In departing from the Philadephi corridor in 2005, the Israelis either accepted that there would be increased smuggling on (and under) the Gaza-Egypt border, or fantasized that Egypt would openly support Israel against the Palestinians. (The Israelis never summoned the nerve to do the only thing that could have ended the tunnel smuggling: clearing a greater area along the border and digging a moat. They might well have asked themselves how likely it was that the Egyptians and the PA would do that.) Instead, by turning Philadelphi over to the PA and the Egyptians (but with supposed Israeli “control” from afar via the EUBAM), the Israelis got the worst of both worlds. They had no ability to stop the traffic in Hamas and/or Iranian money, material and manpower. But, because Israel supposedly controlled all access to Gaza, world opinion held it responsible for Gaza’s misery.

The Egyptians, for whom Israel is arguably the ultimate enemy, had little incentive to cooperate with Israel. Somehow the smuggling through tunnels just couldn’t be stopped, despite some 750 Egyptian military troops (permitted by an agreed modification of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty) and Egyptian police forces. When it suited the Egyptians (for example, when they wanted Hamas to turn over a terrorist suspect), they temporarily opened the border to Hamas. Once the NIE came out, and the American threat to Iran seemed to wane, Egypt boosted cooperation with the Iranian-sponsored Hamas, even to the detriment of the PA. Most notably, Egypt permitted the exit and re-entry of Gazan “pilgrims” to Mecca, in cooperation with Hamas instead of the PA. Indeed, it is not impossible that Hamas demonstrations and the mass “breakthroughs” at the border over the last few days were coordinated with Egypt.

In retrospect, Israel might have done better to have left the border to the PA and the Egyptians when it evacuated Gaza in 2005. At least the PA might have gotten credit for the inevitable opening of the border, and it might have been able to control who crossed. Of course it is just as likely that the PA would have done no better than the Israelis working through the EUBAM. But at least Israel would not have been held responsible for “imprisoning” Gazans.

As Israeli politicians are suggesting, a new Israeli policy may include a complete separation from Gaza, with all crossings into Israel closed permanently, leaving Egypt as Gaza’s only connection to the outside world. Giving up on Gaza and sealing it off is a real alternative—as soon as the UN can make alternate provisions for bringing in humanitarian assistance through Egypt or by sea. Israelis arguably would then be freed from responsibility for Gaza.

Unlike Steven Cook, I do not think the Egyptians or the “International Community” can stick Israel with Gaza. If Israel does cut all ties with Gaza, then the likelihood of Gaza becoming a ward of Egypt is much greater than its reversion to Israeli custodianship. The Israelis, especially if they were to redirect their sea blockade to intercepting contraband rather than obstructing all commerce, would have a reasonable basis for ending all land connections with the bellicose, terrorist-run Gaza. And the Israelis could offer to send UN shipments arriving at their ports to the Israeli-Egyptian crossing point at Nizzana, a few miles south of Gaza, whence they could enter Gaza via the Egyptian-Gaza crossing point at Rafah. It is Egypt that would be stuck with the onus of isolating fellow Arabs and fellow Muslims. It is likely that Egypt would come under greater pressure than Israel to allow traffic through its border with Gaza.

But a complete separation has downsides for Israel too. Gaza would be left under the domination of Israel’s implacable enemies, and moderate Gazans, unable to re-establish economic ties with Israel, would be hostages to Hamas. And of course, Israel’s critics would still try to saddle Israel with continued responsibility for Gaza’s problems, no matter what steps Israel takes.

Finally, with regard to making Gaza viable, I suspect the physical enlargement of Gaza is a non-starter. Egypt has already, and not unreasonably, rejected outright any surrender of territory to the Gazans. It is hard to imagine a set of circumstances in which Israel could be induced to give more land to the Gazans—at least not without compensation in West Bank land, a circumstance which, if Gaza and the West Bank do become two states, also seems highly unlikely. In any event, the Gazans, given their likely natural growth, would quickly fill up any additional space allotted to them—and then require more.

James G. Lindsay is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. During 2000-2007, he served with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which carries out relief and public works projects for Palestinian refugees in the Near East. —MESH

Let’s stipulate that if the Egyptians were smarter they could have actually played the Gaza border problems to their advantage. There was a case to be made that the Egyptians could have used more border police than the Israelis were permitting and that Israel’s pressure on Gaza was driving the smuggling problem. Instead, the Egyptians chose to complain that the problems on the Gaza-Egypt border were not that bad and that the Israelis were just stirring up trouble for them in Congress. That being said, so long as the Egyptian commanders charged with securing the border were getting a cut of the smuggling proceeds, there was little chance that the Egyptians were going to do much anyway. Now that the border barrier has been breached, Egypt’s languid approach to Gaza is quickly coming to an end. From Cairo’s perspective the worst possible development—besides Hamas ruling Gaza well—is Jerusalem’s current effort to foist Gaza on Egypt.

The Egyptians are already contending with unrest in Sinai, a failed social contract, overburdened infrastructure, and the prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood. A new responsibility for Gaza’s 1.3 million Palestinians is likely to accentuate each of these problems in a variety of ways that will instill further tension and uncertainty in Egypt’s fraught political environment. As a result, Egypt’s security services are unlikely to take any chances with Gaza. Despite growing public pressure on Mubarak to do something to relieve the suffering in Gaza, the Egyptians will reseal the border. They did it in 2005 after a previous breach and they will do it again. Moreover, despite Hamas’ demands it is unlikely that there will be major changes to the way the border is administered. The Egyptians simply will not countenance changes to the status quo. There isn’t a single upside for Cairo.

Having learned their lesson, after resealing Gaza the Egyptians are likely going to work hard to ensure that the responsibility for the suffering in Gaza is squarely on the shoulders of both Jerusalem and Washington. This narrative—which has the benefit of being largely true—will, no doubt, encourage the Europeans to begin clamoring for dialogue with Hamas. It will also subject Washington to Arab demands that it either apply pressure on the Israelis or risk losing Arab support on Iran. Indeed, with Cairo and Riyadh already hedging when it comes to Tehran, Washington’s Arab allies have some leverage in this area. The United States will likely blink and force some sort of change in Israeli policy toward Gaza. There is too much at stake as the situation on the Gaza-Egypt border is, if left unattended, likely to undermine the Bush administration’s two recent regional initiatives—the “Annapolis process” and building a durable coalition against Iran (an uncertain prospect to begin with).

Once the Egyptians reseal the border, expect the Bush administration to continue to emphasize negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The administration’s position is based on the hunch that progress between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will undercut Hamas and ultimately lead the way back to the 1990s when a passage between the West Bank and Gaza seemed like a viable option. Given conditions on the ground—the situation in Gaza, continued Qassam fire, settlement building, and the political fissures in both Israel and among Palestinian factions—it is unlikely that this hoped-for progress will be realized.

So what to do about Gaza in the long run? A very good question that has very few good answers. It is hard not appreciate the creativity of both Saul B. Cohen and Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, but their plans are farfetched for two primary reasons. First, Palestinians are likely to resist the further fragmentation of their land. From their perspective, there is no such thing as a “three-state solution” as Gaza remains an integral part of any future Palestinian state. Second, Egypt is unlikely to surrender territory for the benefit of creating a Gazastan. The return of every inch of Sinai is a critical component of Egypt’s nationalist pantheon. In the Egyptian narrative, Israelis give up land for peace, Arabs do not. For Cairo, Gaza is an Israeli problem. If there is going to be a state in Gaza, then it is an Israeli responsibility, after the dispossession of the Palestinian people, to provide the territory to make it viable.

In the end, Gaza will remain in Gaza and the struggle over who can pass it off to whom will continue.

Steven A. Cook is Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. —MESH