I believe, however, that another round is highly likely, sooner or later, if only because the battle against Israel is Hezbollah’s raison d’etre. It has undoubtedly evolved into an integral part of the Lebanese political scene and is the primary provider of social services to the Shiite population, but Hezbollah is first and foremost a jihadist organization, an Iranian proxy, committed to Israel’s destruction. So another round is a matter of timing and the pretext will be found.

One of the possibilities that worries me is that the next round may take place a few years from now when Iran already has a nuclear capability, which will be an entirly different ballgame. The following is the opening paragraph of a study I recently published on the Iranian issue:

Fast forward, Lebanon, summer 2010. After four years of tenuous quiet, a rearmed Hezbollah, acting at Iran’s behest, again launches rockets into Israel. Israel, determined to deal Hezbollah a truly severe blow, counter-attacks, successfully applying the lessons of the 2006 war. Syria, greatly strengthened by its growing military alliance with Iran, concentrates forces. Iran, having thwarted all diplomatic attempts to curtail its nuclear program, announces that it has “the bomb,” hinting at Israel’s destruction. The US places its forces on alert. The Security Council convenes in emergency session. Oil prices go off the charts…

If I were writing this today, I might simply put it off by a year or two and ask whether Mubarak is still in power in Egypt, or whether an Islamic regime has taken over and also decides to join the fun and games.

It does seem likely that the Iranians wish to preserve the rocket arsenal as a massive retaliatory deterrent against Israel, to be used if and when either the United States or Israel attacks their nuclear program. Indeed, Defense Minister Barak recently stated that the rocket arsenal had been fully rebuilt and tripled in size since the 2006 war. Depending on whose estimates of the prewar arsenal one accepts, Israel’s or Nasrallah’s, that would now mean between 39,000-60,000 rockets! Having made the mistake of using it too early once, they may be more careful and hesitant to do so next time—or not.

UNIFIL makes it harder for Hezbollah to operate but is at best only a partial solution. Hezbollah has fully redeployed north of the Litani and is gradually doing so in the south as well. It appears to have fully restored its capabilities within the towns in the south—actually, far more than restored—but is limited in its ability to redeploy and build up its positions in the open areas in between, where UNIFIL patrols. Moreover, there are already signs that the contributing countries are getting tired and may reduce their forces. In any event, it does nothing to prevent the flow of arms from Syria and Iran, via the Syrian border.

Bottom line, sooner or later, Lebanon will continue to be a source of joy for the peoples of the Middle East and beyond.

Chuck Freilich, former Israeli deputy national security adviser, is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Nevertheless, given Hezbollah’’s track record, retaliation against Israel seems a foregone conclusion. Earlier this week, Israeli intelligence chief Amos Yadlin said as much. But what kind of target will Hezbollah choose? Is it realistic to expect that Hezbollah can “calibrate” its attack so that it demonstrates what it considers to be an appropriate response to the killing of Mughniyah—one of the organization’s’ top three all-time martyrs—while at the same not provoking another war with Israel?

Although neither Israel nor Hezbollah necessarily wants another war, it’’s going to be difficult for Hezbollah, after it retaliates, to avoid what Michael refers to as “unmanageable escalation in Lebanon.” Indeed, one only has to look to the 2006 war for the last time things spun out of control. Sincere or not, it’’s useful to recall Nasrallah’’s televised “apology” of August 2006:

“The party leadership never expected a response on such an unprecedented scale and volume [by Israel]. Had we known that what we did would lead to this, we would certainly not have embarked upon it.”

The miscalculation, of course, was that the routine kidnapping of IDF soldiers—something that in the past more likely would have resulted in a more measured response—just happened to occur when Israel was fighting another war in Gaza. Some conditions have changed, but many of the variables remain the same: Israel still sees itself in a war with Hamas in Gaza.

For all of these reasons, and others mentioned by Michael and Andrew, I think a return to fighting is likely. But we’ll have to wait at least another three weeks or so until the end Mughniyah’’s arba’in (forty days of mourning) to find out.

David Schenker is a member of MESH.

There are a few things worth highlighting, however, that Michael did not mention. On the Israeli side, the appointment of Gabi Ashkenazi—arguably the senior commander in the IDF with the most experience in southern Lebanon—was taken by many to be a sign that Israel was preparing for another round of fighting sooner rather than later. But just as surely as an IDF led by Gen. Ashkenazi would be better prepared to fight in southern Lebanon, someone with the general’s experience might be much more reluctant to embark upon a large ground offensive deep into the heart of the country from which he withdrew the IDF in 2000. Perhaps more than any other senior Israeli leader, Gen. Ashkenazi knows well the difficulties involved with large-scale operations in Lebanon.

In southern Lebanon, the addition of roughly 11,000 more troops to UNIFIL also changes the battlefield geometry. Analysts worry that UNIFIL’s mandate is too weak to effectively prevent another conflict, but they forget that Lebanon south of the Litani River is not a particularly large area. One of the things that has struck me in two visits south of the Litani River since the 2006 war has been how ubiquitous UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army have become. 13,000 UN peace-keepers—plus soldiers from the newly deployed Lebanese Army—take up a lot of space, and their presence must be accounted for in the plans of both Hezbollah and the IDF. In the event of full-scale conflict, it’s entirely possible that both Hezbollah and the IDF will simply fight though or around UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army. But regardless, they present a significant obstacle for commanders on both sides that was not present in 2006.

And finally, I have previously written about Hezbollah’s preparations north of the Litani River to which Michael alluded. I suspect—but cannot be sure, of course—that these positions north of the Litani are either meant to shield some of Hezbollah’s medium- and long-range rockets (which the Israel Air Force largely neutralized in the opening days of the 2006 war) or, more likely, are meant to deny Israeli armor columns a key axis of advance into the southern Bekaa Valley.

What is most curious about these Hezbollah positions, however, is why Hezbollah—in both 2006 and in its preparations for a new round of fighting—is largely organizing conventional defenses in the face of a threat from the IDF. Military analysts are always confused when groups that have previously enjoyed success in guerrilla warfare—such as the Irish in 1919-21 or the Algerians in 1954-62—feel the need to abandon guerrilla tactics and organize conventionally, even if they cannot hope to match their enemies in conventional strength.

Finally, if you had asked me on July 11, 2006 whether or not I thought there was going to be a war in southern Lebanon that summer, I would have answered no, and I would have been wrong. Along the same lines, although I agree that war is unlikely anytime soon, I can’t bring myself to rule out the possibility. I think we are all waiting to see what the aftershocks of Imad Mughniyah’s assassination will be, and Michael Young is wise to consider the possibility that another war might not take the shape of the war of 2006. It could be something much different. What is sure, though, is that it can only result in more suffering for both the people of Israel and Hezbollah’s Shia constituents.

Andrew Exum is a member of MESH.