Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Mark T. Clark

The controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program raises more questions than it answers. Critics—and criticisms—are aplenty. These have focused on three levels: tactical (the kind of intelligence we have), strategic (understanding Iran’s intentions) and political (the fallout on U.S. and international policies in curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions). Given the recent disastrous failures of intelligence, this reversal of previous estimates also does little to restore public confidence in the intelligence process.

There are other grounds for concern about this NIE, especially the timing of its public release and whether it has inadvertently signaled a “green light” to Iran to restart or continue its nuclear weapons development program. At the very least, it will make it extremely difficult for the U.S. to reverse itself once again and muster a domestic and international consensus for diplomatic or military pressure against the Iranian program, should it be found again to have an active weapons component.

Central to the problem of this NIE is its assessment of the Iranian decision-making process. The NIE reports:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs [emphasis added].

That is to say, the Iranian leadership is a rational actor. Some combination of threats and inducements can and does alter its decision-making process in the development of its nuclear weapons program.

Raymond Ibrahim points out correctly that common sense tells us Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is very difficult for leaders in states that have nuclear weapons to understand the intense desire of non-nuclear states to acquire them. Why then this disparity between common sense and “intelligence”?

The problem may be with our understanding of “cost-benefit” analysis. While a rational actor approach may be useful for some theoretical approaches to international politics, it may actually mask or misstate the approach of human policy-makers. In fact, for the real world of decision-makers, a cost-benefit analysis oversimplifies the whole process. When it comes to acquiring nuclear weapons, it is not a simple either/or: either build or avoid building a nuclear weapon. The decisions may include how to build, whether to build on a civilian program, whether to deceive opponents in the process, and how to mask the deception.

The “cost-benefit” approach may also oversimplify nuclear deterrence. In my case study of four small nuclear powers, including Israel, India, Pakistan and the Republic of South Africa, I showed how all pursued nuclear weapons despite international opprobrium and all displayed a nuanced appreciation of the conditions under which they might actually use them (see Figure 1: Nuclear Deterrence/Threat/Use Continuum, below).

There I quoted a Pakistani nuclear strategist who indicated that “mutual suicide” could be a rational choice for Pakistan if other options were closed, further shaking our confidence in the “cost-benefit” calculus of rationality.

There are related problems in a “cost-benefit” approach to analyzing Iranian decision-making in pursuit of a nuclear arsenal: the potential for self-deception as well as strategic deception by Iran.

The self-deception comes from “mirror-imaging” how our adversaries decide policy: that is, interpreting another’s decision-making process in light of our own. Such an approach ignores the intensity of the desire an opponent may have to acquire nuclear weapons and its strategic calculus in doing so. It pays to recall the lesson of the first Gulf War, after which one Indian general concluded: “Never fight the Americans without nuclear weapons.” It is likely that Iranian decision-makers have seen and understood the very different treatment North Korea and Iraq received from the U.S., attributing it to North Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal.

Strategic deception is also possible. As in the case of the four small nuclear powers, all masked their weapons programs or hid them behind civilian nuclear energy programs. All of these states actively sought to discourage U.S. and international discovery of their weapons programs. The Soviet Union was famous for its efforts at strategic deception and perceptions management. Even tactically, we can be surprised. Indian scientists bragged at being able to spoof U.S. satellites at Pokhran the day of the first overt nuclear weapons detonations in May 1998.

The NIE has raised eyebrows for a number of reasons. But the approach it takes to understanding the decision-making calculus of Iran may be the most fundamental flaw of the estimate, one that has lead to all the other problems. When professors get it wrong, little or no harm is done. But it is a completely different matter when our best intelligence officials err. Everyone is liable to suffer.