Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Harvey Sicherman

The Winograd Report has confirmed what I heard on a trip to Israel in August 2006, namely, that an inexperienced Israeli cabinet sought the rewards of a combined arms (air-ground) operation at the risk of an air raid. When this proved inadequate to the rhetoric of victory, the same group bungled the transition to an inferior infantry action and then ran out of time. In the end Israel got only the benefits of the air raid. And the politicians (perhaps) learned the timeless lesson that excessive rhetoric supported by underwhelming force is a sure formula for disaster. Jerusalem may not be the only place in need of that lesson.

It seems to me, however, that the crucial problem we all need to tackle is the strategy revealed in Lebanon. How do you defeat a well-trained enemy using some civilians as shields and other civilians as targets? Even precise firepower will still kill many civilians. And a careful infantry operation will risk many soldiers.

Current Israeli strategy is to wage a select war of attrition against the Hamas command and leadership ranks while exacting a penalty (the economic blockade) against a population partial to the terrorists. This produces its own pressures. As the recent Gaza blowout shows, Hamas’ reaction will be to escalate while offering a cease-fire intended to enable them to consolidate until they are ready for the next round. It is not clear that Israel’s government and population have the patience to play this game, especially if more accurate rocket fire affects more of the country. This would return Israel to the 1953-56 situation when Fedayeen raids from Gaza, among other places, made the south unsafe. And, insofar as this tactic succeeds, the wet noodle that is the Palestinian Authority will be further enfeebled in fulfilling its pledges and negotiating a diplomatic settlement. People go with the strong horse, as Osama bin Laden once observed.

Israel will then be left with the alternative of firepower and infantry.

Israel, the United States, NATO, and, indeed, the Western democracies as a whole must find a solution to the “shield and target” problem. Otherwise, we shall find the Iranian and other forces throughout the region gaining ground and adherents. None of our diplomacy will matter except perhaps as a smokescreen for defeat. The United States and others, of course, can always withdraw to other places. Israel cannot.