture-free world as envisioned in this statement would make communication and agreement a lot easier. The reality, however, is that cultures do differ, and that people and peoples do not see life and existence the same way, and may disagree on goals. Iranian regime goals of Islamic and Shia domination are not secret; these are the explicit raison d’etre of the regime, not to be negotiated away to build “confidence” and a “more prosperous and productive relationship with the international community.”

Similarly this statement appears to assume that there are not real conflicts of interest between countries, or between the regimes running those countries. In this view, disagreements are basically misunderstandings, which, with good will and open communication, can be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. But power, control, and honor are gained and held only at the expense of other parties. There are winners and losers. Regimes wishing to improve their positions cannot do so by compromising with other parties. Furthermore, it is notoriously necessary in Middle Eastern despotic regimes to control the populace through confrontations with external enemies, real, imagined, or manufactured. Improving relationships with identified “enemies” is not in their interests and not on their agendas.

Finally, what good does it do to acknowledge the “powerful calls for justice” of the Iranian people when you are about to throw them under the bus by trying to make deals with the regime that is shooting them down in the street, torturing them in prisons, and executing them?

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